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Paper no. 942
08. 03. 2004
by B.Raman
SUMMARY: Ever since the ceasefire accord between the Government of Sri Lanka and the LTTE was signed two years ago, there were persistent reports of unhappiness amongst the Tamils of the East over what was seen by them as unjustified overtures to the Muslims by the northern leadership of the LTTE, over the lack of recognition of the Easterners, who had fought and won most of the battles of the LTTE against the Sri Lanka Army and over the perceived discriminatory treatment meted out to them in the North. Did this unhappiness force Karuna, the Eastern warlord, to act against Prabhakaran against his will or did he take advantage of it to defy Prabhakaran and assert his independence? Will he succeed in his defiance? Will the fighters of the East carry out his orders or disobey him? If they obeyed his orders, will there be a military conflict between the North and the East, leading to a resumption of the violence and damaging the peace process? Even if Prabhakaran succeeds in having Karuna eliminated, will he be able to re-assert his control over the East? Will his authority remain as strong as before?
These are very relevant questions, but it would be difficult to answer them at present. All one could say is that Karuna's position is not as strong as he seems to think it is and not as weak as Prabhakaran seems to wish it is. Even presuming that the overwhelming majority of Karuna's followers remain loyal to him, which is doubtful since they may not wish to contribute to a weakening of the struggle for Tamil Eelam, the two forces would be evenly matched and the outcome uncertain.
THE TEXT
The Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam (LTTE) disseminated the following statement on the morning of March 6, 2004:
"Today the 6th March 2004, at 10.20 a. m. a Press Conference was held at the LTTE Peace Secretariat in Kilinochchi,in which Mr. S. P. Tamilselvan, Head of the Political Wing of the LTTE, along with Mr. Ramesh, Special Commander, Batticaloa-Amparai District, Mr. Ram, Commander, Batticaloa-Amparai District, Mr. Piraba, Deputy Commander, Batticaloa-Amparai District, Mr. Gihaththan, Commander, Batticaloa-Amparai District, Mr. Ramanan, Head of the Military Intelligence Wing, and Mr. Kausalyan, Political Head of the Batticaloa-Amparai District, were present.
“Mr. Karuna who was Commander, Batticaloa-Amparai, instigated by some malicious elements opposed to the Tamil Eelam liberation struggle, acting traitorously to the Tamil people and the Tamil Eelam National Leadership, has planned to secede himself from the liberation organization.
“The Commanders, Divisional Heads and cadres under him, unable to acquiesce with this traitorous act, have refused to comply with his orders and met with the National Leadership, explaining the ground reality prevailing there. In accordance with this, Karuna has been discharged from the Liberation Tigers organization and relieved of his responsibilities.
“The Tamil Eelam National Leadership has appointed Mr. Ramesh as Special Commander, Mr. Ram as Commander, Mr. Piraba as Deputy Commander and Mr. Kausalyan as Political Head of the Batticaloa-Amparai District.
“It is hereby informed that these officials will assume their positions and functions as the official representatives of our organization.”
2. It has been reported that simultaneously with this announcement Prabhakaran has ordered that about 500 cadres from the Eastern Province working in Kilinochi, whose loyalty to him was suspect, should be disarmed and placed under house-arrest. Karuna has retaliated by appealing to the fighters from the East deployed in the North to get those under house-arrest released and to help them to return to the East.
3. An LTTE spokesman said before the orders sacking Karuna were issued: " How can Karuna be a part of the LTTE when he has violated our founding principles? This is a problem with an individual. All eastern commanders have expressed their allegiance to the movement except Karuna. We have no problem with the control of cadres in Batticaloa and Amparai."
4.The announcement came in the wake of over three days of speculation about serious differences between Prabhakaran, the leader of the LTTE, and Vinayagamoorthi Muralitharan, alias Col. Karuna, who, as Special Commander, Batticaloa-Amparai, was in over-all charge of the LTTE's military operations in the Eastern Province. The speculation was initially denied by Tamilselvan, but subsequently admitted after reports came in that Karuna had replaced some key officials of the LTTE in the Eastern Province, who enjoyed the confidence of Prabhakaran, with his own nominees and approached the Sri Lankan authorities and the Norwegian monitoring mission for a recognition of the separate role of his set-up in the now-stalled peace process, for physical protection and for ensuring safe passage for the Eastern cadres bottled up in the North who want to return to their homes in the East.
