Paper no. 1115	13. 09. 2004
LTTE’S  ISGA PROPOSALS AND SECURITY IMPLICATIONS FOR INDIA Guest Column-by Col R Hariharan (retd.)  “The destruction of our State governments or the annihilation of their control over the local concerns of the people would lead directly to revolution and anarchy, and finally to despotism and military domination” – Andrew Jackson (1767-1845)  It is clear to Sri Lanka watchers that the LTTE upped the ante when it put up its elaborate proposal for the Interim Self Governing Authority (ISGA) a year and a half ago in its peace parleys with the Sri Lanka Government (SLG). LTTE’s timing the proposal was impeccable because it came just before the exit of Ranil Wickremasinghe’s government. The general elections that followed saw the Sinhala polity divided over how much and in what form powers be devolved to the Tamils. Since then the ruling SLFP coalition and the opposition UNP alliance have not been able to work out a combined strategy for furthering the cause of SLG in one voice. Nor the ruling coalition had been able to put up a coherent response to LTTE proposals due to the vehement opposition to ISGA from JVP – an important coalition partner.  The gainer is LTTE. Internationally LTTE has upgraded its image, having done ‘its bit for peace’ by placing its cards on the table. Its propaganda mills have been working overtime on how LTTE’s desire for progressing peace is being stalled by the SLG. Clearly it has seized the initiative now because the SLG has been caught on the wrong foot.  The ISGA proposals broadly envisage the setting up of an interim administration with LTTE representing the Tamils, for the whole of North East Province. Except for finance and foreign affairs the ISGA would rule the entire province on its own terms. These include own armed forces, administration and judiciary. It shall not only rule the land and skies of the eight districts that make the province but also command the seas with its own brand of the Navy – the Sea Tigers. It will have powers to levy and collect taxes and dispense justice through its own courts. It will have a minimum of four and a maximum of five years life. In simple terms it visualizes the creation of an Eelam as a part of Sri Lanka, a contradiction of sorts. Thamilchelvan, LTTE’s vocal political head, has made it clear that the peace talks for a final settlement could start only if the SLG accepts the ISGA proposal.  As the SLFP and its allies had won an election mandate clearly on the basis of not accepting the ISGA proposals in its present form, President Kumaratunga is facing a no-win situation.  In her press conference of September 3, 2004 she sounded a little desperate. She said “With a group as intransigent and as ruthless as the LTTE and as one minded and as focused as Mr. Prabhakaran… with a leader like that you cannot predict anything.  He is in the habit of telling a lot of things to Governments and going back on his word.  The best example is what he did with President Premadasa. He promised him many things, got arms and money from him and then killed him off because he did not do exactly as the LTTE wanted.  … … So one cannot say… but all I can say is that there is hope.  I have not said this, in such a convinced manner before. Also, one must not forget that the LTTE is not just one person; the LTTE is a large number of people. The cadres are tired of this ruthless management of affairs – killing off people who don’t agree with their ideas; killing off ordinary Tamil civilians… …So there is a time when the Tamil people will get tired of this kind of politics and will demand from the LTTE.  I still hope that the LTTE also, like the other militant groups, will agree finally to come in to the democratic stream.  That is our final objective.”   It is unlikely that LTTE would be influenced by either what the Tamil people or the cadres think.  In the absence of a viable SLG strategy ISGA appears to be here to stay, whether SLG likes it or not, or whether there is constitutional provision for it or not. Thus accepting the ISGA with some slight cosmetic changes, and selling it to her alliance partners and to the Sri Lankan people may well be on Kumaratunga’s cards.   Government of India, in keeping with the style it had been following for the last 13 years since its disastrous military foray into Sri Lanka, has not vocalized its reaction to the ISGA proposals. India’s muted response to the ISGA should have warmed the cockles of LTTE’s heart because it has implications for India’s national sovereignty and security. It is difficult to believe that our Security Advisor, a former Indian High Commissioner in Colombo and architect of the Rajiv-Jayawardane accord in 1987, would have failed to study these implications. Perennial preoccupations on the Western front have always pushed Sri Lanka to a low priority in India’s scheme of things. And at times our foreign policy bosses have been votaries of Samuel Johnson’s dictum “ignorance is bliss, if its is folly to be wise.”    Here are a few things that will affect India, if the ISGA proposals are accepted by the SLG. 1.      Clause 9 on Jurisdiction of the ISGA: "The ISGA shall have plenary powers for the governance of the “Northeast” including powers in relation to resettlement, rehabilitation, reconstruction and development, including upgrading of existing services and facilities (hereinafter referred to as RRRD) raising revenue, levies and duties, law and order and over land. These powers shall include all powers and functions in relation to regional administration exercised by the GOSL in and for the Northeast”. This means that Indian business deals (i.e., IOC in Trincomalee) within the region would come under the purview of the ISGA. The commercial and strategic implications of such control over-riding the jurisdiction of SLG are obvious. In such a case, Govt. of India may have to directly deal with the LTTE sponsored ISGA, in addition to SLG. 2.      