Paper no. 1203	27. 12. 2004
EXERCISING THE HARD OPTION IN SRI LANKA Guest Column-Col R Hariharan (retd.)   Sri Lanka President Chandrika Kumaratunga addressing the Asia Society, New York, on Sep 20, 2004 on “Conflict resolution and peace building: lessons from Sri Lanka”, said the resolution of the conflict lies mainly in the following two areas:  ·        “Firstly, we recognize the need to build a pluralist, democratic State, where the human rights, freedom and equal opportunity for all will be guaranteed and practised. ·        “Then we undertake the actions required to achieve this.  We believe that the solution lies in seeking alternatives to the concept of a monolithic, unitary state - to blend power with principle, to reconcile authority with freedom.  We are looking at an extensive form of devolution of power, with a high level of democratic participation in decision-making, law making and governance by the regional authorities or the devolved units.  We do not believe that the dismemberment of the Sri Lankan State, demanded by the LTTE through the employment of terrorist means, would in anyway be a solution to the Tamil peoples problems.”  However, such lofty pronouncements of the President have not yielded tangible results so far to progress the stalled peace talks, let alone solve the conflict. Despite nearly three years of ceasefire and six rounds of meeting between the representatives of the Government of Sri Lanka (GOSL) and LTTE, with active international involvement, little has been achieved. President Kuamaratunga hamstrung by political considerations for her alliance partner JVP, which is opposed to ‘giving in’ to LTTE, and one-upmanship of Sri Lankan politics, has not been able to evolve a national consensus for a roadmap to progress the talks. The GOSL has not taken visible actions to improve the quality of life in the North, all though it could have been proactive to show that it cares for the Tamils. LTTE leader Prabhakaran in his Heroes Day address on 27 Nov 2004 described the present situation as  “a political void, without war, without a stable peace, without the conditions of normalcy, without an interim or permanent solution to the ethnic conflict.” In a way he was reflecting the sense of frustration that is growing amidst of millions of Tamils the world over who desire for permanent peace above all other things. Historically, the Tamils of Sri Lanka have seen rulers reneging on agreements and promises made by successive governments to meet their democratic aspirations. So their consternation and suspicion at the delay is understandable.  At the same time, the LTTE has also handled the issue as a power game to achieve its aims only. It had not used the opportunity to handle it as a human issue to bring en end to the war by leveraging its strengths.     The GOSL is in no position to resolve the conflict situation other than by peaceful means for a number of reasons – war weariness, economic cost of war, limitations of military capability, international pressure and the desire to bring the conflict to an end so that the country could move forward economically etc. On the other hand, there had been a progressive hardening of the LTTE stand, as seen in Prabhakaran’s Nov 27th statement. So the question in Sri Lankan mind is –  ·        Will Prabhakaran bite the bullet and take the hard option to resume war?  Insurgent movements and armed conflicts  In Sri Lanka we have a situation of armed truce, with a large part of the country under the rule of LTTE, who are running a parallel government, with all the trappings of administrative machinery, judiciary and armed forces in place. Historically, such unnatural situations have never yielded peace dividend. Palestine conflict is a very good, live example. So are the Karen conflict in Myanmar and the Kurdish revolt in Iraq and Turkey. They only prolong the agony of the people. Unless both sides put away arms and talk peace, peaceful resolution of conflict does not follow. Therefore there is a distinct possibility of LTTE, a seasoned insurgent force armed to the teeth and spouting belligerent rhetoric, resuming armed conflict. A few points that favour this inference are:  •      Position of strength: Prabhakaran had always proclaimed, “We are not politicians, we are freedom fighters”. This reflects the tendency of insurgent groups to put their faith in force of arms rather than peace parleys to achieve their objectives. So invariably, when they are politically stalled, they seize the initiative to launch operations so that they do not lose the military advantage. This option becomes attractive when the group is in a position of strength, and fully controls or dominates territory coupled with high morale of its cadres. In the Sri Lanka context, LTTE is in this position of strength. •      Vulnerability: In the no war-no peace situation, there is a dilution of cadres’ revolutionary zeal after rejoining or meeting their families, which make them vulnerable and ‘soft’. This results in dissipation of cadre motivation and integrity because they find a progressive loss of their influence and relevance in a peace environment. This in turn leads to frustration resulting in internal conflicts, and power struggle. LTTE rank and file has increasingly exhibited such manifestations. •      Follow up: Insurgent groups use the periods of armed truce to rest, recuperate, refit and retrain its cadres. Prolonged spells of peace create storage and maintenance problems for arms, equipment and armament, particularly sensitive items like missiles and communication sets.  