Fissile Material Cut-off Treaty and
India: Part I
by Dr. S. Chandrasekharan
With the nuclear tests by India and Pakistan in
May 1998, the whole non proliferation scenario has changed. In the
negotiations leading to the Prep Com for 2000 Review conference, the
attempts of nuclear weapon powers will be to keep what they have and deny
the same privileges to the two nuclear powers that have gate crashed. The
following is a part of a series we propose to discuss FMCT and other
related issues.
After Pokharan II tests, India has formally
announced that it will participate in the negotiations for FMCT. These
negotiations will be the defining moment from India’s point of view as
that would determine India being recognised as a nuclear weapon power or
not.
The test for FMCT should be whether the treaty
would contribute towards the ultimate objective of a non discriminatory,
non proliferation regime and universal disarmament or whether it would
perpetuate the existing disparity between the nuclear and non nuclear
weapon states and among the nuclear states themselves.
Based on the December 1993 United Nations
consensus resolution (48/75L) on cutoff, the Geneva Conference on
Disarmament voted unanimously on March 23 1995, to form an Ad Hoc
committee to negotiate a multilateral, internationally and effectively
verifiable ban on the production of fissile material for nuclear weapons
or other nuclear explosive devices. The mandate expressed the conviction
that the treaty would be a "significant contribution to nuclear
non-proliferation in all its aspects". The key words in the mandate
are non discriminatory, multilateral (not universal!) and verifiable in
that order.
It has taken almost five years since the
consensus UNGA resolution in 1993 to seriously discuss and negotiate the
Fissile Material Cut-Off Treaty in the second session of the 2000 Review
Conference of the Parties to the Treaty on the Non-proliferation of
Nuclear weapons in Geneva between 27th April and May 1998. The blame for
delay in taking up the treaty is being placed at the doors of the
Non-aligned nations who have continued to press for the establishment of
an Ad Hoc committee on nuclear disarmament in tandem. The group insisted
on negotiations "on a phased programme of nuclear disarmament for the
complete elimination of nuclear weapons within a specified framework of
time, including a nuclear weapons convention".
But the fact of the matter is, that the weapon
powers are unwilling to link FMCT with other disarmament issues.
India will have to take note of not only the extent to which the cut-off
would constrain its weapons programme and its security concerns in
relation to other states particularly China but also, how intrusive the
verification programmes would be. Given a large number of un-safeguarded
reactors in India, the definition of fissile material itself will be
relevant to the negotiations.
Having taken a consistent stand towards universal
and time bound disarmament, in its present position of having conducted
nuclear tests, India’s overall approach towards universal disarmament
and linkage to time bound disarmament also needs to be reviewed.
Conceptually, the FMCT should be seen as an
instrument to prevent further vertical and horizontal proliferation of
weapons. If the primary objective is to prevent the five nuclear powers ,
two declared but unrecognised weapon powers (India and Pakistan) and the
lone threshold power (Israel) , then a treaty involving all the eight
states to stop producing fissile materials for weapon purposes would
do. But it is our view that the treaty should be seen in a larger
framework of comprehensive non proliferation regime, involving not the
production, stockpiling, management and disposal of fissile material alone
but also as a disarmament measure to fulfill the objectives of Article VI
of the NPT. This can be done only if corresponding steps are taken first
to limit and then to eliminate nuclear weapons.
A reading of papers at the Second session of the
Prep. Committee for the 2000 Review Conference at Geneva, gives the
impression that the weapon powers and their surrogates are keen to rein in
those outside the nuclear club while paying lip service to the core issue
of nuclear disarmament.
India is now in a peculiar situation where by
virtue of its tests, is a nuclear power but not recognied by the weapon
powers. It is like someone who has passed the graduate degree examination,
but told by the University that his degree will not be recognised! The non
weapon powers will not be equally at ease to accept it as a non nuclear
power anymore. To put it bluntly, the objective should be for India to get
itself accepted if not declared as a weapon power and get what the weapon
powers propose to retain for themselves in the negotiations leading to
FMCT. It will be hypocritical to continue to stress on the discriminatory
nature of the treaty once India has entered the nuclear club recognised or
unrecognised.
The fissile materials used both in nuclear
weapons and nuclear power reactors are the same-- Uranium and Plutonium.
But the useful isotope of Uranium is Uranium 235 which has to be in a
concentration of 90 percent and above for a weapon. Unlike Uranium,
Plutonium of any composition of isotopes can be used for a nuclear weapon.
