Note no. 230	12. 07. 2004
SRI LANKA: Prospects of peace are fading. Update 65. by Dr. S. Chandrasekharan. Following the Kollupitiya incident in Colombo, it looks that prospects of peace are fading although both sides, the Sri Lankan Government and the LTTE have assured the Sri Lankan Monitoring mission (SLMM) that the cease fire will hold. The Kollupitiya incident and its impact: Details of the Kollupitiya incident have already been given in SAAG paper no 1051. Though the LTTE has denied its involvement (they have never admitted before in every case), its signature are all over the incident- from the identity of the suicide bomber, her associate who has since been caught, the sophisticated device used and above all the motive for targeting Douglas Devananda, the EPDP leader and a cabinet minister in President Chandrika’s cabinet. The LTTE cannot justify a violent act of this nature in an area outside their control and that too, to eliminate a cabinet minister of a government with whom they are having a cease fire agreement. This is a clear and a major violation of the cease fire agreement and surprisingly for reasons best known to them the SLMM has not so far responded to the incident. The problem with the SLMM appears to be that they do not want to say or do anything that would offend the negotiating parties that in turn may wreck the cease fire agreement causing more problems to them as facilitators. It would have been better in the beginning itself, if monitoring and facilitating had been separated with two different teams. The facilitator’s silence and their inability to control LTTE will have repercussions as law and order in the east is fast deteriorating. The SLFP and the JVP in the past and the JVP even now continue to claim that the Norwegians are not neutral in facilitating. It was thought that LTTE is slowly getting legitimised. Unlike the Sri Lankan government who seem to be adamant on the agenda for the talks, the LTTE was sweet reasonableness, pointing out the urgent need to have a mechanism to do the resettlement, reconstruction and rehabilitation in the north east. They seemed to be comfortable with democratic elections as they managed to send 22 of the 23 members ( the lone member being Devananda) to the Parliament and have been using them effectively to further their interests. A TNA delegation at their behest is expected to reach Delhi in August to meet the Indian leaders to brief them on the ISGA ( interim administration for the North east). Separately two members of Parliament were sent to Tamil Nadu to meet the political leaders sympathetic to them, to plead on their behalf for removal from terrorist list and withdrawal of extradition orders! Acts like that of Kollupitiya will not help in getting around either India or the international community. Beyond the Kollupitiya incident, the message the LTTE wants to convey to Sri Lankan government, besides going after Karuna and his supporters wherever they are, is perhaps that in the event of Tamils not getting their dues and cease fire failing, Colombo will not be spared. Douglas Devananda who has defied the LTTE and survived has not acquitted himself well in openly associating himself with Karuna. His briefing to the BBC admitting his contacts with Karuna and advising Karuna to start a political party will not go down well with LTTE. Besides being the head of EPDP, he is a cabinet minister in Chandrika’s cabinet and has certain responsibilities. When one of its own ministers is in touch, the Sri Lankan government’s position that they do not know the whereabouts of Karuna will not wash. The best way would be for the government to leave Karuna alone. Left to himself Karuna can still survive in the east and manage on his own, but we suspect that the government does not want to miss this opportunity to weaken the LTTE. The LTTE has already begun putting pressure on the Sri Lankan government to hand over Karuna. To start with, they have refused to recommence regular meetings between security forces and the LTTE to deal with the deteriorating law and order situation in the east. Tamilselvan, the political head of the LTTE told the Norwegian head of mission that "for LTTE to recommence regular meetings with SLA in Batticola-Amparai, the SLA should give up Karuna. It is only then we can trust the sincerity of the SLA in its dealings with us." The LTTE’s position is likely to get harder in the days to come and Batticola would also be experiencing more serious clashes. The Karuna affair and its impact: The assessment was that with Karuna having given up his confrontation with the "Wanni leadership"  the LTTE had regained full control of the east  It now appears that the LTTE under the leadership of Rajesh, former deputy of Karuna has not been able to gain full control of Batticola-Amparai region. Some trends that need to be noted are * When Karuna gave up his confrontation, he disbanded over