Paper no. 1015	01. 06. 2004
SHAM TRANSFER OF IRAQI SOVEREIGNTY IN DISARRAY Guest Column-by K. Gajendra Singh Caught in the quagmire of its own making, George W. Bush Administration is now looking for ways and means to “quit” Iraq and is looking for someone reliable to whom Iraq’s “sovereignty” can be handed over because the polls indicate that 64 percent of Americans believe Bush has no clear plans for Iraq. The sovereignty timetable remains driven by the American electoral calendar and growing Iraqi impatience with a deeply unpopular occupation. So a date, 30 June, 2004 was fixed in November 2003 to handover “sovereignty” to some Iraqi “entity “ and then tell US electorate that “ the Mission” in Iraq ( changed from time to time ) was accomplished.  Both on internal matters and foreign affairs discordant voices are now emerging in Washington. Attorney General John Ashcroft warned last week of alarming intelligence that "indicates Al Qaeda's specific intention to hit the United States hard," while Tom Ridge, secretary of homeland security, reassured interviewers that there really was not much new intelligence floating around, just a general concern that Al Qaeda would try to influence the election or attack big events, like the Group of 8 summit meeting in Georgia and national political conventions. So many alerts have been sounded in USA and UK that it might become the “cry wolf” fable as steps taken to stop terrorist attacks are far from fool proof  A few weeks ago, officials from Bush down said there was only one fate for the radical cleric Motqada al-Sadr, leader of the Shiite militia that has been occupying the Iraqi city of Najaf: "Kill or capture."  Under a deal last week, the murder charges against him were apparently dropped. The White House had said earlier that his militia must be broken up, but it is intact and even now active. Another deal cut four weeks ago with Sunni rebels in Falluja, effectively turned the city over to former Baathist commanders acceptable to the insurgents. The United States would hand over to the interim government a deteriorating military situation. Many in Washington complain that U.S. commanders, desperate to avoid clashes heading into the June 30 transfer, have granted concessions to Sunni and Shiite insurgents, greatly strengthening the hand of sectarian militias answerable neither to Baghdad nor to Washington. "What we're trying to do is extricate ourselves from Falluja," said a senior U.S. official familiar with U.S. strategy who would speak only on the condition of anonymity. "There's overwhelming pressure with the Coalition Provisional Authority and the White House to deliver a successful Iraq transition, and Iraq is proving uncooperative."  People in Washington are asking how did an administration that made an art form of singing from the same hymn suddenly lose its rhythm? "What you find is that coerced discipline often erodes," said an expert ,"And when it goes, it really goes. Some of that rigor of message was suddenly the stuff of coercion, born of fear rather than real loyalty."  Even Richard Perle, until recently a powerful adviser to U.S. Defence Secretary Donald Rumsfeld, described U.S. policy in post-war Iraq as a failure "I would be the first to acknowledge we allowed the liberation (of Iraq) to subside into an occupation. And I think that was a grave error, and in some ways a continuing error," said Perle. "We didn't have to find ourselves in the role of occupier. We could have made the transition that is going to be made at the end of June more or less immediately," he told BBC radio. "The war itself has led to, rightly or wrongly, the feeling among many in the military that they're not receiving competent direction, that it is too ideological, and that a lot of their military efforts have been wasted by what they regard as poor, inept planning for the stability phase," said Anthony Cordesman, a former Pentagon official now with the Center for Strategic and International Studies. Meanwhile, the military has been stained by a scandal in which soldiers physically and sexually abused Iraqi prisoners. "It's obvious there has been damage to the U.S. military as an institution because it is over-strained and it is over-deployed. And it is beginning to see its morale erode because it is losing confidence in the direction of the war," Cordesman said. Military historian Richard Kohn said a natural tension always exists between political appointees to head the Defense Department and the professional military officers, but Rumsfeld's relationship with the military brass has been as tense as any defense secretary except Robert McNamara, the Vietnam War era Pentagon chief. US led coalition, now weakening, with Spain and few others having withdrawn their troops already, invaded Iraq against the will of most of the members of the United Nations, thus fatally under-mining what ever credibility the world body had left after its misuse first by big powers and then by USA since the fall of the Berlin Wall. With its deplorable record of resolutions and implementation of food for oil program in Iraq, UN remains a hated, some what irrelevant and partisan entity as far as Iraqis are concerned. Even some Iraqi diplomats now under training in India, with whom this writer interacted recently, had no good word for the UN which “takes orders from USA”. The attack  last August which devastated the UN compound, killing Vieira de Mello, the UN Special Envoy and another score persons did lead to some soul searching about the neutrality of the world body, its utility and even its relevance.  