5. The changes reportedly made by Karuna in the LTTE set-up in the Eastern Province, without apparently consulting Prabhakaran, which preceded his sack by Prabhakaran were: The appointment of Karikalan as the Batticaloa-Amparai Political Wing Leader in the place of Kausalyan;. the replacement of Ramesh, Karuna's deputy military commander, by Rabat; and of Pirabha, in charge of administration, by Thurai. He also sacked about 60 policemen from the North posted in the Eastern Province and ordered them to leave the area and banned the entry of any officials of the LTTE's intelligence wing into the Eastern Province. He has also reportedly ordered the detention of recruits from the North, who had come to the East for undergoing military training, and the closure of all offices of the LTTE in the Eastern Province. It is not clear whether his orders are being carried out by his subordinates. Latest reports, however, indicate that Karikalan has also gone to Kilinochi on March 7 and supported Prabhakaran and criticised Karuna..
6.The 53-year-old Karikalan, a native of the Eastern Province and a close confidante of Prabhakaran for two decades, who was then designated as the Special Political Commissar for Batticaloa and Amparai,had been removed from that post along with two of his close associates, Visu and Thurai, both also natives of the East, by Prabakaran, on July 31, 2002. They were attached to the military wing and transferred to Kilinochi.
7.While no reasons were given for their unceremonious dismissal and transfer out of the East, well-informed observers said that the dismissal followed the submission of a report by the intelligence wing of the LTTE blaming them for provoking riots by Muslims of the province the previous month through their unwise and irresponsible statements, which were perceived by the Muslim community as anti-Muslim. Karikalan had justified the action of LTTE volunteers in collecting taxes from the Muslims on the ground that since the Muslims were in occupation of lands, which originally belonged to the Tamils, they had to pay taxes to the original owners.
8. Prabhakaran had also reportedly taken umbrage at another statement made by Karikalan rebuking Rauf Hakeem, the leader of the Sri Lankan Muslim Congress (SLMC), indirectly without, however naming him, for taking up the problems of the Muslims of the Eastern Province directly with Prabhakaran instead of first discussing them with the LTTE's leadership in the Eastern Province. Karikalan had told the Colombo Tamil daily "Virakesari:"Solutions to real problems can be achieved by holding discussions with the regional commanders in areas where such problems really exist. Instead of doing so, making attempts to resolve problems by talking to our hierarchy will not help because solutions about the exact field situation, the ongoing problems and how to resolve them won't be available there. Matters should be resolved through discussing issues in places where they exist. Unity cannot be reached through commandments or insistence."
9. After dismissing Karikalan and his two associates, Prabhakaran had named Kausalyan, the LTTE's financial controller for the province, as political chief of Batticaloa-Amparai and Reginald, the then head of administration, as the deputy political chief in addition to his charge as the head of administration. These changes were welcomed by the Muslim community who viewed Karikalan and Karuna as anti-Muslim. However, this action of Prabhakaran caused ripples of discontent amongst the local Tamils, many of whom approved their hardline towards the Muslims.
10. After the action taken by Karuna,Kausalyan, Ramesh and Pirabha fled to Kilinochi and they have now been reinstated by Prabhakaran in the LTTE's set-up in the Eastern Province---Ramesh as Special Commander, Piraba as Deputy Commander and Kausalyan as Political Head of the Batticaloa-Amparai District.
11.Over 100 cadres of the LTTE loyal to Prabhakaran are also reported to have fled to Vanni before the LTTE issued the order sacking Karuna. It is not known how many of them are from the North and how many from the East. At the same time, Karuna was reported to have sought the help of the Sri Lankan Army and the Norwegian monitoring mission officials to ensure the protection of nearly 2,000 cadres from the East employed in the North and for their safe return to the East. Among those loyal to Prabhakaran, who escaped to Kilinochi were Keerthi and Senadi Kuilanban.
12.Long-simmering differences between Prabhakaran and Karuna came into the open on March 3 when Karuna refused to send an additional 1000 troops to the North as requested by Prabhakaran. Though Karuna has not said so, it is believed that Prabhakaran had ordered the transfer to the North of the 1,200-strong Jayanthan Padaippirivu (Jayanthan Battalion), consisting exclusively of Easterners, which had returned to its bases in the East after distinguishing itself in the Elephanta Pass battles of 1999 under the leadership of Karuna.