With the cadres fully trained, equipped and ready, taking to armed conflict is the logical follow up for LTTE to retain its initiative. •     Political climate: Periods of armed truce provide a good climate to exploit political opportunities to further the cause of the insurgents and rally the population to their side. Insurgents harp back to historical grievances to remind them of the cause and denigrate the government as the perpetrators of such grievances. When they feel the population is sufficiently softened they take up arms. As opposed to this democratic societies suffer from slow decision-making process, dictated by political considerations, which may not coincide with what is good for the nation. Political parties operating in such a framework use the demands made by insurgents as bargaining points in their political game resulting in lack of a unified strategy to deal with the insurgents.   The Sri Lankan polity is currently in such a classic bind. This creates an ideal opportunity for LTTE to cash in on the political confusion, rally the Tamils, and resume the conflict to further enhance its military and territorial advantage. •     Initiative: When insurgent groups do not have adequate force levels to achieve a total victory, seizing initiative and timing the conflict becomes important to gain maximum bargaining position in the next spell of talks. In Sri Lanka neither LTTE nor Sri Lanka armed forces (SLF) have sufficient force levels to wage a full-scale war to achieve decisive results in a reasonable time frame. LTTE will have to seize initiative and launch operations to achieve surprise and compensate for inadequate force levels. •     Recognition of success: In spite of the developments in the global anti-terrorism scene, the dictum ‘possession is three fourths of law’ still holds good. Holding territory and defending it, becomes the final arbiter of recognition of sovereignty of nations and movements, regardless of the legitimacy of means adopted. LTTE has an urgent need to gain this recognition and legitimacy; quick success in armed conflict may give them this.  Indicators of conflict  Normally war is resorted to when a force is in excellent mettle and in a position of strength. This status is indicated by both political and military ‘indicators’, which help analyst to discern the intentions. Is LTTE in such a position of strength? Based on the behaviour of insurgency movements in general, and LTTE in particular, we find the existence of such political and military ‘indicators’. The political indicators are:  • Reneging of past agreements: In his recently published book "War and Peace", LTTE ideologue Balasingham had disowned the LTTE’s willingness to explore a solution to the Tamil problem in a federal framework, agreed upon earlier in the Oslo accord. This statement caused a lot of concern among the international community, particularly the Norwegians. Such aberrations are typical of LTTE for justifying war and we may expect more such statements. • Placing unacceptable conditions: It is extremely difficult for a democratically elected government to agree to proposals, which sacrifice elements of national sovereignty, particularly as a precondition for progressing peace talks. The interim self governing authority (ISGA) proposal made by LTTE falls in this category.  LTTE knows that the political fortunes of President Kumaratunga and the SLFP alliance depends upon evolving a face saving method of coming out of this trap. • Building favourable international climate: LTTE had been assiduously cultivating international opinion, which had soured after the 9/11 catastrophes. A recent trip by Thamilselvan-led LTTE delegation to European Union countries, where the foreign ministry representatives of Netherlands and Norway received it, is an indication of its partial success in this effort. In Tamil Nadu also pro-LTTE forces have been orchestrating efforts to create a favourable public opinion.    • Unifying all ranks, neutralising opposition by all means: Through a systematic process of coercion and elimination LTTE has neutralised the influence of almost all Tamil political parties including the TULF. These emasculated parties banded under the label of Tamil National Alliance (TNA) have become client organizations of LTTE and toe its line, under the slogan of unification of Tamil polity.  Thus we have these TNA members of parliament acting as spokesmen for LTTE rather than Tamil people.   • Focussing on historical grievances: Affected sections of society vocalizing their historical grievances is accepted as an exercise of political freedom in a democratic society. But when insurgent groups like LTTE, which deny the very same political freedom to the people, take it up with its well-oiled propaganda machinery, it is aimed at stoking the passions of people to advance the insurgent’s agenda to build a crisis situation. The fast unto death undertaken by Thileepan on the eve of LTTE’s war with IPKF was a similar effort. We can expect orchestration of similar ‘crisis building’ actions.  •  Negative propaganda against GOSL: While the GOSL had been scrupulously avoiding negative propaganda, LTTE had been quite free in its loud and vocal criticism and condemnation of individuals both in political leadership and in government. Such a criticism of LTTE and its leaders and their activities and intentions had been met with violent retribution ending in assassinations and bombings.  There are also certain ‘battle indicators’ which point to a possible recourse to resumption of operations by LTTE:  • Elimination of  intelligence assets: Through a process of selective assassination, LTTE has eliminated many of the key intelligence assets of SLF and terrorized the anti-LTTE Tamil groups like Eelam Peoples Democratic Party (EPDP) • Creating intelligence assets: LTTE cadres have been caught videographing key installations. This is not an innocuous activity. In the past LTTE had used such information collected in times of peace for covert operations. • Reassertion of leadership to eliminate internal opposition: It is not in the culture of insurgent groups to brook dissent, let alone opposition. LTTE’s handling of Karuna’s dissent with planned elimination of his followers through a mix of armed action and assassinations is indicative of this. • Recruitment and training of new cadres: Despite international criticism, LTTE has gone ahead with the ‘compulsory recruitment’ of child soldiers. It is also recalling former cadres back to the ranks in the Eastern part where its strength has been depleted. Offensive elements like RPG units have been trained and raised. It is expensive to raise, train and maintain such forces. Unless there is a future role for them, it is not a cost effective.  •  Organising supply chain network: LTTE appears to have mended its international supply chain, having corralled the Sri Lankan Navy, thanks to the freedom and ‘legitimacy’ given to Sea Tiger movements by the Norwegian mediators.  Since the ceasefire, there had been a number of reports of movement of ships carrying arms and military hardware for LTTE. • Strengthen administrative control: In times of war it is essential to tighten control over the civil administrative structure so that base areas are geared to provide the full logistic support and does not affect or interfere with operations. LTTE has fully organised the administrative control of areas under its domain.   Disincentives for taking up the hard option  On the positive side there are a number of political disincentives, which could discourage LTTE taking up arms once again. These are –  •     Leveraging the political advantage: Sri Lanka’s presidential elections are due in 2005. As the constitution does not permit President Chandrika Kumaratunga to contest any more, the UNP leader Ranil Wickramasinghe stands a good chance of being elected as the next president. He has spoken in favour of accepting ISGA proposal first and resuming talks with LTTE thereafter. So it may be counter-productive for LTTE to resume operations as it can gain its ends without war, if Mr Wickramasinghe is elected. •     India-Sri Lanka Defence Cooperation Pact: This pact is in the final stages of coming into being. Though it is not specifically directed against LTTE, it unequivocally signals India’s support to Sri Lankan sovereignty and existence as unified entity. With the bitter memory of fighting with the IPKF, which led to a lot of bloodletting, the Pact could be big disincentive for LTTE to take up arms again. • Global anti-terror stance of the U.S. and the West: LTTE still figures in the U.S.’s global list of terrorist organizations. LTTE had been lobbying to get off the list for sometime now. Resumption of operations would not only damage the LTTE case but also bring down the wrath of the U.S. and its allies to crush LTTE’s global resource and support network built over the years. War is an expensive process and without this global support network, LTTE will find it difficult to sustain military operations. LTTE has also assiduously tried to cultivate the European Union members for mustering support for its cause with some success. This limited acceptability built up so far also could be lost if it resumes war.   • Development aid: International community has promised a developmental aid package of $ 4.5 billion as an incentive for progressing peace in the island state. LTTE stands to gain a large part of these funds apportioned for the development of war torn North and East. LTTE runs the risk of losing this allocation of funds, in case of war. • International opinion: Already LTTE has risked the adverse international opinion due to its recruitment of child soldiers, selective killing of opponents and human rights violations. To counter this LTTE had been wooing countries to gain some legitimacy. It has made some headway in this respect. If it takes up arms it can lose such good will.  • Tamil public opinion not favouring war: Neutral observers have reported a sense of war weariness among large sections of Tamils, particularly among internally displaced populations. Resumption of war would further alienate the population. •  Antagonising friendly constituency among Sinhalas: Thanks to a greater understanding the Tamil problem, slowly a constituency supportive of a just solution for Tamil problem is emerging among sections of Sinhala population. The UNP, a major political force in Sri Lanka politics, is also in favour of the resumption of talks on LTTE’s terms. These sections could be adversely affected if LTTE takes up arms once again.  There are also a few military disincentives that could prevent LTTE from taking up arms:  •   Force levels: Despite having a large regular force and sizeable special forces than ever before, LTTE still does not have adequate strength to wage offensive operations to overwhelm SLF, which has been beefed up. Thus capture of Jaffna, a vital objective to signal LTTE’s final success, might not come through so easily. There are two reasons for this. Unlike the previous occasions, LTTE is now not only controlling, but ruling a sizeable swathe of territory. So in case of war, it will have to apportion forces to defend these areas and look after the administration and civil supplies of the population.  This will deplete the strength of forces available for offensive operations. Secondly, the loyalty of cadres from East cannot be taken for granted anymore. (LTTE is known to be quite paranoid on the question of loyalty.) Thus reinforcements from the East might not be available in sizeable numbers in times of operations. This would impose limitations on the offensive capability. Thus operations would be scaled down resulting in prolonged duration of battles. •  Weakness in the East: The dissident forces of Karuna, however weak at present, could become a major problem in times of war in the East. In times of war they could be armed by the SLF (which is a distinct possibility); they could act as guides, provide intelligence and carry out minor operations in the East. Thus LTTE will be forced to restrict itself to a defensive posture supported by guerilla operations in the East. This would imply that even if there were complete success in the North, LTTE would not be able to gain control of East. Thus its success will be still a muted one in the East, and the Tamil Eelam it achieves well short of its desired expanse.  Prospects of peace  To sum up, resolving the issue by resuming the peace process, rather than war, appears to be a logical and distinct possibility in the current impasse in Sri Lanka. In brief, waging war is unlikely to usher in a lasting solution to the problem to satisfy either the GOSL or the LTTE for the following reasons: •     Inability of both sides to achieve decisive results due to limitations of force levels resulting in a battlefield stalemate. •  Adverse international reaction to resumption of operations, resulting in stoppage of international development aid. •  Greater chances of achieving a win-win solution for both sides through peace parley than by waging war. • Continuing human tragedy due to prolonged war and loss of economic assets.  But the realities of power politics, military expediency and personality projections that affect decision-making may still turn a deaf ear to such logical reasoning. The situation is aggravated because we have an asymmetric situation in Sri Lanka. On the one side we have a democratically elected government accountable to voters, where power hungry politicians have to work out a consensus and sell it to the public and muster their majority support. The government is accountable to international community for all its actions in times of both peace and war. On the other side is ranged a fighting machine – a monolithic organisation, where accountability to either national or international community is the strong point. A man who has no faith in democratic process or in building political consensus leads it. He is not swayed by nuances of logic or dialectical reasoning in decision making. His decisions are often made for reasons of gaining military advantage and political power for the organisation. So only time can tell, whether these two antipodes can come to terms with each other for lasting peace, which everyone desires. (Col R Hariharan, an MI specialist in counter-insurgency intelligence, served with the IPKF as Head of Intelligence in Sri Lanka. E-mail: colhari@yahoo.com)
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