Paper no. 1226	21. 01. 2005
TSUNAMI: POLITICS OF RELIEF IN SRI LANKA  Guest Column-by Col R Hariharan, VSM (retd)  (This paper may be read in continuation of the South Asia Advisory Group Paper No. 1213 dated Jan 5, 2005 titled “Tsunami: Security Implications In Sri Lanka”)   The Tsunami disaster came as a setback to Sri Lanka when it was reaping the dividends of a three-year peace pause in its two-decade old civil war. But it also came as a blessing as it made the resumption of military operations by either side a more difficult and not very practical option. This is important in the context of LTTE threat to resume operations spelled out in Dec 2004, if the Government of Sri Lanka did not restart the peace talks.  Casualties and relief for the people  Fourteen districts – (Jaffna, Kilinochi, Vavuniya, Trincomalee, Batticaloa, Amparai, Hambantota, Matara, Galle, Kalutara, Colombo, Gampaha and Puttalam) - faced the wrath of the Tsunami. The GOSL has estimated the rehabilitation cost as a whole at more than $ 1.5 billion. Next to Indonesia, Sri Lanka has suffered the highest casualties due to the Tsunami.There are minor variations in the estimates of human casualties given by different sources. The Consortium of Humanitarian Agencies in Sri Lanka has released the following details of the effect of the tragedy and the on going relief effort:  District Families affected Displaced persons Deaths Relief camps Northeast province Jaffna 13,652 48,729 2,640 43 Kilinochi 10,568 40,129 560 12 Mullaitivu 5,373 24,557 3,000 19 Vavuniya 111 641 0 5 Trincomalee 31,896 51,863 957 76 Batticaloa 57,219 203,807 2,497 100 Amparai 38,624 183,527 10,436 125 Total NE Prov. 157,443 553,253 20,090 380 Rest of Sri Lanka Puttalam 232 1,029 3 4 Gampaha 6000 32,000 7 11 Colombo 4,395 14,965 76 43 Kalutara 5,484 34,282 217 84 Galle 23,025 120,000 4,141 154 Matara 10,225 41,500 1206 44 Hampantota 5,471 27,351 4,500 19 Total Rest of SL 54,832 271,127 10,150 359 Total Sri Lanka 212,803 833,780 30,240 739    An analysis of the data reveals that the Northeast province has suffered the maximum with - ·        61% of the deaths ·        66% of the displaced persons ·        89% of the affected families   Despite this the GOSL appears to have focused relief efforts mainly in areas under its control in the south and southwest of Sri Lanka. Many non-Tamil media as well as international aid agencies have pointed out this deficiency. For example the number of relief camps is almost equal in northeast and the rest of Sri Lanka, all though northeast has 90 per cent more displaced persons. In the north, where LTTE is in control of a sizeable part of the territory, it is the LTTE and the pro-LTTE relief agency Tamil Rehabilitation Organisation (TRO) that are carrying out the relief work. However, this has limitations as LTTE and TRO do not have the resources that are at the command of GOSL. In the east, Tamil and Muslim inhabited villages along the Batticaloa-Amparai coastal belt have suffered the worst. But still for the 3.86 lakh people there are only 225 relief camps as against 329 camps for 2.71 lakh people in the south and southeast. However, in the east at the local level coordination of the relief effort among the representatives of GOSL, LTTE, and NGOs appear to be working with some success. The reasons for GOSL neglecting the predominantly Tamil regions in providing relief could be any one or more of the following related to the conflict with LTTE:   ·        The LTTE demand for all relief effort to be canalized through its administrative set up, particularly in the north. The GOSL probably fears that LTTE would misuse the effort for adding to its own military reserves and garner propaganda value from the whole relief exercise. ·        Focussing the effort in Sinhala majority areas of the south and southwest because GOSL can exercise direct control. There is also the question of ethnic affinity, which matters in a country fighting an ethnic civil war for two decades. Considering that both the ruling SLFP coalition and the UNP opposition are gearing up for a presidential poll confrontation every crisis would appear to give a political opportunity. ·        GOSL would like to avoid confrontation as LTTE was preventing the people from availing assistance from GOSL sources. People not availing relief from government sources for fear of LTTE retaliation would make such an effort useless. ·        The other could be the desire to ‘teach a lesson’ to make the Tamil population realize how much it has to depend upon the rest of Sri Lanka for their essentials and show LTTE in a poor light.  A more charitable view of it is that it could be because of more ‘mundane’ reasons, usually found in the rather not-so-efficient system of governance found in democracies:  ·        Sheer inefficiency of government machinery in reaching outlying areas, where the road communication has been put out of action. This is true of the eastern and southeastern coastal highways, which have been breached in a number of places with major bridges at Arugambay and Oluvil cutting off free access to the southeastern region. In LTTE controlled areas there is lack of GOSL interaction on an ongoing basis, which could add to this problem. ·        GOSL probably would like to spend more money in getting the top tourist resorts operational as a first priority. This would ease the burden of displaced persons on government machinery and income would start flowing, when tourist traffic resumed. ·        The issue of territorial integrity: The government is the arbiter of what should be the quantum of relief based on its own assessment. Bureaucracy in crisis situation generally takes this attitude.  This attitude is also seen in our own crisis management situations. GOSL has gone about organizing centralized coordination bodies quite methodically. But government process is a time consuming one for the size of the of relief work required to be done.  