13. Since there was really no operational requirement for this transfer unless Prabhakaran was planing to resume hostilities against the Sri Lankan Army about which he had not consulted him, Karuna would appear to have suspected that this was possibly a prelude to have him removed from the leadership of the East and decided to pre-empt Prabhakaran by refusing to send the additional troops and removing those loyal to Prabhakaran posted in the East.
14. Another reason for Karuna's revolt was his anger over the operations of Pottu Amman, the chief of the LTTE's intelligence wing, in the East without keeping him in the picture. Ever since elections to the Sri Lankan Parliament were called on April 2,Karuna had been assuring the people of the East that the LTTE would ensure that there was no interference with the electoral process in the East. He felt that the actions of the intelligence wing in carrying out the assassinations of a candidate of the UNF and an election worker of the EPDP, who did not enjoy the blessings of the LTTE, discredited him (Karuna) in the eyes of the people and the international community and called into question his ability to keep up his promise.
15. After deciding to defy the directions of Prabhakaran,Karuna simultaneously informed the Norway- managed Sri Lanka Monitoring Mission that hereafter he and his Eastern troops would act independently. Immediately thereafter, the Monitoring Mission's chief, Major General (retd) Trond Furuhovde flew to Kilinochchi in a Sri Lanka Air force helicopter and had urgent discussions with Tamilselvan.
16.The diiferences between Prabhakaran and Karuna burst into the open a day before Kausalyan was to get married at a holiday resort. On hearing of Karuna's revolt, Kausalyan postponed the wedding and fled to Kilinochi with his fiancee and their parents.The Sri Lankan Army came to know of the revolt when Varathan, Secretary to Karuna, contacted Army officers and requested them to prevent Kausalyan, Ramesh and Pirabha from escaping to Kilinochi and hand them over to Karuna. The Army reportedly turned down his request and did not attempt to prevent them and other Prabhakaran loyalists from fleeing to Kilinochi.
17. In an interview to the "Daily Mirror" of Colombo, Varathan stated as follows:
* A separate ceasefire agreement by the Government with Karuna could ensure security in the Eastern Province. In the backdrop of continued killing of political activists in the East by the intelligence wing of the LTTE headed by Pottu Amman, there was little choice left to ensure security." We have banned any of their men from entering the East, but some men can remain. We can not rule out their involvement in these killings."18. Before staging his revolt, Karuna wrote a letter to Prabhakaran complaining of discrimination against LTTE cadres from the East by the leadership and alleging ill-treatment of Eastern cadres when they were posted in the North by the northern leadership. He pointed out that 4,550 fighters from Batticaloa and Amparai had so far sacrificed their lives in the struggle for Tamil Eelam and 2,248 were serving in the North. Despite this, according to him, not a single cadre from these districts figured in a list of 30 divisional commanders recently appointed by Prabhakaran.* Prabhakaran's decision to dismiss Karuna would have no "impact" practically. "There will be no impact on our interests. It is out of their control."
* When asked about a possible threat to the life of Karuna similar to what had happened to Mahattaya in 1994,he stressed that there was "no similarity between the two situations." "These are totally different issues. In Mahattaya's case, there was foreign involvement, there's nothing like that here."
* The continued alienation of the Eastern Commanders of the LTTE by the Northern hierarchy, the continued attempts to fortify the North by using Eastern cadres and the Eastern members having to face the brunt of the consequences of the actions of the Intelligence Wing of the North had all contributed towards the decision of Karuna to split from the LTTE. "How do we answer the parents of these boys when the North asks us for additional cadres during a period of peace? Over 30 of the hierarchy in the organisation are of the North. They hold the posts of Finance, Police, Intelligence and the Political Wing, leaving nothing for us despite our sacrifices to the cause."
* Karuna would remain committed to peace and was ready to sit in any negotiating table with the Government to discuss peace.
19.The letter said: "It is very painful that when all the heads of Tamil Eelam divisions and administrative heads tour Kilinochchi town in luxury vehicles, members of the Jeyanthan regiment from Batticaloa and Amparai remain on full time duty at the checkpoint in Palai. How can this be reasonable?
