Note no. 210	21. 01. 2004
NEPAL: The King makes yet another move to get the political parties together: Update 40 by Dr. S. Chandrasekharan After a long pause, the King has again taken the initiative to bring all the political parties to reach a consensus for national government as a prelude to deal with the Maoist problem and perhaps ultimately conduct the general elections for the restoration of status quo ante. The five agitating parties are still belligerent and continue to hold on together but differences have surfaced among them. Madhav Nepal of UML has proposed a kind of a road map to solve the present crisis while the Nepali Congress of Girija Prasad Koirala continued to harp on a non starter- the restoration of Parliament. The King while conveying his concerns about the failure of the political parties to arrive at a consensus, has himself proposed a seven point programme to solve the current political impasse. The NSP ( Nepal Sadhbavana Party) in a surprise statement on 19th of this month has welcomed the proposal of the King as a ‘positive step’ in rescuing the country from the prevailing uncertainties. All in all, except for Girija Koirala, the King and the rest of the political parties are seriously trying to come to grips with the current situation and find a way out. The King meets the political leaders individually: It all started with the visit of Christina Rocca (US Assistant Secretary for South Asia Affairs) to Nepal in the third week of December last year. A detailed briefing given to her by the Director of Military operations given to her on 16 December is given as an appendix to the update after the one detailing the incidents relating to Maoist activities since the last update. It is understood that Christina Rocca made a case that there could be no military solution ( despite the rosy picture drawn by the Director of Military operations in his briefing) and that the political parties will have to be taken on board in finding a solution to the current problems. Madhav Nepal of UML met the King on 2nd January and though he would not say whether  the meeting was positive or not, he probably briefed the King on the outcome of the meeting he had with the Maoist leaders in Lucknow recently. The same day, the King had also met the two ministers of the government Dr. P.C.Lohani and Kamal Thapa. Later in the day he met Sher Bahadur Deuba former Prime minister and leader of Nepali Congress (democratic). The King had also talks with two other former Prime ministers Kirti Nidhi Bista and Lokendra Bahadur Chand besides Pasupathi Samsher Rana the leader of the RPP. The speaker of the Parliament Ranabhat was also called in. Girija Prasad Koirala was the last to meet the King on 6th Jan. and according to Koirala, he impressed on the King the need to reactivate the constitutional process. He continued on his pet theme of revival of the Parliament as the only way to resurrect the "now derailed constitutional process." In all his talks with the political leaders the King came up with a seven-point agenda for the consideration of the agitating parties and these were Consensus on national issues Peace & Security Curbing of Corruption People oriented system of governance National Unity People represented elections An all party consensus government. Individually, all these points are relevant, but the key to resolving the current political crisis lies in point 7- the formation of an all party government. Except for the Sadhbavana party, no other party has whole heartedly supported the King’s proposals. Madhav Nepal and his road map: Soon after meeting the King, Madhav Nepal of UML convened a Central Committee meeting and presented a ten-point proposal for the removal of the present government to form an all party government which would then hold talks with the Maoists. These proposals are a significant shift from the earlier combined stand of the five agitating political parties and these do not call for restoration of Parliament, a pet theme of Girija Koirala. What is more important is that the proposals envisage an interim government comprising the Maoists also. Formation of an all party government is also a point made out by the King as this is one of the seven points in the agenda given out to the political parties but the flip side is that the proposals include a "new constitution" to be approved by an elected parliament. The various steps brought out in the report sequentially are Sacking of the present Thapa government Formation of an all party government from among the political parties represented in the dissolved parliament. Making a forward-looking agenda for action and initiate talks with the Maoists. Convening of a round table conference of all political parties and the Maoists and an agreement to be reached for a new constitution Formation of an interim government that includes the Maoists. conduct the parliamentary elections. The new parliament thus formed  could pave the way for approval for drafting an entirely new constitution to be implemented and preceded by the scrapping of the 1990 constitution Finally disbandment and disposal of arms of Maoist militia  if need be with the help of the United Nations agencies. Though the proposal has received positive response from some politicians and the media, this appears to be a road map to nowhere for the following reasons. If the proposals were meant to be an