four thousand of his cadres and asked them to go home. LTTE’s efforts to get them back into their group have not borne fruit. In the initial confrontation at Verugal over half the hundred and odd cadres who surrendered to LTTE were executed as a warning to others. Others out of fear are unwilling to rejoin. Sympathy for Karuna has since grown in the east. * In the initial stage Karuna escaped not with the help of the Sri Lankan security forces but with the assistance provided by an UNP MP, Ali Zahir Moulana. Ali Zahir has since resigned. . On his way from Batticola he was seen freely visiting a restaurant in Polonnaruwa. It only shows that Karuna had friends outside the LTTE in the east. * There have been a series of incidents in Batticola involving cadres of LTTE and that of Karuna. On heroes’ day one of the most serious incidents was the ambush of Senathiraja, the political chief of the town and his colleague while travelling in a motor cycle to receive the LTTE motor cade. There is one estimate that in the last two months over 40 cadres of LTTE have been eliminated. It could be more. It is also significant to note that some of the incidents have taken place in LTTE controlled areas. The media does not report attacks by LTTE cadres on alleged sympathisers of Karuna. There have been some. One gory incident was the slitting of the throat of a girl accused of being a spy of Karuna, whose body was found in a bathroom at Batticola with hands tied. The point being made here is that Batticola is going to witness more serious incidents and the security forces will not be able to control and some of the incidents would occur in LTTE controlled areas too. The Sri Lankan establishment appears to have drawn its own conclusions regarding the Karuna affair. One of the media reports gives the following reasons: * Batticola-Amparai districts are of utmost importance to the LTTE. Without these two districts, the claim of a separate Tamil Homeland of Eelam would become futile. * This would deny the claim that they are the sole representatives of the Tamil people and weaken the LTTE’s claim for ISGA. * It would deny the LTTE’s claim for a merged North and East. * It would deny fresh recruitment for LTTE as well as much needed finance. * It would give Sri Lankan forces an advantage both in recruiting strength and creating a vast intelligence base. * Continued weakening of its role in the two districts would blunt the LTTE military machine including the capability of Sea Tigers in the eastern coastal waters. * It would gradually erode the civilian support base and allow their sympathies to be won over by the Government in Colombo and the Security forces. Some points could be wishful thinking but there is no doubt that thinking in the government circles is along these lines. The assessment is that in due course of time there could be more Karunas weakening the LTTE further and so what is the hurry? The net result is that it pays the Sri Lankan government to delay the renewal of talks with the LTTE as long as possible till the balance of power shifts in favour of the security forces. The argument that the ISGA should be discussed along with talks of the core issues holds no water as the ISGA itself has certain core issues built in. The delay appears to be intentional and addressed to the domestic audience particularly the JVP. The LTTE on the other hand is desperate to get the ISGA proposals soon. The issue they considered important was the delivery of peace dividends to the people of north east as quickly as possible. Here they are already in an embarrassing position and are unable to explain to their people for the delay. Except for Killinochi with well laid roads, buildings and offices, there has been very little development in other LTTE controlled areas. Tamil areas particularly Jaffna under the control of the Sri Lankan forces are in no better condition. Challenges Ahead: There are challenges for every body, the facilitators, the Sri Lankan government, the LTTE and even Karuna. Now that Chandrika has in alliance with the JVP swept the provincial polls, she should be able to confidently discuss the ISGA proposals directly as some core issues are contained in the proposal itself. Time is also running out for LTTE and earlier they agree to start the dialogue the better it will be for them. If they are to wait till the east is stablised or Karuna is taken out, they may have to wait indefinitely. More importantly, the facilitators will have to use all their skills and persuasive powers to convince the two sides that the interests of both the parties are best served in resuming the dialogue. Discussing the IDGA does not amount to approval into, but both parties will have to understand their mutual compulsions and the need to make progress in the talks to become eligible for getting the aid promised by the donor countries.
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