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Paper no. 1009
27. 5. 2004
INDIA, JIHADI TERRORISM & IRAQ
by B.Raman
Since 1989, the jihadi terrorism directed against India has passed through the following stages:
FROM 1989 to 1993
2.The jihadi terrorism was largely centred in J&K and was the work of indigenous Kashmiri organisations trained and armed by Pakistan's Inter-Services Intelligence (ISI) in camps in Pakistan-Occupied Kashmir (POK). The terrorists mostly resorted to attacks with hand-held weapons. Instances of the use of improvised explosive devices (IEDS) and landmines were not large in number. There was no instance of suicide or suicidal terrorism. Kidnapping for ransom and for achieving political and operational demands was one of the modus operandi (MO) used. Very few non-Kashmiri Pakistani nationals and other foreign jihadis were infiltrated into J&K. The few who were infiltrated came and operated as members of the indigenous Kashmiri organisations and not as members of Pakistan-based jihadi organisations. The terrorists had no agenda outside J&K.
FROM 1993 to 1999
3.The terrorists started increasingly using IEDs and landmines. The IEDs were activated through timers or remote control devices. There was still no case of suicide or suicidal terrorism. Non-Kashmiri Pakistanis and other foreign nationals trained in camps set up in Afghan territory after the capture of Kabul by the Afghan Mujahideen in 1992 started infiltrating into J&K in increasing numbers. They no longer operated as members of indigenous Kashmiri organisations. Instead, they operated as members of Pakistani jihadi organisations such as the Harkat-ul-Mujahideen (HUM), the Lashkar-e-Toiba (LET), the Harkat-ul-Jihad-al-Islami (HUJI), Al Badr etc.
4.While the LET claimed responsibility for its successful operations in its name, the others preferred to let the indigenous Kashmiri organisations, which supported the merger of J&K with Pakistan, claim responsibility in their names. The responsibility for many successful operations of the HUM and the HUJI, which were operating together under the name of Harkat-ul-Ansar (HUA) before October,1997, was often claimed by the Hizbul Mujahideen (HM), the terrorist wing of the Jamaat-e-Islami (JEI) of J&K, which is an appendage of the JEI of Pakistan, headed by Qazi Hussain Ahmed.However, there were exceptions to this. An important example was the kidnapping of a group of foreign tourists by the HUA under the name of Al Faran in 1995.
5.The Pakistani organisations expanded the agenda of their terrorism, which became increasingly religious, with pan-Islamic slogans and objectives used to justify their jihad. They started projecting the jihad in J&K as part of the world-wide jihad of the Muslims. They described J&K as the gateway to India and their jihad in J&K as only the beginning of a struggle for the "liberation" of the Muslims of India and for the formation of an Islamic Caliphate in South Asia. The jihad was extended to Indian territory outside J&K too, starting with the Mumbai blasts of March,1993.
6.After capturing power in Kabul in September,1996, the Taliban ordered the HM to quit Afghan territory because of its (the Taliban's) differences with the JEI and handed over its training camps to the HUM and the HUJI. The HUM joined Osama bin Laden's International Islamic Front (IIF) in 1998. The LET and the HUJI followed later. The US Cruise missile attacks on the training infrastructure of Al Qaeda in Afghanistan in 1998 in retaliation for the explosions of August,1998, outside the US Embassies in Nairobi and Dar-es-Salaam destroyed the training camps of the HUM and the HUJI too. In fact, they suffered more casualties and damage than Al Qaeda in the Cruise missile attacks. They shifted their training infrastructure back to Pakistani territory in the North-Weat Frontier Province (NWFP), Punjab, the POK and the Northern Areas (NA---Gilgit & Baltistan).
FROM 1999 to 2003
7.After the Kargil conflict of May-June,1999, the Pakistani jihadi organisations took over the leadership role in the jihad in J&K and other parts of India. The Jaish-e-Mohammad (JEM) made its appearance in the jihadi scene in 1990 and joined the IIF. Inspired by Al Qaeda, suicide/suicidal terrorism made its appearance in J&K and there was increasing resort to it by the LET essentially and also sometimes by the JEM. The LET started setting up sleeper cells in different parts of India, including Mumbai, Andhra Pradesh, Karnataka and Tamil Nadu, to which recruitment was made from amomgst Indian Muslims living in India and West Asia, and established contacts with the Muslims of the Eastern Province of Sri Lanka and Singapore.
8.When the US-led war against international terrorism spearheaded by Al Qaeda started in Afghanistan in October 2001, in the wake of the 9/11 terrorist strikes in the US, a large number of jihadis from the HUM and the HUJI left their training camps in Pakistani territory and went to Afghanistan to join the jihad against the US. They suffered large casualties in the US air strikes. This affected their capability for jihad in Indian territory. Their dregs, who had escaped the US air strikes, focussed largely on terrorist actions against the US and other Western nationals and interests in Pakistani territory. The LET and the JEM avoided involvement in the jihad against the US in Afghanistan. As a result, their capability for jihad worldwide remained unimpaired.
9.The US-led invasion of Iraq was preceded and followed by the jihadi terrorists of Al Qaeda inspiration opening a second jihadi front against the US. Many of the jihadis of Al Qaeda and other components of the IIF started gravitating towards Iraq to fight against the US just as thousands of jihadis from all over the world had gravitated towards Afghanistan in the 1980s to fight against the Soviet troops. However, the movement in Iraq is not yet in their thousands. The maximum number, who have gone to Iraq, is estimated to be around 600--consisting of the Chechen and Arab dregs of Al Qaeda and Pakistanis belonging to the HUM, the LET and the anti-Shia Lashkar-e-Jhangvi.