20."At this time of peace, all fighters like to be with their relatives in their home areas. It is my feeling that up to now they have rendered an invaluable service to the people of 'North Tamil Eelam', sacrificing their lives. At this time I like to serve the people of 'South Tamil Eelam' ; not only that, it is my final wish to fight for these people here itself and die at their feet. I do not like any other person interfering in these matters".
21.It further said: "We do not want to desert you. We look to you as our god. Sometimes this decision of ours can anger you. The reason is that I do not like to commit the historical mistake of not disclosing to you the hopes of the people and the fighters here and not respecting their feelings. If you believe in the people here and the fighters here allow us to work independently under your leadership".
22. In an interview to Shimalee Senanayaka, a journalist of the Associated Press, who was the first to break the news of the revolt on March 3, which was disseminated by AP, Karuna was quoted as saying as follows:
* He had sounded the Government about negotiating a separate cease-fire in the Eastern Province." We think it's very important to have a separate defense pact with the security forces. There is no question of reconciliation, everything is beyond reconciliation. In future we will have a full self-administration (in the east). We'll receive no more command from the Wanni administration or Prabhakaran."23. Shimalee Senanayaka subsequently stated as follows in an interview to the Sinhalese programme of the BBC radio:* His men would not begin fighting and would respect the current cease-fire until a new agreement was signed. Explaining the reasons for the split, he said that he disagreed with Prabhakaran's request to recruit more fighters and deploy them in the north. "In the past it did not seem a big issue. Now it's peace time, people and parents are trying to analyze why they have to give soldiers during peace time."
* He also said that the northern cadres were favoured for positions in the group's administrative wing." We have already paid a heavy price to protect Wanni, its people, particularly the leadership. I sincerely hope that unlike the Wanni leadership, those people (in the north) will be grateful for our sacrifices."
* Col. Karuna said that he and his troops were ready to retaliate against Prabhakaran and his loyalists if he (Karuna ) or his troops were ever harmed in any way.24.On March 5, Cyril Herath, the Defence Secretary, rejected a request from Karuna for a defence pact with the security forces and a fresh ceasefire accord. "We cannot agree to that," he said. "When there is one ceasefire agreement signed between the Prime Minister and Prabhakaran, how can we have another with a member of one of the parties?" He revealed that Karuna had made the request through government military commanders, but the military chiefs were against entering into negotiations with a faction of the LTTE. "Both sides have indicated that they will abide by the ceasefire that is currently in place," Herath said. "In this situation we don’t want to do anything. But we hope they will not fight each other."* Karuna accused Prabhakaran of using the troops from the East for his own personal ends. He said that he refused to send 1,000 more troops to Wanni as requested by Prabhakaran because the Eastern troops had always been used at the front lines while the others led a luxurious life enjoying all comforts in the North. He alleged that the lives of 2,300 eastern troops had already been sacrificed for the protection of Prabhakaran.
* He said while the intelligence head of Prabhakaran, Pottu Amman, was busy carrying out political assassinations in the East without his knowledge, he had to answer to the Norway-led Sri Lanka Monitoring Mission and the international community about the assassinations. He was referring to the assassinations of the UNF candidate in a Batticaloa Hospital and an election worker of the EPDP in Valachchenai during the last few days.
* Karuna alleged that none of the economic benefits of the current ceasefire had benefitted the Eastern Province. He accused the LTTE leadership of buying luxury vehicles for their use out of international funds and of building a new town at Kilinochi out of these funds while totally neglecting Batticaloa. He further alleged that the Norwegian and the Swiss money that reached Kilinochchi was never shared with the Eastern Province for the benefit of its people. He claimed that he had pointed out many of these issues in many letters written to Prabhakaran for which he did not receive any reply.
* Karuna pointed out that he had led many hard won battles and was, therefore, not afraid of his personal safety. If he or his troops were harmed, the LTTE leadership would be held responsible by the international community and he would violently retaliate.
25.There was no comment from the Government on reports that Prabhakaran had sought its clearance for sending a team of 20 officials of the LTTE from Kilinochi to the Eastern Province through Government-controlled areas, apparently for replacing Karuna and his supporters in the Eastern leadership.
