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Paper no. 1071
29 -07-2004
9/11 REPORT--PART III: THE NATIONAL INTELLIGENCE DIRECTOR
by B.Raman
Some interesting observations in the report:
* Intelligence is meant to be shared. Details as to how it was collected and from where or whom are not.2.WHAT WERE THE DEFICIENCIES IN THE INTELLIGENCE COMMUNITY BEFORE AND AFTER 9/11?* Agencies collect intelligence by spending the taxpayers' money. The taxpayers have a right to expect that they would share the intelligence with each other in order to protect national security.
* An agency does not have a proprietary right over the intelligence collected by it with the taxpayers' money.
* The need to share with each other and not the need to know should be the working principle of the intelligence community.
* Working culture agency-specific and not nation-specific. The concept of joint mission in the national interest absent. No multi-agency integration of operations.3. WHY THE ROLE OF THE DCI HAS BECOME INEFFECTIVE?* No common standards of evaluation, analysis and assessment. Each agency followed its own agency-specific practice.
* After the end of the Cold War, there has been a decline in the influence of the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) in the intelligence community. From being the first among equals, it has become one among equals. The TECHINT agencies, which form part of the Department of Defence (DOD), give priority to the DOD's requirements.
* Weak capacity of the Director, Central Intelligence, (DCI) to set priorities and allocate resources.
* The DCI wears three hats. He co-ordinates the functioning of all the 15 agencies of the intelligence community and acts as intelligence adviser to the President. Functions as the head of the CIA. Performs the role of the analysis-in-chief to the Government. Too many jobs. Unable to do justice to all of them and use effectively even the limited powers of co-ordination he has presently.
* The working of the community has become too complex, too secret and too arcane, rendering difficult the task of external oversight.
* He has limited control over the purse strings. Gets the budgetary requirements of different agencies, consolidates them and gets them approved by the President and the Congress. Once the allocations are approved and placed at the disposal of the agencies, he has no control how they actually spend them. That control is exercised by the respective departmental heads such as the Defence Secretary in the case of the TECHINT agencies.4.RECOMMENDATIONS: CREATION OF THE POST OF NATIONAL INTELLIGENCE DIRECTOR (NID)* Limited powers to hire and fire the heads of the agencies. It has been laid down that the heads of all national agencies will be appointed with the concurrence of the DCI. But if the Defence Secretary wants, he can get the head of a TECHINT agency appointed without the DCI's concurrence. The DCI has no powers to sack the head of any agency whose performance is found unsatisfactory.
* Has no powers to enforce common standards and practices, which all agencies must observe.
5. WHAT WOULD BE THE NID'S CHARTER OF RESPONSIBILITIES?* The post of DCI should be replaced by a newly-created post of NID.
* The President's nominee to the this post should be confirmed by the Senate and he would be required to testify before the Congress whenever called upon to do so.* He would have three deputies under him: The head of the CIA, who would supervise the day-to-day running of the CIA; the Under-Secretary of Defence for Intelligence, who would co-ordinate the functioning of all intelligence agencies, which come under the control of the Defence Department; and the official who would co-ordinate all units responsible for homeland security---which could be either the Executive Assistant Director for Intelligence of the FBI or the Under-Secretary for Homeland Security for Information Analysis and Infrastructure Protection.
* The report says: "The Defence Department's military intelligence programmes---the Joint Military Intelligence Programme (JMIP) and the Tactical Intelligence and Related Activities Programme (TIARA) would remain part of that Department's responsibility." This is not clear. Apart from the DIA, the intelligence Directorates of the Army, the Navy, the Air Force and the Marines too presently form part of the intelligence community as defined under the law. Does this mean that the NID's powers of supervision over the intelligence community would remain limited to the CIA and the TECHINT agencies of the DOD and would not extend to the intelligence Directorates of the four services? Probably so, but this has not been specifically stated.
* To oversee National Intelligence Centres (NICs) on specific subjects of interest across the US Government. The report describes the role of the NICs as "conducting joint collection and analysis". It refers to six such NICs which would deal with terrorism, WMD proliferation, international crime and narcotics, China/East Asia, Middle East and Russia/Eurasia. There is no reference to South, South-East and Central Asia, Afghanistan, Africa and Northern and Southern America. This does not mean that there would be no NICs specifically dealing with them. It describes the above-mentioned six NICS as "illustrative". That apparently means, there could be others dealing with regions/tasks not specifically mentioned in the report. The most confusing part of the report relates to the NIC. In the case of terrorism, the report makes it clear that the NIC dealing with terrorism would be housed in the proposed National Counter-Terrorism Centre which would function directly under the NID. In the case of others, the position is left vague with the following observation: " Other National Intelligence Centres---for instance, on counter-proliferation, crime and narcotics and China--- would be housed in whatever department or agency is best suited for them". It adds: " The Directors of the NICS would report to the NID. "Does this mean, for example, that the NIC dealing with China could be housed in the State Department and not necessarily in the CIA? If so, who will supervise it? Such questions have not been posed and answered. It would seem that each NIC would be responsible for strategic analysis and assignment of operational responsibilities (tasking) in respect of the subject under its jurisdiction.6. HOW WILL HE MANAGE THE NATIONAL INTELLIGENCE PROGRAMME?* To manage the national intelligence programme and oversee the agencies that contribute to it.