10.Initially, there was no evidence of a common command and control, but since April,2004, there is increasing evidence of a common command and control possibly exercised by Abu Musab al Zarqawi, presuming he is still alive. Simultaneously with their jihadi operations in Iraq, the dregs of Al Qaeda and the IIF have also stepped up their acts of terrorism in Saudi territory.
11.For them, the control of Saudi territory is important for achieving success against the US for two reasons. Firstly, Saudi Arabia could act as a rear base for the anti-US jihad in Iraq just as Pakistan had served as a rear base for the anti-Soviet jihad in Afghanistan. Secondly, they can use Saudi oil as a jihadi weapon in their attempts to bring about the collapse of the Western economy.
12.The jihadis of Al Qaeda inspiration are determined to step up their operations against US nationals and interests in a bid to bring about the defeat of President Bush in the Presidential elections of November next. While the US officials are apprehending major terrorist strikes in US territory and rightly stepping up their physical security, the thinking amongst important sections of the jihadi strategic analysts in Pakistan is that major terrorist strikes in the US might prove counter-productive and make the Americans rally behind Bush and ensure his re-election. They are, therefore, advocating spectacular terrorist strikes in Iraq and Saudi Arabia to make the Americans bleed heavily and to hit at the Western economy. In their calculation, terrorist strikes in the US could unite the Americans behind Bush, but in Iraq and Saudi Arabia could further divide the Americans and weaken support for Bush.
13.While Zarqawi, presuming he is still alive, is probably exercising command and control in Iraq and possibly in Saudi Arabia too, the LET has assumed responsibility for command and control in the rest of Asia and Australia. It is not clear who is exercising command and control in Europe and the US.
SINCE JANUARY 2004
14. It is significant to note that no Afghan terrorists belonging to the Taliban and the Hizb-e-Islami of Gulbuddin Heckmatyar have moved to Iraq. They are focussing on their jihad against the US troops in Afghanistan from their bases in Pakistani territory. Similarly, no Kashmiri terrorists belonging to any of the indigenous Kashmiri organisations have moved to Iraq. They continue to focus on their jihad against India. The movement of the foreign jihadis to Iraq and Saudi Arabia is showing signs (still tentative) of a qualitative change in the jihad against India. Indicators of such qualitative change are:
* A declining trend in acts of jihadi terrorism in Indian territory outside J&K.15. What has been the role of Pakistan's military-intelligence establishment in sponsoring and supporting jihadi terrorism against India to annex J&K. There has been a change of tactics, but there is no evidence of a change in their strategy of using terrorism as a weapon to achieve their objective. This change of tactics is marked by the following features:* A declining trend in suicide/suicidal terrorism in J&K.
* Indigenous Kashmiri organisations once again seeking to re-assume their leadership role on the ground, which they had lost to foreign jihadis post-1993. The use of an IED to kill over 30 members of the Border Security Force (BSF) and their families in Lower Munda on the Jammu-Srinagar highway on May 23, 2004, for which the HM has claimed responsibility, is part of this process of the Kashmiri terrorist organisations once again coming to the forefront.
* Restoration of the leadership role of the indigenous Kashmiri terrorist organisations and letting them claim responsibility for the operations of even Pakistani jihadi organisations in order to give an impression to the international community that what is now happening in J&K is a freedom struggle and not pan-Islamic jihadi terrorism. A large number of Pakistani jihadis trained and infiltrated into India post-1999 are still at large and should be able to keep up the jihad for many years even in the absence of fresh infiltration.16. What is happening in Iraq is of tremendous importance from the medium and long-term point of view of India's counter-terrorism strategy. The failure of the Soviet troops in Afghanistan to prevail over the jihadis and their withdrawal from there gave the jihadis a feeling that they have defeated one super power. Were the US troops to fail to prevail over the jihadis in Iraq and withdraw in humiliation from there, they would think that Islamic jihad has defeated the other super power too. With their morale and feelings of invincibility strengthened, they would start spreading out in different directions including India, thereby aggravating our national security problems.* Decreasing emphasis on pan-Islamic objectives by organisations in J&K controlled by Pakistan and once again projecting the future of J&K as their main and only agenda.
* Encouraging and facilitating the movement of foreign and Pakistani jihadis to Iraq in order to avoid US pressure for action against them in Pakistani territory.
17. Even if they do not succeed in the long-term ,but succeed in the short-term in causing serious disruption of the oil supplies, the Indian economy is likely to be badly hit and our aspirations of emerging as a major economic power could be belied.
18. The US invasion and occupation of Iraq was a Himalayan blunder, which has been compounded by the beastly acts of some US troops against Iraqi prisoners. No words can be too strong to condemn their brutalities and to demand action against them. But it would be extremely short-sighted on our part to let any anger against the US cloud our lucid-thinking and to wish for the defeat of the US troops by the jihadis in Iraq.
19. The US is presently facing a no win situation in Iraq. This has to be converted into a no defeat situation. A no defeat in the war against jihadi terrorists in Iraq is in the common interest of all victims of jihadi terrorism in the world, including India.
(The writer is Additional Secretary (retd), Cabinet Secretariat, Govt. of India, and, presently, Director, Institute For Topical Studies,Chennai, and Distinguished Fellow and Convenor, Observer Research Foundation (ORF), Chennai Chapter. E-Mail--corde@vsnl.com )
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