Paper no. 1094	20. 08. 2004
AN UPDATE ON LTTE VIEWS ON RESUMING PEACE TALKS. Guest Column-by Col R Hariharan (retd.)  Recently Thamilchelvan, LTTE’s political head, held a press briefing at Kilinochi on August 14, 2004. Apart from this he has made a series of statements on LTTE’s readiness to resume talks with the Sri Lankan Government, following a series of meetings with visiting EU delegation, the Japanese Ambassador, and the Deputy Ambassador of Norway. He is also reported to have discussed the current issues of LTTE with  the Bishop of Mannar, Rt.Rev. Rayappu Joseph, when they met at the Madhu Church festival according to an interview TamilNet had with the Bishop. An analysis of these statements of Thamilchelvan and the excerpts of the Bishop’s interview bring out the following perceptions of LTTE regarding the resumption of talks and other related issues (own comments are given in italics): The LTTE is ready to restart negotiations with the Government of Sri Lanka only the basis of the Interim Self Government Authority (ISGA) proposal as it has been “endorsed by the Tamil people at the general elections”. In fact it was “the moral responsibility of everybody including the LTTE that the Tamil people’s wish expressed as an overwhelming electoral mandate should be respected and talks should recommence without any further delay. (LTTE has used the electoral success of TNA as an endorsement to legitimize its ISGA proposals.) LTTE had created the conditions for Peace Talks by unilaterally declaring a cease-fire in December 2001. Solution to the Tamil problem should be on the basis of aspirations of the Tamils because “they are the ones who have faced discrimination, oppression and war for many years.” It cannot be based on what the Sinhala people want. It cannot be based on what the SLG wants. This was why the political pacts Tamils made in the past with Sinhala leaders came to naught. (This would indicate that ISGA proposals might not be ‘maximalist’ to be diluted during the resumed peace talks, as expected by the SLG.) LTTE considered the counter-proposals put up by the SLG as a pretext to block LTTE from coming to the negotiating table. (LTTE is passing on the blame for delay on resumption of peace talks on SLG.) ·        The EPDP group and Karuna's accomplices were engaged in activities aimed at disrupting the peace process. These paramilitary groups were allowed to function in SLA controlled areas in the East. ·        Institutionalizing the ISGA must be viewed on a humanitarian perspective rather than making it a political bargain to satisfy extremist elements in the southern polity. (LTTE has started using the concept of ‘institutionalizing the ISGA’ more frequently. Does this imply accepting the establishment of ISGA even before substantive talks can start? The stress on the humanitarian aspect of the issue is apparently made in a bid to carry greater appeal to the EU and the Norwegians.) ·        President Chandrika Kumaratunga’s alliance with the Janatha Vimukthi Peramuna (JVP), which has been against any negotiations with the LTTE all along, has created serious doubts about her commitment to a solution through political negotiations with the LTTE. Thamilchelvan also noted that they were aware that except for a negligible minority, people in the South are for peace. The interview with the Bishop carries two interesting sidelights on intervention by other interest groups (probably includes India also) and the impact of Karuna’s rebellion on the resumption of peace talks – ·        When asked whether it would help the peace process to have, besides the Norwegian facilitation, also groups of a few countries representing the interests of the parties known as "Interest groups,” Mr.Thamilchelvan said that the countries of the European Union and Japan were fully cooperating with Norway and the idea of "interest groups" was not something that was needed at the moment. He said, “The LTTE will not be in a position to give such a proposal to the Government knowing well the problems that the Norway itself has been facing in the South." Significantly, Mr. Thamilchelvan also mentioned, in answer to a question about India's position, that the "LTTE's priority is the aspirations of the Tamil people." (This would indicate that for the time being LTTE would not like Indian involvement in any form, perhaps till the new Indian Government’s stand on the issue becomes clearer.) ·        The ‘Karuna’ (breakaway LTTE commander Vinayagamoorthy Muraleetharan, alias Karuna) factor would never be connected to the peace talks as it was a “sacred exercise” to find a peaceful settlement to the ethnic conflict. LTTE had made it “very clear to the Sri Lanka government to stop making use of the renegade, as that would violate article 1.8 of the ceasefire agreement, which prohibits existence of any other armed Tamil groups”. LTTE statements, part of a propaganda blitz, are probably aimed at achieving the following: ·        Legitimize ISGA proposals as having the mandate of Tamils because of the overwhelming success of TNA in the elections. ·        Psychologically pressurize SLG into accepting the inevitability of ISGA proposals as a starting point for the resumption of talks. ·        Put SLG on the defensive by referring to the JVP alliance. ·        Influence EU and Japan to pressurize SLG to start the peace talks, which would involve their acceptance of ISGA proposals, at least, in its broad format.  ·        Indicate to the SLG that ISGA proposals as of now are non-negotiable. ·        Explain to the Tamil population that the delay in resumption of talks is due to the ambivalence of the SLG and not the LTTE. ·        To convince the Tamils that the alleged SLA support to Karuna was part of a grand plan to delay the resumption of peace talks. ·        To make the public feel that the Karuna factor was not of great consequence; it was only part of machination of the anti-LTTE Tamil elements in collusion with SLA. To indicate that LTTE was quite happy with the Norwegian mediation and would not want the involvement of any other “interest group” at this stage. (Col R Hariharan retired from the Intelligence Corps after 28 years of service in the Army. He had been a specialist in counter-insurgency intelligence. He had seen active staff and field service in counter-insurgency operations in Assam, Manipur, Mizoram, Nagaland, Punjab,Tripura and lastly in Sri Lanka with the IPKF as Head of Intelligence. e-mail: colhari@yahoo.com)
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