PAKISTAN’S POST-CHAGAI NUCLEAR DIPLOMACY
An analysis
Pakistan’s
post-Chagai diplomatic negotiations to harmonise its security concerns with the
non-proliferation concerns of the international community and to free itself from
what it looks upon as unjust and unequal (in comparison to India) economic and military
disabilities imposed on it since 1990 because of its pursuit of its nuclear and missile
objectives have been mainly with the USA and Japan.
While the negotiations
with the US (at the political as well as bureaucratic levels) have been covering all
aspects of the two issues of security and non-proliferation, those with Japan
(also at the political and bureaucratic levels) have been largely confined to Japanese
concerns over Pakistan’s missile co-operation with North Korea and the need for an
effective, verifiable export control mechanism..
Two themes which
Pakistan has been doggedly pursuing in its negotiations are the removal of perceived
asymmetries vis-à-vis India in matters relating to fissile material stockpiles and
conventional weapons and equality of treatment with India with regard to incentives for
entering any non-proliferation architecture in the sub-continent and obligations to be
adhered to under such architecture.
To understand
Pakistan’s post-Chagai nuclear diplomacy in the proper perspective,
any analysis has to start from the sanctions imposed against
Pakistan under the Pressler Amendment by the Bush Administration on October 1,1990. These
sanctions were substantial, but not as comprehensive as those imposed under the Glenn
Amendment by the Clinton Administration after Pakistan’s nuclear tests at Chagai in
the last week of May,1998.
The most important
difference was that the sanctions of the Bush Administration did not ban US support to
assistance to Pakistan by multilateral financial institutions. Despite this, the Pressler
Amendment sanctions severely affected Pakistan economically and militarily by terminating
all military supply relationship with Pakistan under the Foreign Military Sales Programme
under which Pakistan was getting US military equipment at concessional rates.
Moreover, the
sanctions of the Bush Administration were , in certain respects, even more severe
than those of the Clinton Administration because they were imposed retrospectively,
freezing even the implementation of orders for equipment placed and paid for even before
October 1,1990, whereas the sanctions of the Clinton Administration are only prospective.
Ever since she
returned to power in October,1993, Benazir Bhutto had been harping on the intrinsically
unfair nature of the sanctions under the Pressler Amendment because it was
Pakistan-specific and not directed against India and violative of commercial ethics as it
not only banned future military and technology supply relationship, but also punished
Pakistan, according to her, for its past military dependence on the US by imposing
retrospective disabilities.
These disabilities
were in the form of a freeze on the execution of contracts signed before October
1,1990, non-return of old US equipment sent to the US for repairs, non-supply of spare
parts for equipment purchased in the past, some of them even before the Pressler Amendment
had been enacted, and making Pakistan pay the storage charges for the 28 F-16
aircraft ordered before October 1,1990, but not delivered due to the invoking of the
Pressler Amendment.
In early 1994, the
Clinton Administration, through Strobe Talbot, Deputy Secretary of State, who had visited
Pakistan, had offered to initiate action for the removal of all retrospective disabilities
except in the case of the F-16 aircraft through a one-time exception in return for
Pakistan agreeing to a verifiable cap on its nuclear weapons programme.
Benazir Bhutto
turned down the offer. While assuring the Clinton Administration that Pakistan was no
longer enriching uranium to weapons’ grade at Kahuta, she declined to agree to any
external inspection mechanism for verifying Pakistan’s claim.
Despite this,
during her visit to the US in April, 1995, Benazir Bhutto succeeded in convincing the
Clinton Administration and large sections of the Congress about the unfair nature of the
sanctions of the Bush Adminstration and the need to remove at least the retrospective
disabilities.
This led to the
enactment of the Brown Amendment in October,1995, which , while maintaining the ban on
fresh military supply relationship with Pakistan, removed all retrospective disabilities
except those relating to the undelivered F-16 aircraft. While refusing to hand over these
aircraft on the ground that these could strengthen Pakistan’s nuclear delivery
capability, the Clinton Administration agreed to sell the aircraft to a third country
buyer and return to Pakistan the money which it had paid for the aircraft.