Since then there have been few takers for UN work in Iraq.  The US led coalition forces have broken almost all international laws and conventions as occupation forces. It is a tragic example of United States held as an ideal becoming an outlaw with majority of US leadership in the Congress acquiescing and with a corporate owned subservient media waking up only when the misadventure was turning into an albatross, with the Iraqi people showing determination not to colonized once again  Transfer of “Sovereignty” On the question of transfer of sovereignty, Bush’s ever faithful ally Tony Blair was out of step when he insisted that after the June 30 handover the Iraqi interim government would have "full sovereignty". He said ‘yes ‘ when Liberal Democrat leader, Charles Kennedy asked if the Iraqi government would be able to "retain control of both its oil revenues and its prisoners. While at the same time Paul Wolfowitz, the US deputy defence secretary, told the Senate foreign relations committee that "June 30 is not a magical date on which the coalition provisional authority (CPA) will suddenly [pass] all of its responsibilities to a new Iraqi government". Wolfowitz added that under the Transitional Administrative Law - the document which lays out broad principles covering the post-June 30 period - CPA orders "shall remain in force until rescinded or amended by legislation duly enacted and having the force of law". Before President George Bush expounded his views on transfer of power to Americans on 24 May  ( more such speeches are scheduled up to 30 June to shore up his slipping popularity), UK media aired the views of from British politicians, experts on Middle East, retired ambassadors and others. While USA would retain authority over the Development Fund for Iraq, established by the UN security council and supplied by revenue from the sale of Iraqi oil, other unanswered questions remain about the status of US-led foreign forces in Iraq and their relationship, militarily and legally, with Iraqi security forces. But what would convince Iraqis that they control their own sovereign state? Views expressed were "New laws should not be vetoed by the US, who should be there in a subordinate role. The UN security council will have to define the limits of the powers of the new transitional government in its resolution which brings it into being. The German idea of a national security council with representatives from Iraq, the UN, and US/UK to handle security decisions seems well worth developing. The main issue is not to have the Americans solely in charge of anything! And to be sure that they don't anticipate/succeed in pulling all the strings from behind the scenes via their advi on the civilian side and military command on the security side."   "The agreement on November 15, 2003 between the Iraqi governing council and the CPA provides for " full sovereignty for Iraq" to be assumed by June 30. In international law "full sovereignty" means the right of the Iraqi transitional national assembly (ITNA) to exercise all the functions of a state within the territory of Iraq, over all persons and things, and the right to exercise supreme authority over its citizens at home and abroad. The starting point must be that no limits or exceptions to "full sovereignty" can be presumed, and that any such limits or exceptions have to be agreed by the ITNA. Full sovereignty means control over everything, including budgets, prisons, laws, borders etc, subject to any constraints arising under international law. It includes control over any foreign military personnel, subject to any express agreement or security council resolution to the contrary, and the right to decide that foreign forces shall leave the territory of Iraq. It means also that the ITNA is free to enter into international agreements with other states, and to become a party to treaties such as the statute of the international criminal court.  "Absolute sovereignty may be less of a concern for the new government than we might think: the key question is perhaps one of its legitimacy. The Iraqi governing council was seen as lacking legitimacy in the eyes of most Iraqis not simply because it was perceived as being appointed by the US, but also because it had no real power to make decisions. Yet even if the scope of the interim government's sovereignty is curtailed by the US, there are other steps it might take to plug the legitimacy gap. Holding local elections would re-engage the disaffected Iraqi population, and contribute to the development of a 'democratic culture' inside the country. Such elections might also result in the emergence of local representatives who might move on to play a role in politics at the national level following the January 2005 elections."  Runaway Pentagon  It is now accepted that strategically the invasion was poorly planned and executed. Former Commander of the Central Command and later special envoy to the Middle East, Marine Gen Anthony Zinni , had described in 2002 some plans to invade Iraq hare brained and likely to end as “ Bay of goats “ disaster, like John Kennedy’s 1961 “ Bay of Pigs” misadventure in Cuba. Now in his new book  "Battle Ready" he writes that in the lead up to the Iraq war and its later conduct, he saw at a minimum, true dereliction, negligence and irresponsibility, at worse, lying, incompetence and corruption. “I think there was dereliction in insufficient forces being put on the ground and fully understanding the military dimensions of the plan. I think there was dereliction in lack of planning. Even before the conflict, not just generals, but others -- diplomats, those in the international community that understood the situation, friends of ours in the region felt strongly we were underestimating the problems and the scope of the problems we would have in there.” Recently both Secretary Rumsfeld and his deputy acknowledged that they hadn't anticipated the level of violence that would continue in Iraq a year after the war began.  