improvement on the gains made in the 1990 constitution, then the two strong pillars on which that constitution rests namely constitutional monarchy and multi party democracy should have been clearly mentioned and a commitment made. It is not so. Disbandment and disposal ( no mention is made of disarming) is the last step. What happens if the Maoists refuse to put their arms down? This is quite possible in the event of the Maoists not gaining sufficient legislative strength in the elections. On the other hand, the proposals take care of all the demands of the Maoists without any quid pro quo from their side? In the present situation where the democratic groups are confined to the district headquarters and towns and the Maoists having their presence in all the villages, there will be no level playing field for all the parties participating in the elections. From the way the UML took all the leftist groups to meet Prachanda at a hotel in Siliguri some time ago and his recent meeting with him gives the impression that an organic nexus continues between the UML and the Maoists. It is time that Nepali Congress wakes up: G.P.Koirala should by now have realised that his party is not only getting isolated but getting alienated from all sides- from the other parties, the people and the King. If he continues to be intransigent, the loss will not be to the Nepali Congress alone but also to the cause of democracy itself for which no other party has struggled and suffered so much as he and his colleagues had done. His deputy, Ramachandra Paudel who talks unceasingly of struggle against October 4 recession, should remember his student days and the suffering he and his student colleagues had during the agitation leading to 1990 revolution. It is time to move on for the Nepali Congress lest history blame G.P.Koirala in particular for destroying democracy in Nepal. A list of incidents since the last update is given as an appendix . At the time of writing a major operation by the security forces is going on in Jajarkot and for the first time, air attacks have taken place. It is believed that some top leaders of Maoists are caught up in the skirmishes. Appendix 1 Incidents January 2004  3              A two-days general strike was called by the rebels in three central districts. At least three soldiers were killed and over a dozen were injured in a Maoist-laid ambush in Jalbire area of the Narayangadh-Kathmandu highway. 4              Maoists shot dead two government employees in Rautahat.  Five soldiers of Rudradhoj Company were hurt in a Maoist-laid ambush along the Pathlaiya-Nijgadh section of the Mahendra Highway in the bordering areas of Bara and Parsa.  Maoists have abducted three ex-Kamaiyas or bonded labourers from the western district of Banke. 5.        Maoists wounded 10 security personnel and abducted 3 more from  Khotang 6              Maoists shot dead policeman Chandra Bahadur Karki in Tetaria village of Morang. 11            In Udaypur a soldier Raju Rana was killed during security operations in Limbatar village. 12.           Maoists robbed over Rs. 1.1 million from a bank and an NEA counter    in Pokhara and Itahari respectively 13            One policeman was killed and two more were injured during the encounter with Maoists in Dhanusha. 14            In Parbat Maoists brutally murdered Nepali Congress activist Hari Dutta Tiwari in Shankar Pokhari VDC with an axe. 15            A group of suspected Maoists shot dead the Mayor of Birgunj, Gopal Giri.  They ambushed a soldier to death and injured two more security personnel in Chaimali VDC in Kathmandu.  In Rautahat, Maoists burnt a passenger bus ( Na 2 Kha 8453 ) during a strike called by the rebels. Maoist rebels shot a police constable Lalit Kunwar in Tikapur VDC, Kailali. 16            A soldier and two civilians were killed near Salleri  in Dhankuta. 17            The Maoist ultras killed a teacher in Morang’s Govindpur-4.  Appendix 2 BRIEF TO US ASSISTANT SECRETARY OF STATE 1. Your Excellency Assistant Secretary of State Ms Christina Rocca, Your Excellency the Ambassador and members of the entourage  2. As the Director General of Military Operations of Royal Nepalese Army, I would like to take this opportunity to welcome you all once again at our Army Headquarters. It's my privilege to give you a short brief on  Ø An overview of RNA Ø Current Maoist situation in Nepal Ø HMG and SF's Strategy Ø Concept of Unified Command Ø Civic, Peace and Development Mobilization Ø Disarmament Demobilization and Reintegration Ø Human Rights Situation and Ø Potential Areas of US Govt Assistance.  Royal Nepalese Army 3. The current organization of Royal Nepalese Army comprises of three infantry divisions, including nine infantry brigades with supporting arms and services and one Valley Divisions, which looks after the security of the Kathmandu Valley, The uniqueness of our organization is characterized by the presence of independent rifle companies, directly under command of the infantry brigades, which in turn, reflects the realities of terrain, tactics and command and control procedures, Similarly, one infantry battalion might be deployed with  rifle companies spread over a large area, At present the total strength of the  Royal Nepalese Army is 72000. Presently the Nepal Police and Armed Police Forces  are operating jointly with Royal Nepalese Army to counter the Maoist insurgent  and terrorist activities.   