26.Since 2001, there have been indications of dissatisfaction against Prabhakaran's leadership style not only in the East, but also in the North. 52-year-old Vaithilingam Sornalingam alias Col. Shankar, a Prabhakaran loyalist, who was in charge of the LTTE's air wing, anti-aircraft defence and military intelligence set-up, was killed by a claymore mine on September 26, 2001, when he was travelling alone in a pickup vehicle from Oddusuddan to Puthukkudiyiruppu. In the previous months, other Prabhakaran loyalists such as Gangai Amaran, deputy chief of the Sea Tigers, Nizam, the political head of Batticaloa - Amparai, and Mano, communications chief of the Eastern Tigers, had been killed in similar claymore explosions. Others such as Col. Balraj, the deputy chief of the LTTE"s Military Wing, Tamilchelvan and senior commander Jeyam had escaped when their vehicles too had struck mines.
27.Shankar had been associated with Prabakharan for nearly three decades. He had set up the overseas purchases unit to procure arms and ammunition , as head of which he was subsequently succeeded by Kumaran Pathmanathan alias "KP". He was also the founder-commander of the Sea Tigers division, the underwater attack unit, the antiaircraft unit and the air wing division. He held a pilot's licence and certificates in marine and aeronautical engineering.. It was Shankar, who assisted Prabhakaran, when he met the Norwegian Special Envoy Erik Solheim at Mallavi on November 1, 2000.
28.While Prabhakaran blamed the deep penetration units of the Sri Lankan army for these incidents, the Army denied these allegations and hinted that these incidents indicated growing dissatisfaction in the LTTE over Prabhakaran's policies. While blaming the Army, Prabhakaran ordered a secret purge of suspected elements in the LTTE set-up by Balraj and Pottu Amman. Many cadres from the East were among those allegedly purged and executed. Many civilians in the Eastern Province were also arrested on a charge of possessing explosive substances and executed. Pottu Amman had claimed to have detected over 30 bombs during searches in the Batticaloa-Amparai area.
29. Following reports of unhappiness among large sections of the population of the Eastern Province over the continued deployment of their children in the North and the severe hardships being undergone by them even a year after the cease-fire went into effect, senior officials of the LTTE met over 5,000 parents of fighters from the East, who had either been killed or deployed in the North at a meeting held in the beginning of February last year at Palugamam in the Batticaloa district. They praised the services of those who had sacrificed their lives for the cause of Tamil Eelam and assured them that those deployed in the North were being well looked after. They refuted allegations that they were subject to discriminatory treatment by leaders and officers from the North.
30. Among those who interacted with the parents were Batticaloa-Amparai district special commander T. Ramesh, Batticaloa-Amparai head of the political wing of the LTTE, E. Kausalyan,the Commander of the Jeyanthan Battalion, Ram, the Batticaloa-Amparai special commander of the women's wing, Nilavini, Commanders Nagesh, Prabha and John Kelly Thaatha (their designations not known), the head of the political section Banuka, the head of the Medical section Vaamanan, Vava of the political section , the head of the administrative division Reginald, the head of the accounts division Suvi, and Kirushan, Karthik and Manalaaru Vijayan from the section in charge of administration..
31.Addressing the parents, Ramesh said:" Our struggle reached the current stage because it developed into a struggle of the people. Tamil people provided the financial and military strength to support our struggle to be free people. This is the reason why we were able to evolve to be a conventional fighting force able to withstand the strength of the forces from the state. People who refused to participate in our struggle are suddenly showing a lot of concern for our community. They are falsely pointing an accusing finger at us of forced recruitment and extortion. We do not force anyone to join our movement. We have turned away several underage youngsters who tried to enlist with us. Our senior commander Karuna Amman has directed us to meet with parents of fighters to hear their feelings and complaints. We are planning to conduct meetings of this type regularly in all regions. We ask the parents to raise concerns if our cadres have unknowingly committed any mistakes. We urge you to help us rectify these mistakes."
32.On July 28, 2003, Tamilselvan visited Batticaloa and addressed over 5,000 fighters of the LTTE from the East at a function held at the 'Meenaham' military base to mark the eighth death anniversary of Lt. Col. Anparasi, an LTTE woman commander, who was killed when the Tigers overran a Sri Lanka Army camp at Pondugal Chenai, near Tharavai on July 27 1995.He also declared open a memorial for Lt. Col. Anparasi. Speaking on the occasion, he dwelt at length on the vital role played by cadres from the Batticaloa-Amparai District in the war to safeguard the Wanni heartland and in the major offensives against the Sri Lanka Army in the north that led to the fall of the Elephant Pass and other key garrisons. Among those who attended the function were Karuna, who was described as the special commander of the LTTE's Southern Front Forces, T. Ramesh, described as the special commander for the Batticaloa-Amparai District ,and Ms. Nilavini, described as the commander of the LTTE's women's unit in the district.They also spoke on the contribution of the East to the freedom struggle.