While fresh
military sales to Pakistan continued to be banned, the Administration used the powers
under the Brown Amendment to remove the ban on the repairs of old US equipment provided no
upgradation was involved. Thus, Pakistan got back from the US all its old equipment sent
for repairs as well as all new equipment, other than F-16, ordered before October 1,1990.
It was also able to get the old equipment, particularly of the Air Force, regularly
serviced and repaired by the US companies on a commercial basis without having them
upgraded.
After her return to
Pakistan from the US, Benazir Bhutto had also been claiming that officials of the Clinton
Administration had agreed with her that the Russian supply of military equipment to India
tended to further adversely affect the conventional military balance in the sub-continent
and that they would pressurise the Russian Government to exercise restraint in its
military supply relationship with India.
She had also been
claiming that if the Clinton Administration did not succeed in pressurising Russia, she
was hopeful of persuading it to initiate another exception to enable the sale of fresh
military equipment to Pakistan except of aircraft deemed to be capable of nuclear
delivery.
The effect of the
sanctions imposed by the Clinton Administration under the Glenn Amendment after the Chagai
nuclear tests is that the benefits enjoyed by Pakistan under the Brown Amendment had
been done away with, thereby dashing Pakistani hopes of resuming the military supply
relationship with the US and once again creating difficulties for the servicing and
repairs of old US equipment and procurement of spare parts for them.
Moreover, the Glenn
Amendment sanctions not only re-imposed the ban on assistance and political risk insurance
cover to US investors in Pakistan by the Ex-Im Bank and the Overseas Private Investment
Corporation (OPIC), but also stopped US support to financial assistance to Pakistan
by multilateral institutions.
However, by using his
waiver powers under the Brownback Amendment enacted in October,1998, President Clinton has
restored the position with regard to Pakistan as it was before Chagai for a period of one
year. That is, the US would once again support multilateral financial assistance to
Pakistan, and the Ex-Im Bank and the OPIC could once again extend assistance to US
investors in Pakistan.
While Pakistan has
delinked its adherence to the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty (CTBT) from that of
India and reportedly agreed in principle to complete the adherence by September,1999, it
is believed to be harping on the theme during its negotiations with the US that the
waivers exercised so far are not sufficient incentive to enable the Nawaz Sharif
Government to sell the CTBT to its public opinion.
It has been
highlighting what it projects as the widening conventional weapon disparity due to the
failure of the Clinton Administration to pressurise Russia to exercise restraint in the
sale of military equipment and technology to India and Washington’s refusal to resume
military supply relationship with Pakistan.
Pakistan’s
insistence during its negotiations with the US on the need to remove
“Pakistan-specific coercive sanctions” before it signs the CTBT relates to its
demand for the removal of the ban on the supply of fresh military equipment imposed under
the Pressler Amendment for which fresh waiver powers would be necessary. The waiver powers
granted to Clinton under the Brownback amendment would not enable him to do this.
Three other
contentious issues in Pakistan’s negotiations with the US relate to the so-called
benchmark about the freezing at the present level of weaponisation , development of
delivery vehicles and fissile material stockpiles and non-deployment as part of a
strategic restraint regime and a stricter export control regime with a mechanism for
external verification of adherence to the regime.
Pakistan has been
insisting on the need to have a minimum nuclear deterrent so long as the Kashmir issue is
not solved and a comprehensive restraint regime covering nuclear as well as
conventional weapons is not in force. According to it, a restraint regime in respect of
conventional weapons should remove the existing asymmetry by pressurising Russia to
exercise restraint in its military supply relationship with India and by resuming the
USA’s military supply relationship with Pakistan,
While Pakistan has agreed
to participate in the negotiations on a Fissile Material Cut-off treaty (FMCT), it has
been resisting US pressure for an immediate cap on its existing fissile material
stockpiles and for an external inspection mechanism to verify its adherence to the cap.