Maoist Insurgency   4. Background, Communist movement has started in Nepal as early in 1954 AD. Since then it has splitted into various factions and also united During 1970-72 AD there was a violent uprising in the eastern part of Nepal by Communist Party of Nepal (Marxist and Lennist) called Naxalbadi Movement which was suppressed. In 1990-91 the Samyukta Janamorcha Party (United People's Front) a communist group led by Babu Ram Bhattarai had contested election and had won 9 scats in Parliament in 1996 one of the dissatisfied group of this party with other radical communist groups had submitted a 40 points demand to the government then led by Prime Minister Sher Bahadur Deuva. As this group felt ignored by the government, they announced their so called Peoples' War to overthrow the existing political system. Since then the eight years of Maoist insurgency has become an issue of serious concern to all Nepalese people. During the period of this eight years more than 10000 people including security forces have been killed. They have destroyed a number of development infrastructures and mostly the rural work force of energetic youths have been fleeing the country. Due to the security reasons most of the socio-economic development has also come to stagnant.    5. The Maoist had come for the first peace talks in August 2001 but broke away unilaterally on Nov 2001 and for the first time they attacked army garrisons, as a result of which the government had to declare a state of emergency and mobilized the army. After relentless military, political, and international pressure, the Maoist again  declared a ceasefire on 29 January 2003 an came forward for three rounds of peace talks after which once again they broke away from it on 27th August 2003. Now they gave started their violent activities once again to include assassination of senior political security forces & other government officials. It is considered that Maoist's recent unsuccessful attack on two bases of Armed Police Force in Western Nepal resulting in heavy casualties has caused them a serious set back. In order to reorganize and strengthen their organization the Maoist Supremo Prachanda has recently issued a press statement attempting to gain sympathy from public as well as from lower ranks of security forces.   6. During the period of last cease-fire Maoist continued their activities of extortion, kidnapping, murdering of  security personnel and civilian. Maoists had extensively used that period to fulfill  their following objectives:   a) Put forward their uncompromising demands. b) Set conditions to release maximum numbers of their imprisoned cadres. c) Interact with civil society, political parties and civil population at large to exert influence. At the same time they persuaded leftist intellectuals to advocate for constitutional assembly. d) Collect as much war materials as possible, recruit and train maximum number of guerillas to include child soldiers and expand their organization. e) Organise mass rallies, demonstration and mass procession by own party of participate in rallies organized by other parties or groups. f) Hold meetings with foreign diplomats to exert won propaganda in order to erase their tarnished image and to prevent international meddling in the internal matters of the nation. g) Pressurize to stop external assistance extended especially by the UK and USA. In this regard, recently they have stated that they will prevent US assisted programs in Nepal to function. h) Contact and influence high-ranking military and police personnel, so that they can be useful in the future.   7. Maoists have been successful in all the above-mentioned goals except gaining support from foreign diplomats, preventing  international support, and influencing high ranking security forces personnel.   Maoist Current Activities   8.  Currently Maoist terrorist are conducting following activities:   a) Sabotage of government and civilian properties. b) Assassination of security forces, political, & other high ranking officials c) Urban terrorism (so-called urban guerilla warfare) d) Carry out extortion e) Attack soft targets (lightly held police posts, check points) f) Ambushes (they say that would be carrying out 150 to 300 ambushes at a time along terrain belt.) g) Carry out so-called decentralized operations and strengthen for centralized ops.  Maoist's Current Strategy   9. Establishment of bases in rural areas in order to encircle the towns and cities and finally encircle Kathmandu valley. For this they are carrying out ambushes and other terrorist activities along the Terrain belt and strengthening their organization.  10. The Maoist's likely game plan can be summarized as follows :   a) Form government or gain power through round table conference, interim government and constitutional assembly, and run government for 5 years, b) After 5 years, organize constitutional assembly and contest for elections. c) During a period of ten years, organize and concentrate all dispersed cadres of so-called Peoples Army and Maoist activists. d) Once power is consolidated in both political and military fronts openly challenge the security forces. e) Simultaneously organize fronts for the democratic revolution f) In the mean time some elements of so-called Peoples Army would continue to remain in the jungle while the party consolidates itself.   