Indo-Pak Imbroglio: Prospects
of resolution
by A.K.Verma
The Prime Ministers of India and
Pakistan have met at SAARC Conference in Colombo. Any number of such
meetings, between the Prime Ministers, Foreign Ministers, Foreign
Secretaries and other dignitaries from the two countries have taken place
in the past. Will the outcome of this particular meeting on any
substantive matter be any different? The answer can be given: an emphatic
"No".
The roots of the problem lie deep in the
history of both what led to the partition as well as what happened after
the partition. Pakistan was created on the basis of two-nation theory. Its
leaders have had to stick to that theory thought it is evident to everyone
that the theory could not have had any logic in it ; otherwise India
should have been partitioned again and again on the same token. In India,
a secular polity has grown on a foundation, which now stands like a rock.
No recognizable group questions its validity. Religion is getting more and
more personalized, the divisions between religion and state are becoming
bolder and bolder in relief. In Pakistan on the other hand the influence
eof religion on governance of the state is on the increase and the leaders
of the government have been seen to bend backwards to accommodate the
views of the fundamentalists. In this milieu, the two-nation theory has
stayed in place in its pristine glory in Pakistan and none can question
it.
Its immediate victim was Kashmir.
Continued adherence to the two-nation theory by Pakistan's leaders implies
that there will be no withdrawal from interference by them in Kashmir in
the foreseeable future. What can, therefore, the discussions between the
Prime Ministers of India and Pakistan during SAARC yield on this issue?
Who has the power in Pakistan to bring
about a modification in the two-nation theory? The general mass of the
people in Pakistan can be said to be not really concerned with the
question. They are more worried about problems that concern them directly
like employment, rising prices, security of life and property etc. One can
even wonder whether all of them together believe that they share the same
nationhood. Their sectarian quarrels, their linguistic rivalries and their
regional ethnonationalism do not give them enough time to reflect over the
present validity of the two nation theory. And yet the coterie, which
rules over Pakistan, acts and governs in the name of two-nation theory.
They do so under the fear that any change in this track could be used to
arouse mass disapproval against them.
Unfortunately, such fears are not based
on figments of imagination. During its 50 years if existence, Pakistan has
had leaders who were prepared to ignore the commands of two-nation theory
to come to terms with India, but they came to grief. First there was
Zulfiqar Ali Bhutto, who while negotiating the Simla agreement was
believed to have held ,but certain assurances over Kashmir. On return to
Pakistan from Simla, he did indeed make some efforts in keeping with the
assurances given, but there arose such an uproar against him that he had
to backtrack. The events that followed ultimately led to his downfall from
power and execution. Another effort somewhat on the same lines but much
broader in its sweep was believed to have been made by Gen. Zia-ul-Huq who
was both the President and Army Chief of Pakistan at the time. It was also
believed that he had obtained the support of his key military brass on his
initiative. However, before the initiative got consummated, he was killed
in an air crash. Not much came out of this initiative eventually because
those who were reported to have supported the exercise when Zia was alive
were also reported to have withdrawn their support after he died. However,
an intriguing question has remained unanswered to this day: did this
exercise have anything to do with his untimely death?
All this suggests that it is not just
the two-nation theory, which is a hurdle in the path of solving of
differences between India and Pakistan. Another hurdle of no less
consequence is the absence of a leadership in Pakistan, strong enough to
take decisive action warranted by ground realities.
Such a leadership can only emerge from
the Armed Forces of Pakistan. And for them to develop the right vision to
see clearly what is in the interest of Pakistan unburdened by the baggage
of the past the syllabi and the training manuals of the Armed Forces will
have to be rewritten in some parts. That really calls for a long-term
overhaul. It could easily take another 50 years to come about. The key
question will remain: is Pakistan ready to repudiate or a least modify the
two nation theory. True progress in Indo-Pakistan relations cannot be
achieved without such a step.
Meanwhile dialogues can go on for
whatever value, which can be gained out of them. More value will accrue if
the Pakistani military brass could be involved in these dialogues,
because, in the final analysis, it is they who have a decisive voice. This
will pose a problem for India since its military remains under civilian
control. But some equation could be considered which will enable the
civilians from India to have a word directly with the military from
Pakistan.
Another imperative to this requirement
has evolved after the recent nuclear tests on the sub-continent. In
Pakistan all developments relating to nuclear weapons and philosophy are
controlled by the military services. Civilian Prime Ministers have even
been denied information on key matters in the past. The contours of the
Pakistani nuclear military doctrine can be made out. The Pakistani nuclear
weapons have been to deter India, which is much stronger in conventional
military and weapons. No promise against first use can be given. If a
contingency arises, calling for use of nuclear weapons who will issue the
orders? Certainly not the civilians. It is the military who will decide,
not necessarily in consultation with the political people in power. And
most likely, their decision will be governed by subjective considerations
given their psychological phobias, unrealistic clinging to outdated ideas
and self-justificatory syndrome.
Is it not, therefore, advisable that a
direct line of communication is developed between the two power centres of
India and Pakistan? Ways can be found and the earlier it is done the
better it would be in the long term interests of the two countries.
(The writer is a former Secretary in
the Cabinet Secretariat.)