33. In a commentary titled "A Major Force Within the LTTE", Bandula Jayasekara, a Sri Lankan analyst, had given the following personality profile of Karuna in the "Frontline", the prestigious fortnightly of Chennai, in July,2002:
* 'It is not clear how old he is, but it is accepted even by the Sri Lankan military that Karuna leads from the front and that he does not believe in withdrawing even if he is in danger. Karuna is credited with leading several battles to victory. He took part in all phases of Operation 'Unceasing Waves'. He was responsible for the capture of Aiyakachchi. It was, in a way, the beginning of the capture of Elephant Pass. Karuna is also well-guarded like his leader and, moreover, Prabakaran recognises Karuna as a real fighter. One of Sri Lanka's most successful Generals and currently the country's High Commissioner to Australia, Janaka Perera, once described Karuna as one of the LTTE's most successful commanders.34. What a perceptive assessment! Ever since the ceasefire accord was signed two years ago, there were persistent reports of unhappiness amongst the Tamils of the East over what was seen by them as unjustified overtures to the Muslims by the northern leadership of the LTTE, over the lack of recognition of the Easterners, who had fought and won most of the battles of the LTTE against the Sri Lankan Army and over the perceived discriminatory treatment meted out to them in the North. Did this unhappiness force Karuna to act against Prabhakaran against his will or did he take advantage of it to defy Prabhakaran and assert his independence? Will he succeed in his defiance? Will the fighters of the East carry out his orders or disobey him? If they obeyed his orders, will there be a military conflict between the North and the East, leading to a resumption of the violence and damaging the peace process? Even if Prabhakaran succeeds in having Karuna eliminated, will he be able to re-assert his control over the East? Will his authority remain as strong as before?* "Karuna is developing Batticaloa militarily, even while securing his place and strengthening his forces in the area. Decoded radio intercepts from Karuna made since the signing of the Memorandum of Understanding (MoU) refer ominously to "when hostilities recommence". More cadres have been recruited in the East. The military strength of the LTTE around its headquarters stands at an all-time high of around 7,000. LTTE cadres who fought in the battles in the North and in the Wanni have moved back to Batticaloa. It was Karuna who took them to fight the battles in the North and proved to Prabakaran how effective his forces were.
* "Most of the cadres in Batticaloa are returning to the East on the pretext of going on leave. One can question the real motive of Karuna at this juncture. What is he doing at a time when he is expected to lay down his arms, building a separate and dreadful force in Batticaloa? Karuna is getting ready to take over the East. He knows that Prabakaran trusts him though there is a difference between the Tamils in Batticaloa and Jaffna. No one knows if Karuna has an ulterior motive, or if he is following the orders of his leader. Karuna, like Prabakaran, is not very comfortable at times of peace. He is a real warlord of the LTTE.
* "At one time Karuna had no control over the political leader of the LTTE in Batticaloa, Karikalan. Karikalan went on a rampage in the East harassing Muslims and making his own decisions. He also upset S.P. Tamilchelvan, the leader of LTTE's political wing, by taking charge of Batticaloa's political operations and doing things his way. Observers say that his action made Tamilchelvan very insecure at the time. However, the shelling Karikalan got from Prabakaran settled matters for everyone. Karuna, the military man in Batticaloa, has a better control of the situation now. Karuna also has a great understanding with Paduman, a leader in Trincomalee described by Balasingham as Colonel Paduman. Paduman too is a strong military leader of the LTTE and was seated next to Karuna at Prabakaran's press conference (in April,2002).
* "It is well-known that he has gained total control of Batticaloa and is strengthening Batticaloa and the East through mass mobilisation and collection of arms and ammunition. He has reorganised LTTE cadres into regiments. The "Pongu Tamil" and the anti-Indian "Annai Bupathi" celebrations held in Batticaloa helped Karuna in his mass mobilisation. The Tigers tried through these two events to project the image of the LTTE as the only saviours of Tamils in Sri Lanka.