11. As far the political scenario is concerned. There are five key players involved in the process :   a) Firstly, HMG of Nepal wants to preserve multiparty democracy constitutional monarchy, and an improved and stable law and order situation. b) Whereas the Maoist want to continue the struggle with the support of other parties pursue their strategy of negotiation/ struggle, and pursue for constitutional assembly. c) The main political parties are not willing to cooperate with the Maoist as their existence and power may be at risk, they feel the government has forfeited their rights, and they want the parliament to be reinstated. For this they have been carrying our political agitation and as of lately have added further demands. d) The civil society at large wants peace and stability. e) Finally the international community wants a peaceful resolution of the conflict in accordance to the constitution and want to assist in peace building in Nepal.   12. At present the government of Nepal, the civil society, and the international community seem to be in the same grid.  13. I Would like to present the following assessment :   a) Although Maoist have hinted that they do not oppose a constitutional monarchy, the activities and the voice of their senior level leadership do not point in that direction. b) National and international pressure forced the Maoist for a safe landing, but because of their unreasonable demand of constitutional assembly it could not succeed. c) The Maoist seemed in a position not to deviate from their demand of constitutional assembly while the HMG is not in a position to grant the same. d) Some amount of flexibility from the Maoist does not negate the fact that their current strategy and organization will be a constant threat to the democratic political system, constitutional monarchy, and the nation at large. e) Once the Maoist political and military capability is completely degraded, and then only Govt. should look into granting them a safe landing. f) At present the only way to show government's credibility is providing population oriented and effective governance as well as strengthening the Security Force and their effective mobilization.   Your Excellency, now we would like to show few clips about Maoist activities.   14. HMG of Nepal is always destined to resolve the issue through political means rather that the use of force. Which however would depend on the Maoist themselves.   HMG's Strategy   15. In order to tackle the Maoist problem HMG of Nepal has formulated a strategy that encompasses all elements of national power to include political, economic, information and diplomatic activities. This strategy came in the form of Civil-Military National Campaign Plan. The grand strategic objectives of the plan are as follows :   a) Deter and defeat the Maoist military capability b) Protect multiparty democracy & constitutional monarchy c) Create a secure environment conducive  the conduct of local and general elections. d) Implement policies and measures for effective governance.   Strategy of CMNCP   (16) The strategies of civil-Military National campaign Plan are as follows:   Ø Conduct relentless operation against the Maoist to disarm them in order to stop violence and terrorism. Ø Negotiate with the Maoist only once their military capability is reduced considerably or if they agree to abide by the present constitution. Ø Enhance the credibility of the monarchy. Ø Provide fair and effective governance. Ø Continuously seek support and cooperation of the other political parties. Ø Continuously seek faith and support of the  citizens. Ø Disarmament, Demobilization, Reintegration. Ø Seek the support and cooperation of the international community, civil society and media.   Concept of security:   17. The concept of security in the Civil-Military National Campaign are as follows:   Ø Civil Military National Campaign Plan will remain the basis of our strategy to counter the Maoist insurgency. Ø Mobilize security forces in accordance with the Unified Command Concept. Ø Relocate and reinforce security bases inline either the present strategically, political, and geographical realities. Ø Increase the strength of the security forces and equip them. Ø Enhance the intelligence system. Ø Establish Civic Peace& Development Mobilization committee under the chairmanship of prime Minister.   CMNCP Desired End State :   18. The desired end state of CMNCP at Strategic Level is Long term peace and security under multiparty democracy and constitutional monarchy and at Operational level is to defeat Maoist military capability.   Maoist desired End state:   19. The Maoist's Strategic End State is to establish a Republican stand and at Operational level establishment of so-called people's Army.   Centre Gravity:   20. In the Campaign  Plan, the  centre of gravity of the HMG of Nepal as ascertained as follows:   Ø Strategic Level – Popular Support Ø Operational Level – Military capabilities.   21. In the campaign plan, the possible centre of gravity of the Maoist was ascertained as follows:   Ø Strategic Level- Political and military command and control. Ø Operational Level- Military capabilities.   22. The basic elements that were coordinated and harmonized in the campaign plan to combat the Maoist insurgency are as follows:   Ø State political situation Ø protection of own centre of Gravity. Ø Strategic information campaign Ø Economic and social development.   