* He is sought to be given stronger powers in respect of nominations of the heads of different agencies of the intelligence community. The report says: "He should approve and submit nominations to the President" in respect of the heads of the "national intelligence capabilities". Presently, the DCI only concurs with the nominations. Their submission to the President and getting the nominations approved by him is the responsibility of the concerned departmental head---for example, the Defence Secretary in the case of the agencies of the DOD. Surprisingly, the report does not speak of his powers to recommend the firing of any head whose performance is not satisfactory. Presumably, this power is inherent and the Commission did not feel the need to make it explicit.7. WHAT WOULD BE HIS OTHER FUNCTIONS?* He is sought to be given better control over the purse strings. The report says: "The NID would submit a unified budget for national intelligence that reflects priorities chosen by the NSC, with an appropriate balance among the varieties of technical and human intelligence, collection and analysis. He or she would receive an appropriation for national intelligence and apportion the funds to the appropriate agencies, in line with that budget, and with authority to re-programme funds among the national intelligence agencies to meet any new priority." Presently, the DCI does not have the power to apportion and re-programme funds after the budget has been passed by the Congress. That power is with the respective departmental head. The report uses the words "national intelligence agencies". Of the 15 intelligence agencies in the US, the CIA, the National Security Agency, the National Geospatial Intelligence Agency, the National Reconnaissance Office and other national reconnaissance programmes are described as "national intelligence agencies". The rest, including the DIA and the intelligence Directorates of the Army, the Navy, the Air Force and the Marines, are described as "departmental intelligence agencies."
* From the use of the words "national intelligence capabilities" in respect of powers of nomination and "national intelligence agencies" in respect of budgetary control, it is apparent that the enhanced powers of the NID would not be applicable in the case of the departmental intelligence agencies.
* He would retain the present DCI's role as the principal intelligence adviser to the President.. The report says: 'We hope the President will come to look directly to the directors of the NICs to provide all-source analysis in their areas of responsibility, balancing the advice of these intelligence chiefs against the contrasting viewpoints that may be offered by departmental heads at State, Defence, Homeland Security, Justice and other agencies." There is no reference to the NID's role as the analysis-in-chief of the Government. Does this mean his role would be confined to stronger management and better co-ordination of the community as a whole with limited or no role in analysis and assessment of available intelligence?8. WHAT SHOULD BE THE FUTURE ROLE OF THE DIRECTOR,CIA?* He would authorise all operations---for intelligence collection as well as covert actions
* He would set uniform personnel, information sharing and information technology policies.
* Re-building its analytical capabilities.9. WHO SHOULD HANDLE COVERT ACTIONS IN FUTURE?* Strengthening its HUMINT capabilities.
* Strengthening the linguistic capabilities of his officers.
* Ensuring a better balance between unilateral and joint operations.
* Widening the sphere of recruitment so that he has at his disposal officers from different cultural backgrounds who could merge easily in different societies.
* "Ensuring a seamless relationship between human source collection and signals collection at the operational level?" What does this mean?
* The CIA should continue to be responsible for covert actions involving propaganda (My comment: Disinformation), non-military disruptions (My comment: Political destabilisation ) and renditions (My comment: What does this mean? Clandestine capture of wanted terrorists and narcotics barons in foreign territory and whisking them off to the US? ).10. OTHER RECOMMENDATIONS:* " Lead responsibility for directing and executing para-military operations, whether clandestine or covert, should shift to the Defence Department. There, it should be consolidated with the capabilities for training, direction and execution of such operations already being developed in the Special Operations Command." It gives, inter alia, the following reason for this recommendation: "Before 9/11, the CIA did not invest in developing a robust capability to conduct para-military operations with US personnel. It relied on proxies instead, organised by CIA operatives without the requisite military training . The results were unsatisfactory."
* My comment: Though the report does not say so, it is apparent that this recommendation for removing the responsibility for para-military covert actions from the CIA and giving it to the Special Operations Command of the military has arisen from the threats to the US national security from the proxies created and nurtured by the CIA in the past such as Osama bin Laden and many others who turned into Frankenstein's monsters. The Commission apparently felt that the CIA exercised very loose control over its para-military proxies, who have since become a menace to the US.
* A beginning in transparency by making the total intelligence budgets public. However, details of appropriations under different heads should remain secret.(The writer is Additional Secretary (retd), Cabinet Secretariat, Govt. of India, and, presently, Director, Institute For Topical Studies, Chennai, and Distinguished Fellow and Convenor, Observer Research Foundation (ORF), Chennai Chapter. E-Mail: corde@vsnl.com )* Better balance between the requirements of security and the advantages of shared knowledge.
* The creation of a trusted information network. Each agency can continue to have its own data-base, but the data-bases of different agencies should be inter-connected so that they could directly access each other's data-base. (To be continued)
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