Formalising the LTTE armed forces: The ISGA would wield power and authority over not only the entire the North Eastern Province and the adjacent territorial waters stretching out to almost 500 nautical miles. How will it exercise control over the land and waters? The ISGA is silent on disbanding of the LTTE Army, Black Tigers and Sea Tigers and Intelligence squads etc. In other words ISGA will legitimize LTTE’s armed forces including Sea Tigers. Sri Lanka will thus be having two armies and two navies!  3.      Clause 18 on Marine and Offshore Resources: “The ISGA shall have control over the marine and off shore resources of the adjacent seas and the power to regulate access thereto”. The consequences of exercising such power on Sri Lanka’s national defence, shipping, fisheries and exploitation of mineral resources in nearly 70% of the territorial waters of Sri Lanka are obvious. Considering that the Indian coast is proximal to the Jaffna Peninsula and the Mannar Coast, Indian Navy and Coast Guard will have to deal with the Sea Tigers rather than the Sri Lanka Navy. [How this will affect the Sethusamudram project is a 64-dollar question?] In Sri Lankan waters in the North East, Indian shipping and fishing will be subjected to the jurisdiction of Sea Tigers rather than Sri Lankan Navy! 4.      Clause 21 on Agreements and Contracts: “All future agreements concerning matters under the jurisdiction of ISGA shall be made with the ISGA. Existing agreements will continue, but the GOSL shall ensure that all proceeds under such agreements are paid to the ISGA. Any changes to such agreements should be made with the concurrence of the ISGA”. In the absence of specific explanation, this implies that India’s free Trade agreements, defence agreements, trade and payments agreements, Construction, supply, transport and labour contracts etc relating to any part of the North East and the territorial waters will have to be worked out with the ISGA rather than SLG. In such a scenario, I presume that ISGA will have representative offices functioning in Chennai and Delhi, for better liaison with the Govt. of India! 5.      Financial autonomy: The ISGA appears to be endowed with all the powers and authority of an independent and sovereign state other than a separate Currency, Central Bank, Monetary Board and the membership of the multilateral lending agencies such as the World Bank, Asian Development Bank and the International Monetary Fund.  But there is a catch in Clause 12 of the ISGA on Powers to Borrow, Receive Aid and Trade; it states “the ISGA shall have powers to borrow internally and externally, provide guarantees, engage in or regulate internal and external trade". This means that the international community including World Bank, IMF, ADB etc. will have to recognise the ISGA as a separate entity which has the power, authority, and credibility to have direct dealings in relation to borrowing, debt servicing and repayment. Further, the ISGA will be empowered to “engage in or regulate internal and external trade”. The logical corollary of this is that it will regulate control all ports and airports in its jurisdiction! It is not the intention of the author to analyse the form and content of ISGA, but only to draw attention to its implications that affect India’s relationship with a sovereign neighbour, Sri Lanka.  But even a cursory glance at the various clauses of ISGA reveals that – 1.      The ISGA does not reflect the spirit of power sharing in a federal format envisaged in the Oslo accord that paved the way for peace talks. It requires of the ceding of the three key elements of nationhood – territorial integrity, executive and judicial powers to the ISGA by Sri Lanka. So it is a de-facto blue print for an independent Eelam. 2.      The ISGA was meant to silence the international community by proclaiming LTTE’s the ‘pious’ intentions of initiating moves for peace, while the SLG is paralysed on the issue. 3.      It was also aimed to catch the SLG in a moment of political confusion and then pressurize it into accepting it. 4.      The ISGA will also preempt discussion of the core issues federalism, namely the extent of power sharing at the negotiating table. It also means that the only thing to be negotiated any further will probably be working out a schedule amending the Constitution to legitimise the ISGA, rather than amend its form and content. The President of Sri Lanka aptly summed up the present situation in her press conference: “The LTTE’s position is very simple –‘no we refuse talk about any final solution; we will only talk about the Interim Agreement; you have to set it up; it has to be operational; once that happens we will begin to discuss about the final solution’.” A proposal like the ISGA is a bitter pill to swallow for any sovereign democratic nation, however much the politicians may try to sugar coat it. For Sri Lanka with more than two decades of fratricidal insurgency, it will be even more difficult. Even if accepted, the country will have a North East with a fascist style one-party rule juxtaposed with a democratic rule in the rest of Sri Lanka, an incompatible marriage doomed to breakup. It is clear that the SLG has lost its initiative to influence the situation. It needs no crystal gazing to see a troubled, if not bloody, future for Sri Lanka as a democratic nation whether it accepts its vivisection through the ISGA or not.   As far as India is concerned, as the cliché goes ‘to be forewarned is forearmed.’ Our course is clear. The least we can do is to come out more strongly and say we respect only a true federal solution that recognizes the legitimate rights of Tamils just as it does those of all Sri Lankans to regard their nation as a whole entity.  We are a big nation and it is in our national interest and in the interest of the sub-continent that we have a peaceful Sri Lanka. If not, we should ensure it. (Col R Hariharan is a specialist in counter-insurgency intelligence. He had seen active staff and field service in counter-insurgency operations in Assam, Manipur, Mizoram, Nagaland, Punjab,Tripura and lastly in Sri Lanka with the IPKF  e-mail:colhari@yahoo.com)
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