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Paper no. 1079
06. 08. 2004
by B.Raman
The US does not have an internal intelligence agency similar to our Intelligence Bureau (IB) or a security agency similar to the MI5 of the UK or the Shin Bet of Israel. The Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI), which many outside the US mistakenly take for an internal intelligence or security agency, is really not so. It is categorised as a law enforcement agency and not as an intelligence agency.
2. It combines within itself the roles performed in India by the Central Bureau of Investigation (CBI) and the IB or the roles performed in the UK by the Security Service, popularly known as the MI5, and the Scotland Yard. It performs three functions: Investigation and prosecution of federal crime, counter-terrorism and counter-intelligence. As investigators and prosecutors, its officers are required to closely interact with the public and are accountable to the judiciary. They cannot withhold from the courts their investigative reports except in special cases and are called upon to testify in cases. Consequently, the majority of them do not enjoy the advantage of anonymity, which is essential for intelligence work.
3. Since the emphasis has generally been more on investigation and successful prosecution than on prevention, the preventive aspect of its work did not receive the attention it deserved before 9/11. Because of the importance given to investigation and prosecution, its officer recruits used to come mainly from the law schools of the country and its work culture used to be dominated by the lawyers' mentality and perspective, which are not very helpful in the collection of preventive intelligence.
4. It used to be alleged that the resources allotted for intelligence collection were being spent more for the collection of intelligence required for the successful investigation and prosecution of cases than for the collection of preventive intelligence.
5. Even before 9/11, there had been suggestions for the creation of a security agency similar to the MI5 to concentrate on the collection of intelligence within the country relevant to internal security, but these suggestions did not find favour either with the FBI or the policy and law makers. These demands acquired force after 9/11 and this was one of the issues examined by the 9/11 Commission.
6. Robert Mueller, the Director of the FBI, who testified before the Commission, strongly opposed the acceptance of this proposal. He argued that law enforcement and internal intelligence collection were two sides of the same coin and that bifurcating the two and creating a separate agency for internal intelligence collection would prove counter-productive.
7. His arguments would seem to have carried conviction with the Commission. It has rejected this proposal. At the same time, to strengthen the capability of the FBI for the collection of preventive intelligence, it has recommended the creation of a separate service in the FBI to focus exclusively on intelligence collection.
8. Among the reasons given by it for its rejection of this proposal are:
* "The FBI is accustomed to carrying out sensitive intelligence collection operations in compliance with the law. If a new domestic intelligence agency were outside of the Department of Justice, the process of legal oversight---never easy--- could become even more difficult. Abuse of civil liberties could create a backlash that would impair the collection of needed intelligence."9. In rejecting the proposal for a separate domestic intelligence agency, the Commission has also taken note of the following changes introduced by Robert Mueller even before 9/11:* " Creating a new domestic intelligence agency would divert attention of the officials most responsible for current counter-terrorism efforts while the threat remains high. Putting a new player into the mix of federal agencies with counter-terrorism responsibilities would exacerbate existing information-sharing problems."
* "A new domestic intelligence agency would need to acquire assets and personnel. The FBI already has 28,000 employees, 56 field offices, 400 satellite offices, and 47 Legal Attaches' offices (My comment: abroad); a laboratory, operations centre, and training facility; an existing network of informants, co-operating defendants and other sources; and relationships with State and local law enforcement, the CIA and foreign intelligence and law enforcement agencies."
* "Counter-terrorism investigations in the US very quickly become matters that involve violations of criminal law and possible law enforcement action. Because the FBI can have agents working on criminal matters and agents working on intelligence investigations concerning the same international terrorism target, the full range of investigative tools against a suspected terrorist can be considered within one agency."
* "Counter-terrorism investigations often overlap or are cued by other criminal investigations such as money-laundering or the smuggling of contraband. In the field, the close connection to criminal work has benefits."
* " Our recommendation to leave counter-terrorism intelligence collection in the US with the FBI still depends on an assessment that the FBI---if it makes an all-out effort to institutionalise change---can do the job."
* The creation within the FBI of an Office of Intelligence, overseen by one of its senior officers.10. After 9/11, the FBI has initiated a proposal for an Intelligence Directorate within it, which would include units for intelligence planning and policy and for the supervision of analysts and linguists. While taking note of this, the Commission has warned: " Despite having found acceptance of the Director's clear message that counter-terrorism is now the FBI's top priority, two years after 9/11, we also found gaps between some of the announced reforms and the reality in the field. We are concerned that management in the field offices still can allocate people and resources to local concerns that diverge from the national security mission. This system could revert to a focus on low-priority criminal justice cases over national security requirements."* The creation of separate Field Intelligence Groups in its field offices to focus exclusively on intelligence collection.
* Advances in improving its information technology systems and in increasing connectivity and information sharing with the various agencies of the intelligence community.
11. In other words, the Commission found that there is still a conflict in the FBI between priorities relating to criminal investigation and successful prosecution and those relating to preventive intelligence collection and whenever there is a resource crunch, the former continues to get greater attention than the latter, particularly in the field offices.
12.Keeping this in view, the Commission has made the following recommendation: " A specialised and integrated National Security Workforce should be established at the FBI, consisting of agents, analysts, linguists and surveillance specialists, who are recruited, trained, rewarded and retained to ensure the development of an institutional culture imbued with a deep expertise in intelligence and national security. The President, by executive order or direction, should direct the FBI to develop this intelligence cadre."
13. To ensure proper co-ordination of the criminal justice and the national security functions of the FBI and equal attention to both, the Commission has recommended as follows:
* All officer-recruits should receive training in both disciplines.14. The traditional resistance in the US to all proposals for the creation of an internal intelligence agency to focus exclusively on internal security-related intelligence has been due to the allergy of the political class and large sections of the public to domestic spying. For them, spying is something which is done in foreign territory and not in their homeland. This allergy was strengthened during the years of the Nixon Administration due to the widespread misuse of the FBI by Nixon and his officials for the harassment of their political opponents and critics as brought out during the various enquiries. In their perception, this abuse of the authority of the FBI was made possible by weak legal oversight. Despite 9/11, this allergy remains as strong as ever. The section in the Commission's report devoted to FBI reforms is the weakest part of it.* New officers should initially serve in both the areas before they start specialising in one of them.
* All senior posts in the FBI , even in the law enforcement division, should be filled by officers who are equally well-versed in both.
15. The proposed creation of a post of National Intelligence Director (NID) to oversee the functioning of the various intelligence collection agencies is expected to remove a present anomaly. At present, Director, Central Intelligence (DCI), in his capacity as the intelligence adviser to the President, is supposed to co-ordinate and oversee the functioning of the intelligence collection wing of the FBI too. But, in his dual role as the Director of the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA), he is precluded from doing it since the CIA is debarred from dabbling in local intelligence collection. (To be continued)
(The writer is Additional Secretary (retd), Cabinet Secretariat, Govt. of India, New Delhi, and, presently, Director, Institute For Topical Studies, Chennai, and Distinguished Fellow and Convenor, Observer Research Foundation (ORF), Chennai Chapter. E-mail: corde@vsnl.com )
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