Whatever are the reasons, the GOSL’s performance has created strong feeling of discrimination among the Tamils in the northeast as well as Tamil Diasporas all over the world. The feeling of despair has further been augmented by reports of both GOSL and LTTE preventing the aid reaching to the displaced persons other than their own. UNICEF had reported that LTTE was recruiting child soldiers in the camps of displaced persons. There were also reports of pedophiles and traffickers in children trying to take away the children from the camps. Apparently to prevent these things, GOSL decided to entrust the running of the camps to the armed forces; this is a stratagem that can further antagonize the aggrieved Tamils. The situation was further aggravated when the GOSL persuaded the UN Secretary General Mr.Kofi Annan not to go ahead with his visit to the Tsunami affected areas of northeast.  LTTE’s systematic approach  On the other hand LTTE showed its organizational capability and discipline by organizing relief efforts in a matter of hours in areas under its control particularly in the north, in cooperation with Tamil Relief Organisation (TRO). The first relief camp came up on the same day. LTTE went about systematically to organize its international effort to collect support in cash and kind from all over the world directly, independent of TRO’s own effort: It set up special action committees for collecting funds in ten countries including France, Italy, Denmark, Norway, Germany, UK, Switzerland, Sweden, Holland and Australia. Its propaganda media carried an appeal from its supremo Prabhakaran for contribution. All pro-LTTE websites launched a tirade against GOSL for neglecting the Tamils and branded them racists. People were asked to directly contribute to the TRO and similar organizations set up for the purpose.  It is obvious that the international funding cannot be done directly. So LTTE’s independent operations have limitations. But such deficiencies are easily attributed to the GOSL’s poor relief mechanism in the Tamil areas. Thus unwittingly GOSL by its own tardy performance has played into the hands of LTTE.   The TRO has a better organization and has more than two decades of experience in relief. It has a lot of commitment difficult to find in a government mechanism. According to TRO, 3000 persons are involved in the relief work. Over 100 professionals from the Tamil Diaspora network and the international community are presently working with us in afflicted regions apart from 12 medical teams (including 52 doctors from the Diaspora and 18 international doctors) are involved in healthcare and work to prevent outbreak of epidemic diseases. Fifteen engineers are working on immediate and long-term rebuilding of shelters, water purification and sanitation. Local psychiatrists are providing counselling support to the traumatized victims of the tidal wave.   International media has commented favourably on its work. According to pro-LTTE media UN Secretary General Mr.Kofi Annan said, “I am aware of the coordinated structures put in place by the LTTE and TRO in the wake of the disaster and the efficacy with which humanitarian delivery is being done and I wish to commend them for this valuable service” when the TNA legislators representing the Northeast met with him on Jan 9, 2005 in Colombo [Many consider TRO as a LTTE front organisation, somewhat on the lines of Hamas, which has a huge welfare network for Palestine refugees. According to a media report, Lord Avebury, the Vice Chairman of the British Parliamentary Human Rights Group, conducted investigations after a complaint following accusations that its monies were going to the LTTE. The British Charity Commission raided the offices of TRO in London in 2000 and froze its bank accounts and assets.  So in U.K, LTTE front organisations are reported raising funds for Tsunami victims in the name of an unregistered charity called “White Pigeon”. GOSL has issued a memorandum to In Canada, a Special Canadian Senate Committee identified TRO as a group raising money for guns and materials used by the Tamil Tigers. In Australia, TRO is an approved charity and is openly collecting funds for tsunami relief work.]  ‘Democratic politics’ in relief work  In the rest of Sri Lanka also political parties appear to have picked up the cue from LTTE and GOSL to politicize the relief work. JVP has openly expressed its appreciation of LTTE’s organized efficiency; and went on to emulate it by flying its party flags and banners in many locations where other NGOs or government agencies were working. Other parties also tried such moves with varying degrees of success. There were reports of police and army seizing relief material, or unloading it for their own use.  GOSL has projected an estimated sum of Rs. 1.5 billion for tsunami relief work in a special report submitted to donor countries outlining plans. The projections have again set off complaints of too little being allotted for the Tamil areas. Many have expressed corrupt practices siphoning off the allocations. GOSL will have a tough task in satisfying all the constituencies to meet their needs; it will have to do a tight balancing act.   Conclusion: opportunities in distress  The Tsunami offered both GOSL and LTTE a very good opportunity to set aside their differences for the time being and get involved in relief and rehabilitation work together. That would have paved way for a better understanding of the genuine problems faced by the people and each other. This could have ushered in the right atmosphere at the people to people level not only in the two setups but also between Sinhalas and Tamils. But unfortunately such a thought requires a political dynamism that appears to be lacking. Even now it's not too late. There are still opportunities in distress. One can only hope they get together to get the country going rather than promote narrow, sectarian agenda.      (Col R Hariharan, an MI specialist in counter-insurgency intelligence, served with the IPKF as Head of Intelligence in Sri Lanka. E-mail: colhari@yahoo.com)
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