Security Forces Concept of Operations (2060)   23. Interest : To bring the Maoist to the political mainstream the RNA with other security Forces will carryout offensive operations to deter & defeat Maoist militarily capability. 3 key objectives will be achieved through this, Ø Maintenance of peace and security. Ø Destruction of Maoist military capabilities Ø Force the Maoist to come under the umbrella of the present Constitution.   24. Method: The SF will continue to be mobilized throughout the nation to exhibit government presence. protect its bases, & launch major  offensives   25. Measure of success : The Maoist military capability is defeated whereby that commit themselves to the political mainstream & come to the negotiation table.   26. Security forces Operations : Security Forces will be carrying out following operations  Ø Offensive Ops (Ambushes. raid of hide outs/trg camps, cordon and search etc) Ø Show of Force Ø Border Ops Ø Securing Lines of Communications and VAs/VPs Ø Prevent Acts of Terrorism Ø Humanitarian Assistance Ø Hearts & Minds Campaign Ø Information & Psychological Operations Ø Population and Resources control. Ø Contingency planning   Unified Command :   27. Concept of Unified Command is to Ø Gain optimum use of capabilities and resources of various security Forces (SF) Ø This is not to merge the identify of individual security Force Ø It will be effective from the central level to the district level. Ø It encompasses RNA,APF,CIVPOL & NID. Ø RNA will have operational control other forces coming under unified command. Ø With joint effort and single chain of command it will have the effect of force multiplier.   Legal Provision :   28. Formulation of Unified command is not an all of sudden act. it was considered 2-3 years before, Due to the current situation and requirement if has become an integral part of HMG's Civil- Military National campaign plan,   Ø In September 2001- HMG had decided to mobilize CIVPOL under RNA control to combat Maoist insurgency. Ø In November 2002- HMG had decided to train 10000 VIVPOL to be trained by the RNA & mobilized under its operational control. Ø APF Act 2002- States that AFP will come under OPs Control of RNA when RNA is mobilized. Ø HMG has decided to mobilize RNA till Feb,2004 which may or may not be extended depends on the situation.   Strategy of Unified Command:   29. In accordance to CMNCP HMG has decide to form up the unified command with our security agencies namely the RNA, CIV POL, APF and NID. The current time plan of the unified command is for one year and it will be revised after every six month. There will be a coordination mechanism at national, regional and district level. For command and control at national level there is a Minister delegated by HMG who acts on the directives issued by HMG. The COAS has overall authority over security forces operations. At regional & District Administrator (civilian govt official) and the Army Division commander mobilizes security forces in respective area of operations. Div Cdr Army relocate, strengthen, and withdraw troops from basses on the recommendation of Regional Administrator.   Civic Peace & Development Mobilization Committee:   30. In recent past there were instances where the local population of certain areas had resisted the Maoist atrocities and drove them away, now they feel insecure for any reprisals and requested the provision for security. Considering the situation and importance of pacifying the Maoist from the population, the government has decided to help those villages in terms of security and other supports from the security force. For this the basic conditions identified are as follows: Ø Participation by all Political Parties & Civil Society Ø Use of Retired security forces personnel. Ø Mobilize locals to deter Maoist threats Ø Coordinate development activities Ø Morale, logistic & training support from security Forces.   31. For this there will be coordination bodies at central, Regional and District level.   32. Organization As shown in the slide.   33. Planned Sequence of Action:   The planned sequence of action of this scheme is as follows:   Ø Phase 1- Preparation Ø Phase 2- Execution Ø Phase 3- Monitoring Ø Phase 4- Conduct of local development.   34. Role of security forces : the role of security forces in civic peace & Development Mobilization are as follows:  Ø Advisory role to the committee. Ø Security training of local volunteer personnel. Ø Reinforce local security team if required Ø Sharing of information Ø Planning of military civic action.   Disarmament Demobilization Reintegration (DDR)   35. Objectives: Obtain peacefully weapons from armed Maoist militant and encourage them to live a peaceful life thereby nullifying Maoist's terrorist activists.   36. Strategy of DDR:   Ø Provided monetary assistance to Maoist surrendering with weapons. Ø Ensure physical security of the surrendered. Ø Provision appropriate opportunities for economic security. Ø Discard previous legal suits against such surrounding militants.  37. Targets of DDR Program:  Ø NCP (Maoist) guerillas and militias Ø Active cadres of NCP (Maoist)   38. Desired End State of DDR:   Ø Disarming of armed militant so that peace and security prevails. Ø Recovery of looted arms and ammunition of security forces.   