When Zinni criticised the group of policymakers within the administration known as "the neo-conservatives" who saw the invasion of Iraq as a way to stabilize American interests in the region and strengthen the position of Israel, he was called anti-Semite. They include Deputy Defense Secretary Paul Wolfowitz; Undersecretary of Defense Douglas Feith; Former Defense Policy Board member Richard Perle; National Security Council member Eliot Abrams; and Vice President Cheney's chief of staff, Lewis "Scooter" Libby. Zinni believes they are political ideologues who have hijacked American policy in Iraq. Zinni adds that the Pentagon relied on inflated intelligence information about weapons of mass destruction from Iraqi exiles, like Ahmed Chalabi and others, whose credibility was in doubt. There was no viable plan or strategy for governing post-Saddam Iraq. “As best as I could see, I saw a pickup team, very small, insufficient in the Pentagon with no detailed plans that walked onto the battlefield after the major fighting stopped and tried to work it out in the huddle -- in effect to create a seat-of-the-pants operation on reconstructing a country.” As for Ambassador Bremer, Gen Zinni says ”he has made mistake after mistake after mistake, like disbanding the army, de-Baathifying, even people that were competent and didn’t have blood on their hands and were needed in the aftermath of reconstruction – alienating certain elements of that society.”   Zinni’s plan called for troops around 300,000 (instead of 180,000) , what Gen. Shinseki had suggested and was reprimanded by Rumsfeld. Gen Zinni explained   “I think it's critical in the aftermath, if you're gonna go to resolve a conflict through the use of force, and then to rebuild the country.” “The first requirement is to freeze the situation, is to gain control of the security. To patrol the streets. To prevent the looting. To prevent the 'revenge' killings that might occur. To prevent bands or gangs or militias that might not have your best interests at heart from growing or developing,” he added.  Zinni believes this was a war the generals didn’t want – but it was a war the civilians wanted. Iraq was the wrong war at the wrong time - with the wrong strategy. Others who had opposed the war were former National Security Advisor Brent Scowcroft, former Centcom Commander Norman Schwarzkopf, former NATO Commander Wesley Clark, and former Army Chief of Staff Eric Shinseki and had voiced their reservations.  “If we are going to ‘stay the course,’( as Bush always insists ) the course is headed over Niagara Falls” warns Zinni.  Sow war and reap terror   Gen.Zinni added that Saddam was effectively contained by the no-fly, no-drive zones and the sanctions that were imposed on him. “Now, at the same time, we had this war on terrorism. We were fighting al Qaeda. We were engaged in Afghanistan. We were looking at 'cells' in 60 countries. We were looking at threats that we were receiving information on and intelligence on. And I think most of the generals felt, let's deal with this one at a time. Let's deal with this threat from terrorism, from al Qaeda.” But Bush made Iraq war the central plank of his so-called war on terror.  A report from a leading think-tank, the International Institute for Strategic Studies suggested last week that the wars in Iraq and Afghanistan have only accelerated recruitment for Al Qaeda. It is estimated that the extremist network now has 18,000 radical militants in its ranks and cells in more than 60 countries. "Al Qaeda must be expected to keep trying to develop more promising plans for terrorist operations in North America and Europe — potentially involving weapons of mass destruction," institute director John Chipman told a news conference to launch the think-tank's annual survey of world  A Colonial War As for raison d’etre for invasion, weapons of mass destruction, it was only a pretext as Wolfowitz admitted soon after the invasion. Saudi Ambassador in London, Prince Turki al-Faisal, recently said in an interview that the U.S.-led invasion of Iraq was a colonial war "No matter how exalted the aims of the U.S. in that war, in the final analysis it was a colonial war very similar to the wars conducted by the ex-colonial powers when they went out to conquer the rest of the world ...," "What we have heard from American sources they were there to remove the weapons of mass destruction which Saddam Hussein was supposed to have acquired." "What we read and hear from our commentators in America and sometimes congressional sources, if you remember going back a year ago, there was the issue of the oil reserves in Iraq and that in a year or two they would be producing so much oil in Iraq that, as it were, the war would pay for itself  -- indicated that there were those in America who were thinking in those terms of acquiring the natural resources of Iraq for America." Prince Turki added  According to year old United Nations estimates, about 80% of all Iraqis lived in poverty. Wars, government mismanagement under Saddam Hussein, and the consequences of the UN sanctions led to the continuous shrinking of the economy despite huge oil reserves. The Gross Domestic Product which was still $3,300 per person in 1980, fell to $1,200 shortly before the Iraq war. This desolate situation has worsened, not improved, since the war. It is suspected that the unemployment hovers around 60% if not more. One cause is Bremer's decision to dissolve the Baath party, the Iraqi army, and the national security forces, making about 500,000 soldiers and employees lose their jobs. So GDP of 2003, according to estimates of the World Bank, shrunk yet again and was between $450 and $610 in end 2003.  