CTBT and CTBTO- II (Feed back)
The response to our paper on CTBT and CTBTO was
very satisfying and evoked quite a few queries. Some of the points
mentioned are clarified in this note.
1. How can the CTBT be described as non
discriminatory when the weapon States are allowed to retain the weapons?
There is no doubt that the NPT, CTBT and the
forthcoming FMCT are all part of a process towards non-proliferation,
vertical and horizontal. But these do not address directly the problem of
nuclear disarmament. The non weapon states, particularly the non aligned
ones have always had a suspicion that the NPT was meant to perpetuate
nuclear apartheid and prevent horizontal proliferation. The basic thesis
put forward by India at the eighteenth United Nations Disarmament
Committee on 15.2.66 two years after the NPT was signed is still valid
today.
The statement said
"One cannot have a spurious treaty which
heaps all the control, all the limitations and all the prohibition on non
nuclear countries while at the same time giving license, even indirect
encouragement to the existing nuclear weapons powers themselves to
proliferate and to continue with their manufacture of nuclear weapons and
delivery vehicles."
There is also the view that in the protocol that
is being framed under the CTBT organization there could be some unequal
provisions either built in or contemplated. This is quite possible. Those
who have a say in the protocol architecture now and those who propose to
join the CTBT in future will have to be vigilant..
It is also true that CTBT does not address the
process of disarmament when the weapon states are allowed to retain the
nuclear weapons. To this extent it is discriminatory.
Having said this, we hold the view that CTBT by
itself is not discriminatory as it applies to both weapon and non weapon
powers alike and prevents further testing (barring sub critical
experiments). Otherwise, where was the desperate hurry for France and
China to defy world opinion and go ahead with testing just before signing
the treaty?
The problem is not in CTBT but in the NPT itself
where discrimination is embedded. Worse still, NPT has been extended
indefinitely.
Having declared itself as a nuclear power, India
should have no reservations and seek no assurances from other nuclear
weapon powers but accede to the CTBT on its own merits.
2. Seismic network is unreliable:
The CTBT organization envisages a series of
seismic networking to detect underground explosions and the reliability
will depend upon very many factors, the chief of which is the geological
structures of the testing region, distance of the monitoring stations, the
strength of explosions as reflected in the Richter scale. A major draw
back in the seismic testing is that it cannot work for yields below 5kT.
We agree that seismic testing alone will not provide accurate results. The
main controversy over the Indian fusion test was over the variable yields
recorded by seismic stations all over the world. What further proof is
required to show that seismic tests cannot be accurate. Secondly, so far
as the Indian test is concerned, it is to be seen whether the reliability
of the thermo nuclear device was to be based on the gap between the
expected and actual yields or whether the "fission-fusion"
process had actually worked?
3. Xenon
monitoring has also some limitations:
The best results of yields and nature of
explosions can be had only by measuring the radio activity. But this has
to be at ground zero and not even a few metres away. Xenon monitoring
referred to in the paper is good for only underground non-venting tests
and not for atmospheric tests where the isotopes will escape into the
atmosphere. Therefore while radio nuclide detection and testing will be
accurate for collection of data of own tests there is no assurance that in
the monitoring mechanism envisaged under the CTBT protocol , xenon
nuclides of other countries will be detected and identified. This is
particularly so when the same gases can be emitted from existing power
reactors. If the detection capability is based on increments from the
existing level of radio nuclide gases , there will be problems in
detection in certain areas like Europe where the background xenon level is
more than the proposed minimum detection capability.
4. India by
joining the CTBT at a late stage would lose its fair share of posts in the
CTBT organization:
Since India did not sign the CTBT at the time
when the monitoring systems were being envisaged and positioned there is a
likelihood of India losing a fair share of posts in the CTBTO and an
assured seat in the policy making bodies of CTBT. This problem is real and
will have to be addressed but these come only after acceding to the CTBT
and then seeking parity.
S.Chandrasekharan. 4-11-1998.