* "Four LTTE boats intercepted by the Sri Lanka Navy recently carried a large stock of arms and ammunition. The boats also carried hardcore Batticaloa cadres returning from the North. These boats were released without taking any count of arms or other items lying with the LTTE. Karuna and Paduman were also in those boats. There were reports about the presence of LTTE intelligence chief Pottu Amman. However, informed sources confirm that Pottu Amman was not in any of the boats. He had taken the sea route and landed before the Sri Lankan Navy intercepted the boats.
* Prabakaran has also started to recruit more cadres from Jaffna and the opening of the A-9 highway helped him to reach out to more people than ever before. It was never in doubt that Prabakaran has most faith in his people from Jaffna even though it was Karuna's people from the East who fought hard for the LTTE in recent times. Unconfirmed reports say that Balasingham had warned Prabakaran to keep Karuna under control.
* "No one knows what Karuna is up to. It is Karuna that Sri Lanka's Minister of Defence, Thilak Marapona, and even Prabakaran have got to watch closely. Karuna may prove people wrong, people who believe that everything will end the day Prabakaran goes to 'heaven'. In fact Karuna is emerging as a formidable leader of the LTTE though he hails from the East. He could be even more ruthless than Prabakaran. Karuna may even tell Prabakaran one day: "I will look after the East and you look after the North."
35. These are very relevant questions, but it would be difficult to answer them at present. All one could say is that Karuna's position is not as strong as he seems to think it is and not as weak as Prabhakaran seems to wish it is. Even presuming that the overwhelming majority of Karuna's followers remain loyal to him, which is doubtful since they may not wish to contribute to a weakening of the struggle for Tamil Eelam, the two forces would be evenly matched and the outcome uncertain.
36..There are conflicting estimates of the real strength of the LTTE, from 9,000 plus and above. The LTTE designates its military formations in Tamil as "Padaipirivu", which means unit. Many analysts translate it in English as Brigade and estimate that each brigade must be having a minimum strength of 2,000 plus. This results in over-estimation. Each "padaipirivu" of the LTTE has a minimum strength of around 1200 only, that is, equivalent to a conventional battalion. In the year 2000, the LTTE had four full-strength "padaipirivus", namely,
* The Charles Anthony Padaipirivu, which was directly under Prabakaran and was commanded by Sornam, the chief of his bodyguards (since transferred to Trincomallee). It was,inter alia, responsible for his personal security. He took into it only Tamils from the North known for their loyalty to him.37.After the battles of 1999, Prabhakaran had decided to raise two more padaipirivus. They are presumably already in position, but details are not available. In addition, the LTTE has an artillery padaipirivu with six batteries,a logistics padaipirivu and the Black Tigers (estimated strength 240 plus), the suicide unit, which consists largely of volunteers from the North. Presuming that the two new padaipirivus are already in position, the total strength of the LTTE army is estimated at 7,200 plus. Balraj, as the deputy chief of the army, commanded this entire force and Karuna used to report to Prabhakaran through him. Media reports that Karuna had at his disposal 6,000 fighters from the East seem somewhat exaggerated. A more reasonable estimate would be 1,200 plus. In a military confrontation, it would be reasonable to expect that the Charles Anthony Padaipirivu (1,200), the Black Tigers and the intelligence wing would be fiercely loyal to Prabhakaran. The Jayanthan Padaipirivu (1,200) may be loyal to Karuna. It would be difficult to say anything about the remaining padaipirivus. The ultimate outcome of any confrontation would depend upon how many of the fighters from the East would obey Karuna and disobey Prabhakaran.* The Jayanthan Padaippirivu. It used to be commanded by Ram. It consists exclusively of fighters recruited in the Eastern Province and hence likely to be loyal to Karuna.
* The Vithusha Padaipirivu. It was formed in 1996 by merging five independent companies of the women's wing of the LTTE. Its women fighters distinguished themselves in the battles of Op. Unceasing Waves II in 1999.Consists of fighters from the North as well as the East.
* The Leopards Padaipirivu. It is the LTTE's special commando force.Consists of fighters from the North as well as the East.
(The writer is Additional Secretary (retd), Cabinet Secretariat, Govt. of India, New Delhi, and, presently, Director, Institute For Topical Studies, Chennai, and Distinguished Fellow and Convenor, Observer Research Foundation (ORF), Chennai Chapter. E-Mail: corde@vsnl.com )
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