39. DDR Program:   Ø Monetary assistance for weapons. Ø Ensured physical security   O Local security base O Rehabilitation center O Community rehabilitation center. O Economic security   40. Organization: As shown in the slide.   41. Resources : Essential resources required to implement the DDR programme are planned to be fulfilled from following respective sources:   National -Benefit for surrendered with weapons -Expenses for local security base -Running of rehabilitation center.   International /Foreign: -Skill development training in rehabilitation centers -Assistance for self-income generation schemes. -Community rehabilitation. -Publicity   Human Rights Situation:   42. After declaring the state of emergency in 23 November 2001 army was mobilized to center the Maoist insurgency. Consequently the RNA had established a cell responsible to monitor and investigate possible violations of human rights by the security forces while operating against the Maoist. At the AHQ it is organized under the Adjutant General and coordinated by the Deputy Judge Advocate General. There are Human Rights cell in each Division HQ also. These cells are responsible for training and dissemination of information regarding human rights and also conduct investigation on any type of human rights abuses by the security forces personnel.   43. In pacifying the Maoist problem our forces has always remained committed to democratic practices & international humanitarian law. In this regard our forces are especially instructed to use minimum force, avoid collateral damage, as well as avoid at all costs human rights abuses. For this particular issue, at all level of our command structure, we have established a mechanism to educate & monitor human rights issues. Those found committing human rights abuses have been reprimanded accordingly ( there are 13 instances of punish in security forces personnel as per the provision of the law of the land who were found in committing the human rights abuses). But let me assure you that there has been no illegal detention, extra judicial killings, torture, or rape carried out by the security Forces as alleged by the various human rights group. There may have been some collateral damages which we always instruct our troops to minimize by being judicious in the use of force, in isolated cases some of our troops have committed mistakes for which they have been duly punished. We are still finalizing our investigation of the killings at Doramba and the School in Doti. Once the reports are finalized, we will make sure if anyone is found guilty, they will be penalized accordingly, to make everything transparent, we have allowed the ICRC to visit all of our camps to see the conditions of the delaines and have always interacted with their representatives at all level.   44. The only irony is why the national and international human rights activities make a big hue and cry if the security force commits a small mistake but remains almost mum on the atrocities committed by the Maoist in the form of recruiting school children, prevent schools from functioning, extorting money and security personnel. Indiscriminate bombings, and there are lots of more. This has to be carefully looked into. It is of grave concern to us that some of the international community seems to be supporting the Maoist rather than the government.   USG Assistance:   45. In regard to the US Gvt. assistance to HMG of Nepal and the RNA, it has been of a great value for us, I on behalf of RNA would like to express our heartiest gratitude to the government of the united states for providing us the political, morale, and material support to counter the Maoist problem without which we may not have reached this far, considering the current situation and also the future we seek following assistance from the government of the US which will help us to enhance the capabilities of the RNA.  Ø Weapons and equipments through the Foreign Military Financing to be expedited. Ø Trainings for counter terrorism and insurgency to be continued.   Ø Means of aerial mobility: Due to our rugged terrain and lack of infrastructure, our mobility has been greatly hampered. Therefore we urgently require some transport helicopters, which will greatly enhance our operational mobility.   Ø Surveillance equipment: In order to target the command and control system of the Maoists, we have been severely limited in terms of surveillance equipment and training. It this support can be provided it will be possible to target their political leadership in the very near future. Ø Night vision equipments Ø Technical and financial support for Rehabilitation, Reintegration, Reconstruction and Reconciliation.   46. On closing the RNA believes that Maoist insurgency in Nepal can be solved by political dialogue  rather than the use of force only. For this all elements of national power are to be coordinated and of course the continuous support from all friendly nationals in the forms of political, military, moral and also material assistances are highly appreciated and we are grateful for that. I hope the briefing we did was enough to highlight why the continued support from the United States and the international community is crucial for the effort to bring about peace and stability in Nepal.   We are sure one day we'll have peace again.   47. Your Excellency now should you have any query I would be happy to answer them.
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