As a UN weapons inspector, Scott Ritter inspected a facility in June of 1996 but found no evidence of WMD. Instead , he did find an organization that specialized in the construction and employment of "improvised explosive devices" - now killing Americans daily in Iraq. So Iraqis were preparing for all contingencies. Of course they have full details of buildings, roads and other installations. The insurgency is home grown, he added. In spite of its heterogeneity Iraq, has been a nation for eighty years, having successfully overcome the British colonialism and an imposed Hashamite dynasty. This unity was maintained during the war with Iran in 1980s after the Khomeini revolution, in spite of a Shiite majority in Iraq .  Iraqis have serious differences among themselves but when it comes to outsiders they close ranks. Cooperation between Sunnis and Shi'ites  against the invading US led alliance emerged immediately after the US led war. Ahmad Kubeisi, Iraq's most important Sunni scholar, in a post prayer sermon in April 2003 said that Baghdad had been occupied by the Mongols, (referring to the sacking of the capital of the Muslim world in 1258 by Hulegu and his hordes ). Now the new Mongols were creating divisions between Sunnis and Shi'ites, he said . The Shi'ites and Sunnis were one, however, and they should remain united and reject foreign occupation. As all religious leaders had suffered under Saddam Hussein he added that they had all suffered together earlier. There were no Sunnis or Shi'ites, all Iraqis were Muslims, and they must defend their country together from the new invaders. Throughout Iraq, Sunnis and Shi'ites held joint prayers and their militias supported each other, during  the battles of Fallujah, Najaf and Karbala, when radical Sunni, former Ba'athist and hardline Shi'ite militias, collectively known as the muqawama, or resistance, sent medical aid and weapons to one another and even fought together.  Inspite of Saddam Hussein’s brutal regime, the numerous wars and the murderous 13 years of sanctions ,the indomitable Iraqi spirit which survived British colonization after the first world war refuses to bend. Any student of history of political violence will tell you how against repression, exploitation and denial of freedom, individual and group violence coalesces into insurgency and then into a war for freedom and independence. Some thing Bush and Blair refused to understand. Instead they chose to listen to the echo of their own voices bouncing back at them from some of the Iraqi opposition groups, nurtured, financed and trained by the Pentagon and the CIA. Now outgoes Ahmed Chalabi, incomes Ayad Allawi. Pentagon favourite replaced by CIA favourite.  The US authority's attempts to define the so called "Sunni triangle" and "Shi'ite Baghdad and south" failed to divide the Iraqi people or drive them into internecine conflict. From the very beginning Iraqis wanted US and other troops to leave. The only people who believe that the US will bring democracy to Iraq are the few who have still not fully grasped America's role in Iraq's modern history, the strategic significance of Iraq and US foreign policy in the region. Even the members of the Council know, some are trying to guard their sectarian interests, others joining in the loot going on, fully knowing it will not last for ever. Chalabi has collected enough information from the tons of records of Saddam Hussien regime to blackmail rulers of neighbouring kingdoms and even those in the West who had collaborated with him during the 1980s Iraq-Iran war. The governing council is not so much hated as ridiculed. Support for the council is largely confined to some activists of the organisations that belong to it. Indeed, it could be argued that most supporters of the more credible organisations belonging to the council are opposed to membership of the US-appointed body. The leaders of the Supreme Council of the Islamic Revolution in Iraq (Sciri), for example, are finding it increasingly hard to convince these supporters that cooperation with the invaders is still a possible route to independence and democracy. The same goes for another smaller but equally credible party, the Islamic Da'wa, which experienced a split and serious haemorrhaging of membership following its decision to join the council. Some council members have been killed, all need as heavy security as the American administrators. Interim Government –Old wine in old bottle  So the US appointed Iraqi Governing Council has now selected Ayad Allawi as the prime minister of interim Iraqi government which will hold elections early next year ( after US elections were over ). Mr. Allawi was not the choice of Lakhdar Brahimi, the UN envoy, charged to form the transition government and give it a stamp of UN legality and credibility. His  choice which was technocrat Hussain Shahristani, who was forced to withdraw following opposition by other council members. Council members 'feel they are a kind of club, and