USE AND ABUSE OF INTELLIGENCE
by B.Raman, CAMP HERZLLIYA, ISRAEL
(To be read in continuation of my earlier
article titled "CIA:
Sinned Against Or Sinning? " at www.saag.org)
President George Bush as well as Prime
Minister Tony Blair have ordered an official enquiry into the
reasons why contrary to what the US and the British intelligence
agencies had reported before their invasion of Iraq about the
presence of weapons of mass destruction (WMD) in Iraq, no such
weapons have so far been found by the Iraq Survey Group set up
by the US to search for them.
2. While the British enquiry is to be limited
to intelligence reporting before the war on the presence of WMD,
the US enquiry is to be much more comprehensive. The bipartisan
commission set up by Bush would not only examine the pre-war
reporting by the US intelligence on this subject, but would also
evaluate the capability of the intelligence to monitor and
detect proliferation of WMD in the world as a whole.
3. By long-observed tradition as well as under
their code of conduct, British intelligence officers refrain
from reacting in public to criticism of their
performance. As such, till the report of the enquiry commission
comes out, one has no means of knowing their version of what
transpired before the war.
4. US intelligence is not shackled by such
tradition or code of conduct. George Tenet, Director of the CIA
and ,concurrently, Director, Central Intelligence, and his
senior officers have been talking in public about their pre-war
reporting. From their statements, two tentative conclusions
emerge:
* Firstly, while the US intelligence did
report about Iraq having a WMD capability, they never said
that the threat from Iraq's actual or potential WMD capability
was imminent. It is apparent that the decision to project the
threat as imminent and hence calling for immediate regime
change to pre-empt it was made at either the
policy-making or political level or both, in the US as well as
the UK. Intelligence agencies provide inputs for
policy-making, but do not participate in policy-making, as a
rule, though there have been unhealthy exceptions to this
rule. There is a salutary reason for this rule. If an
intelligence agency advocates or contributes to a policy, it
might develop a vested interest in projecting its intelligence
in such a manner as to justify the policy.
* Two, the inaccuracy in reporting to the
policy-makers by the CIA's analysts arose partly from the fact
that the analysts, who had no responsibility for
source-running, did not have adequate idea of the background
of the sources who were feeding intelligence about Iraq's WMD
capability, their access to such intelligence and their
credibility.
5. There are generally three types of
intelligence failures:
* Zero intelligence.. A typical example was
the total ignorance of the MI-6, the British external
intelligence agency, about the Argentine plans for the
occupation of the Falklands Islands in 1982. The Lord Franks
Commission, which went into it, absolved the MI-6 of any blame
for it because it did not have a presence in Argentina and
hence, did not have the required capability for collecting
such intelligence.
* Inadequate intelligence: Good examples
would be the intelligence failures preceding the assassination
of Rajiv Gandhi, former Indian Prime Minister, in 1991 and the
Pakistani occupation of the Kargil heights in 1999. General
intelligency, which should have alerted the policy-makers, was
there, but it was not specific and precise enough to warrant
effective follow-up action.
* Inaccurate intelligence. Iraq is a typical
example. The inaccuracy of the intelligence collected and
disseminated by the US and UK intelligence agencies was
evident not only in respect of the WMD, but also of the
reaction of the Iraqi people to the invasion and occupation of
their country by the coalition forces led by the US. The
present situation in Iraq, marked by resistance by Iraqis and
acts of suicide terrorism by foreign jihadi terrorists, is a
reflection of such inaccurate reporting.
6.What could be the reasons for such
inaccurate reporting? The technical intelligence (TECHINT) agencies
of the US and the UK could not pick up any TECHINT relating to
Iraq's WMD. This could have been due to two reasons:
* Either Iraq had no WMD or had no on-going
plans for WMD. Hence, there was no need for any electronic
communication on this subject, which could have been
intercepted by the Western agencies.
* Or, Iraq had adopted a sophisticated
communication security system, which made such interception
impossible.
7. The only way of making up for this zero
TECHINT was through human intelligence (HUMINT). An intelligence
agency collects HUMINT in two ways: Through a physical presence
in the targeted country, which provides access to people having knowledge
of such intelligence, and through what are called third
country operations. A third country operation is raising
and using a source not from the territory of the targeted
country, but from the territories of other countries.
8. An intelligence agency resorts to third
country operations when it has no physical presence in the
targeted country or, even if it has, it is too dangerous to meet
its sensitive sources in its territory due to effective
surveillance by the counter-intelligence agencies of the
targeted country.
9 After the Gulf war of 1991, neither the
CIA nor the MI-6 had any physical presence in Iraq under the
cover of either diplomats or businessmen because of the total
disruption of diplomatic and commercial relations with Iraq.
Their physical presence was, therefore, limited to their
scientific and technical experts included in the UN inspection
teams, which were considerably infiltrated by the CIA and the
MI-6. Since the Saddam regime kept an effective surveillance on
them, they had no means of raising sources having access to WMD-related
intelligence.
