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Note no. 220
20. 04. 2004
SRI LANKA: Post Election Scenario- Update 63.
by Dr. S. Chandrasekharan
The United People’s Freedom Alliance (UPFA) was able to manage the support of only one candidate from the non UPFA members, making it a total of 106 seats in an assembly of 225. The lone member of EPDP who joined the government has been made a cabinet minister!
Thus, for all practical purposes, the UPFA government now in place is a minority government. It could get outside support of Buddhist Monks’ Party JHU which has nine seats, but it is going to be at a price which we will see.
The outgoing Prime minister Wickremasinghe has already said that a minority government will be a danger to the continuity of peace process with the LTTE (news conference on 5 April at Colombo). His view was that a party with no absolute majority would find it difficult to take control of the peace process and make it move forward. Had he, on the other hand said that his party though now in opposition would strive hard to help the government in moving forward with the peace process initiated by his party (UNP), it would have been a statesman like gesture. But statesmanship appears to be a rare commodity in Sri Lankan politics!
LTTE’s Reaction:
It is important to see how the LTTE has reacted to the elections results. Two points look ominous.
First, the LTTE has perceived the election of 22 MPS of TNA from the north east ( leaving only one seat for the EPDP) as a "clear message that the concept of Tamil Home Land, Tamil Nationalism and the right for Tamil self rule should be accepted as the basic aspirations of the Tamil people and that the Tamil National problem should be politically resolved on that basis." In the official communique the LTTE had also warned that if the Tamil National problem is not solved on that basis, the Tamil people will fight to establish the Tamil sovereignty in their home land on the principle of self determination. In other words, the Tamils have endorsed the "Thimpu principles" and if these are not accepted, Eelam is inevitable!
Second and more significantly, the LTTE has compared the present results to the 1977 elections when the TULF fought the elections on the basis of "Vadukoddai resolution" that called upon all Tamils to work towards the goal of a separate state of Tamil Eelam and as a result got an overwhelming response from the Tamil people. It is said that if the Tamil mandate of 1977 to the TULF was decisive, the 2004 mandate to the TNA can be called as more decisive with the support of a committed Liberation Force of the LTTE
The TNA has emerged as the third largest party in Parliament but it is clear from their mandate as well as from the statements from the LTTE, that the TNA will not be able to take an independent view and would toe the line of the LTTE, hook, line and sinker. The first move that the TNA parliamentarians took was to go to the Peace secretariat of LTTE at Killinochi and get a briefing from the LTTE political chief Tamil Chelvam.
The Karuna Factor:
The month long confrontation between the LTTE and the rebel led Karuna faction in the east came to a surprising end with Karuna disbanding his units and leaving with some close followers to an unknown destination.
As expected (see our last update 62), on the night of 9 April, LTTE forces crossed the Verugal river both by sea and land and in the initial fight there were losses on both sides. Karuna’s faction withdrew about 15 Km. towards Batticola. It is confirmed that over 200 fighters of Karuna faction were either captured or surrendered to the LTTE forces. Some LTTE forces landed by sea both at Amparai and the former LTTE naval base at Kathiraveli and took control of the places without much of a fight.
In a matter of three days the LTTE took full control of its former bases at Meenakam, Kokkadicholai and Karadiyanaru and had regained complete control of the entire eastern region by 13 April.
The surprising feature of the whole episode was that Karuna gave up without any fight. He is said to have personally disbanded his group who numbered more than five thousand and asked them to either go over to LTTE or go back to their parents. Over 200 child soldiers who were in Karuna’s group were handed over to their parents by the LTTE amidst great publicity!
Those who had followed Karuna’s growth path, would have placed him only next to Prabakaran in the LTTE hierarchy both in leadership, fighting skills and as a strategist. He had nurtured the LTTE units in the east and made it a formidable force. In spite of a hostile Sinhala and Muslim population around and the Sri Lankan security forces, he had carved out areas in the east where he had complete control. He and his fighters were familiar with the topography and with the uneven landscape of the eastern regions he could have continued his fight even if an overwhelming force from the north had penetrated his territory.
What made him give up the fight perhaps could be that he was not willing to weaken the Tamil cause due to internal differences. Any continued fight would have weakened the LTTE and the Tamil movement in the final analysis. In the past, lack of unity amongst various Tamil groups had been the main problem. Prabakaran had by means fair and foul brought a semblance of unity of approach to the Tamil problem. Even the TNA which consists of disparate Tamil groups is now one in unison in supporting the LTTE. No one talks of political pluralism now!
The initial ferocity of the first encounter near the Verugal river must have unnerved Karuna. What has not come out in the media is that Karuna did not destroy the arms and ammunition of thousands of fighters he had. These could have been easily destroyed or dumped into the sea!
The net result of the Karuna episode is that the LTTE has become stronger and sure of its invincibility. Their approach to the peace process could only harden in the days to come. The first test will be in the discussions on the ISGA proposals of LTTE discussed in Note 202-update52.
President Chandrika’s problems:
One could say that Chandrika’s problems have only multiplied and not diminished. These are
* Of the 105 seats 40 seats belong to the JVP who in the eyes of Tamils is not only considered as anti peace process but anti Tamil also. Their opposition against any devolution to the Tamil areas is well known. With forty seats they will have considerable clout within the government. To manage the peace process with their support is going to be a difficult task.
* The Buddhist lobby is another factor which will have great influence in the governance. It is said that the first shot was fired by them when they forced Chandrika to dump her trusted and loyal Kadirgamar and appoint instead Rajapakse, a typical staunch and devout southern Buddhist who has the blessings of the Mahasangha as the prime minister.. Now the Buddhist lobby has a decisive presence in the parliament with nine seats!
* Chandrika cannot be seen to be giving any more "concessions" to the LTTE in the peace talks that would follow as her and her party’s main stand before election was that Wickremasinghe’s government had given in too much to the LTTE. She had criticised the ISGA proposals of the LTTE in very strong terms and it remains to be seen how she could find some common ground to get the interim administration in the north east going. Rehabilitation, reconstruction and development and use of the funds offered by donor countries will all depend on the progress in peace talks. This was made very clear many times by the Japanese special representative Akashi. She has to do a balancing act of showing some progress and at the same time take a stronger stand than that of her previous government on the ISGA proposals in particular and the peace process in general. It is not going to be easy.
* Finally as said earlier, the Karuna episode would only harden LTTE’s stand. The overwhelming support of Tamils to the TNA now backed fully by the LTTE, in the parliament, inside the country and internationally would only complicate the situation. Both the LTTE and the TNA perceive the election result as a mandate for upholding the Thimpu principles!
The talks may go on for a long time. But reconstruction and rehabilitation of internally displaced people cannot wait any longer. The best that Chandrika could do is to keep the cease fire going and perhaps to some extent persuade the donor countries to release funds for reconstruction and rehabilitation of war ravaged areas. The case of those persons within the High security zones particularly in the heavily populated Jaffna peninsula needs a fresh review. It does not matter whether the funds are released to the LTTE or to the Sri Lankan government. What is needed is that the people who have suffered for the last two decades get some immediate benefit.
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