US leaders and intellectuals
are better informed than their counterparts in any
other country of China's nuclear capability which it
has steadfastly built up since 1958 when the late Mao
Zedong took the decision to go nuclear and of its
clandestine assistance to Pakistan since the 1970s in
acquiring a military nuclear and ballistic missile
capability. It should not, therefore, be necessary
for one to go into the details of these developments.
However, certain facts need to be mentioned to put
the matter in the proper perspective.
A 1988 study by the US
Department of the Army had estimated China's nuclear
arsenal as consisting of 225 to 300 weapons. The
"Nuclear Weapons Data Book" of 1994 brought
out by the US Natural Resources Defence Council had
estimated China's nuclear arsenal at 450 warheads, of
which about 300 were physically deployed.
A fall 1995 study of the US
"Strategic Review" had estimated the
delivery capability of China's strategic triad as
consisting of four Inter-Continental Ballistic
Missiles (DF-5A also known as CSS-4) capable of
hitting Russia, the US and Europe, Intermediate-Range
Ballistic Missiles ( an unknown quantity of DF-4 also
known as CSS-3 and about 50 DF-3A also known as
CSS-2) capable of hitting targets in Russia,
including Moscow, and India, about 25 to 50 mobile
missiles (DF-21 also known as CSS-6) with a range of
1,800 kms, an unknown quantity of tactical missiles
(DF-15 also known as M-9) with a range of 600 kms,
Submarine-Launched Ballistic Missiles (JL-1 also
known as CSS-N-3) with a range of 1,700 kms and a
limited number of aircraft capable of nuclear
delivery such as the H-5 and H-6 bombers and the Q-5
attack aircraft.
In addition, according to
the "Strategic Review", China was also
developing DF-31 with a range of 8,000 kms, DF-41
with a range of 12,000 kms and JL-2, a
submarine-launchable version of DF-31.It was also
developing H-7, a twin-jet, twin-seat all-weather
strike and interdiction aircraft capable of nuclear
delivery.
China's clandestine
assistance to Pakistan in the nuclear and missile
fields and North Korea's clandestine help to Pakistan
in the missile field in return for cash and
foodgrains was confirmed, if further confirmation was
needed , by Pakistan's test of the North
Korean-supplied Ghauri missile on April 6,1998, and
nuclear tests at Chagai on May 28 and 30,1998.
After its nuclear test of
1974, India exercised restraint and waited patiently
for 24 years in the hope of progress towards
universal nuclear disarmament, including China, which
was not forthcoming. China's stand has been that it
cannot participate in strategic nuclear arms
limitation and reduction talks till the US and Russia
reduce their arsenals to China's level.
Similarly, for four years,
India waited patiently for the US Administration to
stop the collusion of China and Pakistan , but this
too was not forthcoming, on the ground that the
evidence against them, though strong, was not
clinching. India delayed the further development of
its long-range missile programmes in the hope of US
action against China and Pakistan. Its hopes were
belied.
While not acting strongly
against China, the US Administration took a number of
ill-advised steps to stop the transfer of nuclear and
space technologies to India even for peaceful
purposes, not only from the US, but even from Russia.
Thus, India, the largest democracy in the world with
a Constitution and pluralistic democratic traditions
which had drawn generously from the US Constitution
and democratic traditions, was sought to be unfairly
penalised despite its being the victim, whereas
China, with no democratic traditions and with a
proven track record of clandestine sales of nuclear
and missile technologies, was treated leniently.
Since 1988, India's
relations with China have improved considerably. The
two countries have taken many confidence-building
measures on the border and the border dispute is
under negotiation to find a mutually satisfactory
settlement. The bilateral trade has been steadily
increasing and has already crossed US $ one billion
per annum. India has ensured that the Dalai Lama and
his followers do not indulge in any violent
activities against China from Indian territory.
In contrast, Pakistan, while
benefitting enormously from Chinese co-operation, has
allowed its soil to be used by Islamic fundamentalist
elements for violent activities in the Xinjiang
province of China.
China's continuing
assistance to Pakistan, despite the latter's role in
Xinjiang and encouragement of the Taliban of
Afghanistan which has also been training the Muslim
fundamentalist groups of Xinjiang, gives rise to
reasonable fears in the minds of the Indian
Government and public that, despite the improvement
in the relations with India, China has not yet given
up its past strategy of keeping India preoccupied on
its northern border with China and western border
with Pakistan, in order to prevent India from
emerging as an economic and military power on a par
with China.
