Paper no. 1206	30. 12. 2004
INDIA’S WEAPONS & MILITARY EQUIPMENT- ACQUISITION PHILOSOPHY NEEDS A REVIEW by Dr Subhash Kapila  Introductory Observations: Independent India after 57 years existence as a nation state and having been subjected to five wars and proxy wars has yet to develop a significant independent and self-reliant defence production capability and systems.  The above has once again been brought into focus in these last few weeks with  the United States offering India the sops of F-16 fighter planes and P3C anti-submarine warfare and maritime surveillance aircraft as a sequel to its sales of this equipment to Pakistan. Both these items are 15-20 years old and nearing the end of their service lives. That the United States hopes that India would fall for their offer is a sad commentary on India’s weapons and military equipment acquisition philosophy and India’s indigenous defence production capabilities.  India’s aspiration for a regional power status and  a key player in global affairs dictate the imperatives of an independent, self-reliant indigenous defence production capabilities.  Admittedly India would still require imports of advanced arms.  But the major portion of India’s requirements should come from indigenous sources and where imports are necessary, India needs to enunciate some declaratory principles in this field.  India’s Declaratory Principles for Weapons and Military Equipment Imports from External Sources: India’s national security requirements would call for external sources being reliable sources not resorting to cut-offs in conflictual situations or resorting to political coercion to achieve their vested political and strategic objectives.  India therefore needs to make declaratory policies on the principles it would follow in awarding contracts for purchase of weapon systems. With at least $140 billion in foreign exchange reserves, India can spend at least $2-5 billion a year on weapons imports for the next 10 years or so for up-gradation of operational capabilities of the Indian Armed Forces.  India’s principles in this regard, should also take into account considerable incentives that India offers in terms of her market-growth potential attraction to foreign investors in terms of infrastructure development and her ambitious plans for considerable expansion of her civil aviation assets, besides her considerable defence acquisition plans.  The above places India in a unique position to dictate declaratory principles that would be followed as consideration for selection of likely sources of weapons acquisitions.  The declaratory principles recommended are: No weapons or equipment purchases will be made from countries which supply weapons systems to Pakistan and upset the regions natural balance of powers. Intending suppliers would be required to make a declaratory commitment, with the penalty clauses of cancellation of India’s contract without compensation in case of infringement.  Intending external suppliers should be ready to supply 50% of the purchase as “off-the-shelf” supplies within a year. Remainder 50% should be as technology transfers for India’s indigenous defence productions. India’s selection of potential external suppliers would be selective. Only countries which support India politically in the international system and respect her national security sensitivities would be favoured for awarding Indian defence contracts. India’s award of contracts for purchase of civil aviation assets and preference for investments in India, would go to countries  which emerge as India’s external suppliers of weapon systems committing to India’s principles of weapons acquisition defined above. India today is in the unique position of declaring the principles recommended above.  India’s Philosophy of Weapons and Military Equipment Acquisition: India today seems to be not following any well-thought out principles in this field. What is happening is that knee jerk reactions take place whenever there is infusion of new weapon systems in the neighbourhood. India’s philosophy here needs to be long-range and time bound. They also need to be related to up-gradation of India’s military operational capabilities to sustain India’s regional aspirations and resist any political coercion which tends to impede India’s national aspirations.  Basically, in terms of weapons acquisitions, India needs to follow broad philosophies as under: Indian Navy and Indian Air Force as repositories of India’s force projection capabilities and long range offensive power be designated as “high technology” services. In terms of “high technology” external imports of systems, the Navy and Air Force need to be prioritised as such. Indian Army does net need “high technology” armaments except for selected areas. It needs to rely entirely as indigenous defence production. Indian Army follows misplaced priorities in the constant up-gradation of her armored divisions which have no potential for operationally-lucrative missions. The areas on which Indian Army needs to get some priority in terms of external acquisition are:  Artillery: Longest range systems available of a unified caliber of 155mm with advanced weapons locating radars and associated equipment. Special Forces: India’s challenges of responding to asymmetric warfare and other missions in conventional warfare call for at least three Special Forces Independent Brigades . These should have integral helicopter-lift capability, helicopter gunships etc along with latest close-quarter battle weapons and night-fighting capabilities. Attack Helicopters: Every Indian Army division should have an integral attack helicopter squadron with anti-tank and all-weather, day and night operational capability. Sources for the first two can be Israel, Russia, France and South Africa. As for attack helicopters, except for avionics and night-fighting devices, the capability should come from indigenous defence production sources.  Defence Research and Development Organisation (DRDO) Needs to Focus on Indian Army Weapon Systems and Equipment Only: The DRDO has been ineffective terms of significant contributions to India’s self-reliant indigenous defence production capabilities. Contributory reasons can said to be: DRDO’s ambitious and vested interest in “empire building” to spread its wings to cover R&D requirements of all the three services. DRDO’s limited capabilities in “high technology” original R&D. DRDO’s long lead times in materialising its projects leading to out-dated contributions forcing all three services to look to external sources. DRDO’s gets bogged-down as an adjunct of the bureaucratic Ministry of Defence. DRDO should be an independent entity under the Prime Minister’s office. It is recommended that till such time DRDO becomes capable of “high technology” original R&D, it should divest itself from R&D projects of the Navy and the Air Force. With its limited capabilities it should focus entirely on Indian Army requirements.  Indian Navy Acquisitions: India navy’s capital equipment acquisitions need “ high priority” attention from the Government. Long lead times after decisions are required for materialisation of orders.  Naval vessels fabrication, metallurgy requirements and naval construction infrastructure are all available in India. The problem is in allocation of adequate and priority financial resources. The Indian Navy in terms of its “ project management” record, independent of DRDO, has been excellent Propulsion systems development and production should be entrusted to the private sector of India’s industry.  External inputs for the Indian Navy would only be required in terms of advanced weapon systems, target acquisition system and other sensors.  Indian Air Force Acquisitions: As a “ high technology” service which will play a decisive role in the future, the Air Force needs highest priority in external acquisitions to augment its offensive capabilities.  The Air Force should give up its acquisition policy in term of Multi-Role Combat Aircraft capabilities. It should delineate its requirement in terms of “fighter aircraft” which deep penetration capability and “ground attack” aircraft separately. The former has to rely heavily on external “off-the-shelf” acquisitions. The later capability should solely rest on indigenous production capabilities.  It is a sorry reflection that even for trainer aircraft, India had to resort to external buying after 17 years of delay and dithering political decision making.  India’s Weapons Acquisitions and Indian Political Leaderships Vested Interest in Awarding Contracts: This is the biggest bane of India’s national security management. This country has heard enough of the Bofors Scandals, the HDW submarine scandals and the T-90 and SU-30 acquisition controversies.  Needles to say, that India’s political leadership of all hues have displayed acute insensitivity in this field. Vested political interests have outweighed the timeliness of national security imperatives. Concluding Observations: India’s weapons acquisitions and the underlying philosophy is a vast subject. What has been attempted above is to give a selective focus on the broad issues, each of which needs  deep analysis.  However, what does emerge from this analysis is that India’s political leadership has to become sensitive to the” time criticality” of weapons acquisitions. Also, India needs to came out with declaratory principles which would ensure that India is not trifled with in this field and that India with her sizeable financial resources, economic strategy and potential, exploits her unique position to ensure that external supplies of weapon systems cater for India’s both strategic and political sensitivities. (The author is an International Relations and Strategic Affairs analyst. He is the Consultant, Strategic Affairs with South Asia Analysis Group. Email drsubhashkapila @yahoo.com)
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