In a sense, Plutonium in the nuclear reactor as a fuel, is itself a
potentially usable weapon grade material. Some experts believe that
reactor grade Plutonium produced for commercial reactors could be
fashioned into a nuclear weapon. Therefore, to carry this logic further,
any non proliferation regime that does not take into account the presence
of Plutonium in civilian reactors is neither complete nor comprehensive.
India being a non signatory to the NPT, most of
its reactors using Plutonium are not under safe guards. The FMCT cannot
become a backdoor entry to place restrictions on the civilian reactors.
A Rand Corporation study defines weapon-usable
fissile materials as Uranium with a fissile isotopic content of 20 percent
or more and Plutonium of any isotopic composition. Problems would arise
with the latter, as the fuel contained in a plutonium reactor cannot be
considered as fissile material so long as it is the reactor itself. Only
the facilities reprocessing Plutonium outside the civilian reactor could
be brought under the meaning of fissile material for the purposes of the
treaty. So will be the case with enrichment facilities for Uranium.
There is a view, that since all the weapon states
have stopped producing weapon grade fissile material now, as a first step,
a treaty legally binding the states producing the fissile materials would
be a practical attainable measure. To negotiate a comprehensive treaty,
many contentious issues like the disposal of the surplus fissile material
removed from the weapons, safety and safeguards for such material and also
of the stocks already left with the weapon powers will have to be
discussed and consensus arrived at. This is no easy task and may take many
years, if one is to judge from the five years it has taken just to form
the committee from the UNGA resolution of 1993.
The weapon states have not stopped production of
fissile materials as a genuine disarmament measure. All these states are
awash with fissile materials and they have no need for further production.
Further in the case of USA and Russia, weapon grade material removed from
the weapons are still available for reloading if necessary. Therefore,
"fissile material cut-off " is of no relevance to them.
Except for USA, no other country has come out
clearly with the details of production of fissile materials or their
disposal. In the case of China, an unrelated remark by a senior scientist
affiliated with the nuclear weapons programme to some present at the
International School on Disarmament and Research on Conflict way back in
April 1994 that China has stopped producing fissile material for nuclear
weapons is being taken as a definitive policy of China. What is needed is
a legal binding and a transparency in the production and disposal of
fissile material.
Perhaps, the most contentious and complex issue
for both India and Pakistan would be of the available fissile material
with them. If the treaty is to implicitly acknowledge the right of the
five nuclear weapon states to do as they wished with the fissile material
already produced, what happens to the fissile materials already produced
by India and Pakistan and even Israel? There would be many objections by
the weapon states to extend this privilege to the three states. The
objections could be
* It would in effect, ratify by international
treaty the right to make nuclear weapons out of their un-safeguarded
material.India being a non signatory to NPT, the term
"un-safeguarded" has no relevance to the Indian fissile
material production.
* Since India and Pakistan acquired nuclear
weapons since the date set by the NPT (1 January 1967), they may feel
less restricted than the recognised Nuclear weapon states to the NPT’s
commitment to reverse the nuclear arms race. We
have seen that except for USA and Russia in making considerable progress
in START I and START II treaties, none of the other three weapon powers
have made any progress to take "effective measures towards nuclear
disarmament" as laid down in Article VI of the NPT. In the case of
India, no dialogue on disarmament is complete unless China is also
involved.
* Hard liners in Argentina, Brazil and South
Africa might regret that their governments had accepted NPT or NPT- type
constraints. (Paper by David Fischer, in the Asia Pacific Regional
seminar on the nuclear non proliferation treaty , Canberra 28-29 March
1994). This does not take into
account the peculiar security concerns of India with not so benign
nuclear powers as neighbours ( See paper on Indo-Us relations after
Pokharan II by B. Raman in this site). It is not the case with countries
like Canada and Australia who have no such security concerns but still,
more vociferous that the weapon powers themselves in condemning the
Indian tests.
In a major policy speech at the Brookings
Institute on November 12th 1998, the Deputy Secretary of State Strobe
Tallbott declared that the US would not concede even by implication,
nuclear-weapons states status on either country. Retention of fissile
material stocks up to the signing of the treaty on fissile material would
be an indirect admission into the nuclear weapons club. Therefore, in the
FMCT, India has to ensure the right to retain the fissile materials
already produced. This is the bottom line. Anything else may not be
acceptable to the people and that too after staying outside the NPT all
these years and after undergoing hardships by way of technology denials,
sanctions and the security threats posed by other countries in its
neighbourhood.
14.11.98