Any responsible Indian
Government would have to take this into consideration
while deciding what is the minimum defence capability
required so that India is not taken by surprise
should relations with China again deteriorate in
future, as a result of either an economic and social
upheaval in China or of recrudescence of unrest
against Beijing in Tibet.
India's nuclear tests at
Pokhran in May,1998, have to be viewed in this
context. It was a responsible and
carefully-considered decision meant to reassure
Indian public opinion and did not presage any
dilution of the importance attached by the Government
and people of India to the improvement of relations
with China and Pakistan.
Neither the US nor the UK
nor France is in the unenviable position in which
India finds itself, of facing nuclear-capable
missiles deployed against it just across the border
--in Tibet in China and in Punjab in Pakistan.
To understand the concern
and fear caused in India by this development, one
would request fair-minded Americans to go back in
their mind to 1962 when nuclear-capable missiles were
shipped to Cuba by the erstwhile USSR for deployment
against the US. President John F.Kennedy, even at the
risk of a military conflict, faced a confrontation
with Moscow and forced it to withdraw them as,
otherwise, their deployment in Cuba would have given
the US a warning and reaction time of just two
minutes to defend itself.
India is facing a similar
situation with nuclear-capable missiles just
two-minutes' warning and reaction time away from its
territory to the north in Tibet and to the west in
Pakistan. How would the American citizens have
reacted to such a nightmarish scenario?
Commenting on the US
Administration's repeated rejection of warnings from
its intelligence community about Pakistan receiving
nuclear-capable missiles from China on the ground
that the evidence was not clinching enough, the
"Time" magazine of June 30,1997, wrote as
follows:" The proof the Administration wants may
not come until it is too late--when the missiles are
actually used (against India)".Comment: The
words within brackets are ours.
Thus, India was faced with a
cruel choice: Wait till the clinching evidence was
forthcoming or take timely action to give to itself a
minimum nuclear and missile capability to defend
itself.
Independent-minded US
intellectuals have been sympathetic to Indian
concerns; Thus, Dr.Henry Kissinger wrote in the
"Los Angeles Times" in the first week of
June,1998, as follows:" India and Pakistan are
testing because, living as they do in a tough
neighbourhood, they will not risk their survival on
exhortations coming from countries basing their own
security on nuclear weapons."
Mr.Marshall M.Bouton, a
former senior official of the Pentagon who had served
in the US Embassy in India and who is presently the
Executive Vice-President of the prestigious Asia
Society of New York, wrote in the "Far Eastern
Economic Review" of Hong Kong of June 25,1998,
as follows: "India's extra-regional security
concerns must be taken seriously. India made explicit
repeatedly that a potential threat from China, not
Pakistan, was a key motive for developing a credible
nuclear deterrent. It has also laid great stress on
its being an odd-nation-out in the evolving post-cold
war security framework. It emphasises that India is
the only emerging power with nuclear neighbours that
has not had its own deterrent or an external security
guarantee. Simply to dismiss these claims is to risk
a new dialogue of the deaf. Yet, most of the
pronouncements and proposals emerging from the West
have focussed almost entirely on India-Pakistan
relations or the global non-proliferation framework
and not acknowledged the strategic context that has
worried India."
In an editorial on May
28,1998, the "Far Eastern Economic Review",
which is owned by the Dow Jones group,wrote:" We
cannot completely discount as illegitimate Indian
fears of their neighbour to the north, China, an ally
of Pakistan."
India and the US share many
values in common. They also have common concerns
arising from the Pakistan-supported triumph of the
Taliban in Afghanistan , the presence and activities
of Osama Bin Laden in Afghan territory, the further
Islamisation of Pakistani Administration initiated by
Prime Minister, Mr.Nawaz Sharif, which would give
more encouragement to the activities of Islamic
terrorist elements from Pakistani territory , not
only against India, but also against the US and
Israel, and the failure of the Pakistani and Afghan
Governments to crush narcotics smuggling.
The USA is the largest
single investor in India since 1991 and ,outside the
West, India has the largest reservoir of
technological competence which could be an asset to
the West as a whole. A democratic, stable, secure and
prosperous India would be a pillar of strength to the
democratic world. Through its prudent economic
management, India has escaped the economic turmoil
currently sweeping across Asia.
Any objective consideration
of these factors should convince fair-minded
Americans that the US policy towards India, which has
contributed to a cloud after Pokhran-II, needs to be
re-considered and reversed. The sooner, the
better--for both the countries and for the democratic
world.
10-10-98
(Former
Additional Secretary,Cabinet
Secretariat and presently Director, Institute for
Topical Studies)
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