10. Their HUMINT operations were, therefore,
largely limited to third country operations under which they
used disgruntled ant-Saddam Hussein political exiles, family
members and scientists. In the absence of sources based in Iraq,
who were still occupying key positions, there was no way of
independently verifying the intelligence coming from such third
country sources with their objectivity suspect. Political exiles
are, as a rule, highly unreliable as sources of intelligence.
They tend to mislead and exaggerate in order to enhance their
importance in the eyes of the intelligence agencies using them.
11. In the CIA, there is a watertight division
of operational and analysis officers. An operational officer
recruits an agent and exploits him or her for the collection of
HUMINT. He has no responsibility for analysing their produce.
Since the performance of operational officers is evaluated on
the basis of the usable and actionable intelligence furnished by
their sources, they tend to exaggerate the credibility and
access of their sources while forwarding their reports to the
analysis officers.
12. The analysis officers analyse the source
reports as received from the operations division and forward
them to the policy-makers with their comments and analysis
regarding the acceptability of the intelligence. Under the
restrictive security rules, operational officers generally give
only vague comments about the background of their sources.
13. While examining source reports for
their acceptability, analysis officers are supposed to ask
themselves the following questions: what is the position
occupied by the source; would he have access to the
intelligence catered during the normal course of his work;
how did he get the intelligence, through direct knowledge or
hearsay; is there independent corroboration from other sources;
what has been his performance in the past: how many of his
past reports proved to be accurate and how many
inaccurate.
14. Such a detailed examination was
apparently not done due to two reasons. Firstly, the forwarding
comments from the operational officers were vague and did not
permit answers to all these questions. As a result, they were
not aware that much of the intelligence was coming from exiles
who had an axe to grind against Saddam and, hence, their
objectivity was in doubt.
15. Secondly, the Bush administration was
impatient to take a decision to invade Iraq and bring about a
regime change. Consequently, there was considerable pressure on
the intelligence agencies to report more and more on the
subject. The textbook rule of reporting is "verify and
report". Sometimes, intelligence agencies do deviate from
this rule and "report and verify". Such occasions are:
* When the report indicates an imminent
threat which needs to be countered immediately . Examples:
Plans for an assassination or other terrorist strikes or a
planned military action by an adversary. In such cases, the
intelligence agencies act on the principle that the
intelligence must be presumed to be correct and acted upon as
if it was correct, unless and until proved to be incorrect.
*When the country to which the agency
belongs is planning for military action and the Government
presses the agency to step up its reporting.
16. There is professionally nothing wrong in
an intelligence agency disseminating unverified intelligence in
such cases provided it adds a specific caution that the
intelligence being disseminated is unverified and hence should
be treated with reserve till it is verified. Under guidelines
laid down by the founding fathers of the Indian intelligence
agencies, they generally add this cautionary advice while
disseminating unverified intelligence.
17. In the past, the British intelligence also
used this cautionary advice, but it is not known whether they
did so before the invasion of Iraq One does not know what has
been the laid-down rule in the US intelligence community.
However, the Congressional and departmental enquiries into the
case of Aldrich Ames, the Soviet/Russian mole in the CIA,
exposed some instances where the agency had not followed this
practice. It sent to the Pentagon source reports regarding
Moscow's plans for the development of new weapons despite the
suspicion of some analysts that the reports were fabrications
planted on the CIA by the Soviet/Russian counter-intelligence
through a mole. Gates, the head of the Analysis Division,
who subsequently became the head of the agency, and other senior
officers came in for strong criticism for their serious
omission.
18. What would appear to have happened in the
Iraq case is:
* The CIA's operational division found
itself handicapped in raising serving officers and scientists
for collecting WMD-related intelligence due to the absence of
its presence in Iraq.
* It was, therefore, forced to depend on
third country operations using anti-Saddam exiles of unproved
access to such intelligence and dubious reliability.
* It forwarded their reports to the
Analysis Division with inadequate comments regarding the
background and access of the sources.
* The Analysis Division disseminated such
reports of questionable veracity to the policy-makers without
cautioning that the intelligence has not been independently
corroborated and should be treated with caution.
* The policy-makers and the political
leadership, who had already made up their mind to invade
Iraq, jumped on such unverified intelligence and went to town
with it in order to justify their action to the domestic and
international public opinion.
19. Such use and abuse of intelligence is not
something unique to the US and the UK. It keeps happening all
the time in many countries, including India. One can only reduce
such instances through appropriate safeguards. One cannot
eliminate them totally. That is the harsh reality.
(The writer is
Additional Secretary (retd), Cabinet Secretariat, Govt. of
India, and, presently, Director, Institute For Topical Studies,
Chennai, and Convenor and Distinguished Fellow, Observer
Research Foundation, Chennai Chapter E-Mail: corde@vsnl.com
)