Shahristani was an outsider and could not get the support of this club, 'said an aide to Shahristani. Allawi had lobbied furiously for the job. Brahimi, was forced into accepting it under joint pressure from the US and the council. Eighteen out of  25 members the Council hold foreign passports. Allawi, a Shiite, himself is a British citizen and until 1975 was a Baathist. He now heads the Iraqi National Accord and is a long term protegé of the CIA and MI6 and like most others spent much of his life in exile. A day later Bremer and Brahimi finalized most other names. To pacify the Kurds key portfolios of defence and foreign affairs were allotted to them( where Bremer’s successor, ambassador Negroponte would continue to take all decisions .He comes with an unsavory reputation in Latin America ) As yet there is no agreement on the next president of Iraq, a decorative post only but 82 year old Sunni, Adnan Pachachi , another long term exile, remains the front runner for USA and the UN. May 31 remains the last date for selections. But the charade of the Council insisting on its candidate Ghazi al-Yawar, an exile and the Council member, as if it were elected by the Iraqi people, remains incongruous, reminding of the days after the first world war and Iraq under British High Commissioner Sir Percy Cox and similar doings of the Iraqi politicians. Only the role of Kurds in the North, who have enjoyed US protection since 1991 remains ambiguous.  But even they admit that the security situation was better under Saddam Hussein. A press release from Patriotic Union of Kurdistan of May 27 said that “the current situation in Iraq and the new found attitude of the US, UK and UN, has led to a serious re-think for the Kurds. The proposed plans do not seem to promise “the expected” Kurdish role in the future of a new Iraq. The Kurds feel betrayed once again.” It added that that”  if the plight of the Kurds is ignored yet again and we are left with no say in the future of a new Iraq, the will of the Kurdish people will be too great for the Kurdish political parties to ignore, leading to a total withdrawal from any further discussions relating to the formation of any new Iraqi government. This will certainly not serve the unity of Iraq.” Underlining  that the Kurds have been the only true friends and allies of the coalition the release concluded that “the Kurds will no longer be second class citizens in Iraq.” Analysts say the post-handover government will be as unknown and unpopular as the current Governing Council, which is widely seen as a U.S. puppet. "The Iraqi people want to see new faces," said Sadoun al-Dulame, head of the Iraqi Centre for Research and Strategic Studies. "They thought the new government would be different. But instead the new government is being nominated by the Governing Council. What about the United Nations? This is what Iraqis are asking." A late April opinion polls for the coalition, said that Mr. Allawi, one of the least popular members of the council was opposed by 61% while only 22% supported him. Others are equally little-known and unpopular. Conclusion:  “Gentlemen, sovereignty and Sultanate are not given to any one by anyone because scholarship proves that they should be; or through discussion and debate. Sovereignty and Sultanate are taken by strengths, by power and by force.  It was by force that the sons of Osman seized the sovereignty and Sultanate of the Turkish nation; they have maintained this usurpation for six centuries.  Now the Turkish nation has rebelled and has put a stop to these usurpers and has effectively taken sovereignty and Sultanate in its own hands.  This is an accomplished fact ---  Thus admonished Kemal Ataturk the Grand National Assembly in Ankara in 1923, when some members including Islamic clerics and scholars opposed his proposal to abolish the Sultanate. Many including some of his comrades had wanted the Sultanate to continue. A vote by applause after his intervention abolished the 6 centuries old institution, leaving Ataturk to embark on his program of westernizing and modernizing the new nation forged out of the ashes of the Ottoman empire.  The nucleus of those who will take back Iraq’s sovereignty by force and blood has come into being at Falluja and Najaf. These are first recognizable but critical developments in Iraqi resistance for freedom and the war for independence. Falluja, where 700 to 1000 people paid with their lives to establish the first independent space in their country, are now guarded by the very troops of demonized Saddam Hussein. Iraqis prefer them to hated US soldiers. The chances of succeeding in Falluja were as high as of Imam Hussein and his supporters in Karbala in 680 AD. But with the world watching, Iraqis in Falluja were prepared to sacrifice even more lives. It would have been un-necessary slaughter. It also  exposed the limitations of sheer brutal power. At the same time the Shiites in Najaf , Kebala and South Iraq led by the rising young Motqada al-Sadr made the point that Iraqi people, whether Sunni or Shiite Arabs were all determined to see USA forces out of Iraq. Questions remain only about the Kurds in the north, under US-UK protection since 1991. (K Gajendra Singh, served as Indian Ambassador to Turkey and Azerbaijan in 1992-96. Prior to that, he served as ambassador to Jordan (during the 1990-91 Gulf war), Romania and Senegal.  He is currently chairman of the Foundation for Indo-Turkic Studies.  The views expressed here are his own.- Email-Gajendrak@hotmail.com)
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