The US insistence on an inspection mechanism is attributable to its suspicion arising from
the quantity of fissile material used by Pakistan for its tests and subsequent reports of
Pakistan still having enough material at least for 25 nuclear weapons that contrary to its
past assurances, Pakistan had continued to clandestinely enrich uranium to weapons’
grade at Kahuta.
Pakistan’s
stand till now has been that the question of a cap on fissile material stockpiles would
arise only as part of the negotiations under the FMCT and that Pakistan would even then
agree to a cap only after its asymmetry with India in this regard has been reduced through
an appropriate reduction of the Indian stockpiles.
Not only the US,
but also Japan have been unrelenting in their pressure on Pakistan for an effective export
control mechanism through the enactment of a special law for the purpose, with provision
for external inspection to verify adherence to the control regime.
The USA is
particularly concerned over the possibility of leakage of weapons and missile technology
and materials not only to other Islamic countries and North Korea, but also to
trans-national Islamic terrorist groups such as that of Osama alias Osman Bin Laden
through the collusion of rogue elements in Pakistan’s military and scientific
establishment, without the knowledge of the political leadership.
Japan is worried
over the possibility that Pakistan’s missile deal with North Korea may not be a
purely commercial transaction with North Korea giving the missiles and connected
technology in return for Pakistani cash and foodgrains and that there could be a
clandestine quid pro quo in the form of Pakistani technical inputs for upgrading North
Korea’s nuclear and missile
capability.
Thus, Japan has
reportedly been even more insistent than the US on the need for an external inspection
mechanism for the export control regime. In its negotiations, Pakistan continues to deny
any nuclear or missile deal with North Korea.
In the past,
Pakistan has never denied its nuclear and missile deals with China, but had always claimed
that the nuclear assistance from China was only for peaceful non-weapon purposes and that
the missiles covered under its deal with China were within the parameters of the Missile
Technology Control Regime (MTCR). However, in the case of North Korea, it has been
vehemently denying the very existence of any deal because in the perception of both the US
and Japan, North Korea is a rogue state. Japanese political and public opinion is unlikely
to accept any Pakistani co-operation with a rogue State like North Korea, which poses a
threat to Japanese security..
During his recent
visit to Washington for talks with President Clinton on December 2,1998, Nawaz Sharif had
reportedly carried a “wish-list” and a “concerns-list”. The wish list
related to Pakistan’s demand for the return of the money paid by it for the
undelivered F-16 aircraft and for the resumption of the military supply relationship with
Pakistan. The concerns-list covered Pakistani worries over the asymmetries with India with
regard to conventional weapons and fissile material stockpiles and the consequences, as
projected by him, to regional peace due to the Kashmir issue.
Since his return
from the US, the Pakistan Government has received satisfaction with regard to the
reimbursement of the money paid for the F-16, but there does not appear to be any
significant forward movement yet on the other issues. For how long can Pakistan resist US
and Japanese pressure?
While one should
not under-estimate Pakistan’s ability to resist US and Japanese pressure on issues it
considers vital for its security vis-à-vis India, it is in a much more vulnerable
position today than it was after the invoking of the Pressler Amendment. Between 1990 and
1998, it was able to withstand US pressure despite the economic difficulties because of
the continuance of multilateral assistance and the flow of money from Saudi Arabia and the
United Arab Emirates (UAE).
Due to the
continuing decline in oil prices, Saudi Arabia and the UAE are themselves now facing a
cash crunch---particularly Saudi Arabia—and, therefore, are not in a position to help
Pakistan out this time. Thus, without a fresh rescue package from the IMF, Pakistan would
have difficulty in continuing to avoid bankruptcy. This aggravates its vulnerability to US
pressure.
B.Raman.
2-1-99
(The
writer is Additional Secretary (Retd), Cabinet Secretariat, Govt. of India, and Director,
Institute For Topical Studies, Chennai. E-Mail address: corde@md3.vsnl.net.in )
