Paper no. 1228	24. 01. 2005
NATIONAL SECURITY MECHANISM by B.Raman (This is an expanded version of a talk delivered at a seminar on "National Security--Internal and External Dimensions" jointly organised by the Association of Retired Senior Indian Police Service Officers (ARSIPSO) and the India International Centre (IIC) at New Delhi on January 15, 2005) Does India have  the national security mechanism it needs? What are the inherent strengths and weaknesses of  the  mechanism it has presently? What modifications are required to remove the weaknesses while at the same time preserving and further adding to the strengths? What are the lessons which we can learn  from the mechanisms of other countries? These are some of the questions that need attention in any debate on national security. 2. National security, which, in Israel, is treated as synonymous with national survival, has the following  five major components--- diplomatic, military, internal security, economic and intelligence. These components are closely inter-linked and even if one of them is weak, national security as a whole will be correspondingly weakened. National security management is the art and technique of integrating  these components and making them function in a co-ordinated, effective and harmonious manner in times of normalcy as well as in times of crises. 3. The post-Second World War evolution of the concept of national security management has identified certain other sub-components, which  need equal attention for preserving national security and well-being. These are risk management, disruption control management, disaster mitigation and management,  whether the disaster is natural (the recent Tsunami which struck Indonesia, Thailand, Sri Lanka, India, Myanmar and the Maldives in the Asian region) or man-made (the Bhopal gas tragedy of 1984), and  consequence and national resilience management. 4. As unconventional threats to nation-States  from non-State actors such as insurgents and terrorists, trans-national criminals, narcotics smugglers, counterfeiters etc have increased, there has been a realisation that techniques and tradecraft, which served us fairly adequately against predictable  State adversaries, may not be adequate against often unpredictable non-State actors, and that new analytical tools are required to meet the new threats. The old concept of threat analysis has been supplemented by risk analysis and vulnerability analysis. Lucid analysis---whether of threats, risks or vulnerabilities---is the starting point of effective national security policy-making, implementation and co-ordination. 5. Al Qaeda's terrorist strikes of September 11, 2001, in the US homeland had important lessons not only for the US, but also for the rest of the world. Among these lessons, one could mention: Without effective internal security, even the most powerful political, economic and military power in the world would be at the mercy of inimical forces. The globalisation of terrorism and the consequent externalisation of internal threats to security have underlined the importance of an integrated approach to national security. Such an integrated approach has always had an importance in national security management but it has acquired added importance post-9/11. 6. The US was the first to  realise the importance of such an integrated, well-structured   approach. This realisation was reflected in the creation of the National Security Council (NSC) with a dedicated national security staff in 1947. The New Delhi-based Indian strategic analysts' community often projects that the NSC is the most innovative part of the US system as it came into being in 1947.  This is not so.  It is nothing but a small group of members of the Presidential Cabinet designated by law as the NSC to examine in depth national security issues, strategic or tactical, and come up with policy responses for approval by the President and subsequent implementation by different departments concerned with national security. The belief that an examination in depth of national security issues would be possible only in a small group of members of the Presidential Cabinet instead of in the large Cabinet as a whole and that  secrecy of decision-making, which is important in national security matters, could be better ensured in a small body than in a large one was behind this decision. Many countries have had such small bodies, by whatever name they were called, long before the US decided to set up the NSC. 7. The most innovative part was the setting-up of a dedicated NSC staff to service the work of the NSC by coming up with policy  options in response to national security situations for consideration by the NSC. Initially, the staff was set up by taking officers on deputation from the State and Defence Departments. Subsequently, the recruitment process was expanded to include inductions from the non-governmental world of universities, think-tanks, media and others. The NSC staff were expected to think in terms of the Government and the nation as a whole instead of in  terms of the limited vision of any individual department of the Government concerned with national security. It was meant to weed out parochial tendencies in national security policy making and implementation, without weakening the policy initiatives of independent departments. 8. Between 1947 and 1953, the NSC staff headed by an individual designated as the Executive Secretary of the NSC, essentially concerned itself with the effective co-ordination of the policy-making and implementation process on behalf of the President. The Executive Secretary was expected to be a co-ordinator par excellence and not a policy innovator and adviser. The additional role of policy adviser to the President came into prominence in 1953 when the then President Dwight Eisenhower revamped the NSC and the NSC staff mechanism and re-designated the Executive Secretary as the  Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs. This post has come to be popularly referred to as the National Security Adviser (NSA). 9. The NSA, who is a member of the executive office, is not subject to Congressional control in the same way as other senior bureaucrats are. The nomination of the NSA by the President is not subject to confirmation by the Senate and he or she has no obligation to testify before Congressional committees if called upon to do so. It is for the President to decide whether national interests demanded that he or she should testify if called upon to do so and his decision cannot be called into question by the Congress. What advice the NSA gives to the President is a matter between him/her and the President and the Congress has no right to know it. 10.  There have been 19 NSAs in the USA since the post was created in 1953---six under President Ronald Reagan, three  under  Eisenhower, two under  Presidents Lyndon Johnson, Ford and  Clinton and only one under Presidents Kennedy, Nixon, Carter and George Bush Sr, the father of the present President. Brent Scrowcroft had the unique distinction of serving as the NSA under two Presidents---under Ford from November 3,1975 to January 20,1977, and under Bush Sr throughout his term. Many analysts consider Scrowcroft  as the best model of how an NSA should function---a low-profile and effective policy co-ordinator, facilitator and problem solver. 11. At the beginning of his term, every President issues an order specifying the duties of  his NSA, though Reagan never issued such an order.  He downgraded the role of the NSA during his first term and made the NSA report to him though his Chief of Staff (Ed Meese), thereby even depriving him of the right of direct access to the President. He came to office with a feeling that under Carter, Zbigniew Brzezinski had been allowed to wield enormous power as the NSA at the cost of the powers and initiative of individual departments. He wanted to correct it. Under Kennedy and Johnson, the role of the NSC as a whole in national security policy-making was considerably circumscribed by their individual style ---particularly in the case of Johnson--- of taking important decisions during informal discussions with close confidantes. They avoided formalised procedures. It was under Nixon (Kissinger) and Carter that the NSA acquired an enormous clout in the field of foreign and defence policies and an aura, which tended to stifle departmental initiative and innovation in policy-making. The NSA's post has since then been denuded of such aura, but foreign Governments, including that of India, while emulating the US system, tend to emulate the  Kissinger and Brzezinski style  aura than the substance of the system. 12.A perusal of the orders issued by various Presidents since 1953 would indicate that all of them  saw the principal task of the NSC system, with the NSA acting as its manager and facilitator, as essentially to integrate the foreign  and defence policies in such a manner as to protect national security and advance US national interests abroad. The following quotations from the official history of the NSC system would be relevant in this connection: "Since the end of World War II, each Administration has sought to develop and perfect a reliable set of executive institutions to manage national security policy. Each President has tried to avoid  the problems and deficiencies of his predecessor's efforts and install a policy-making and co-ordination system that reflected his personal management style. The NSC has been at the centre of this foreign policy co-ordination system, but it has changed many times to conform with the needs and inclinations of each succeeding Chief Executive." " The view that the Council's role was to foster collegiality among departments also gave way to the need by successive Presidents to use the Council  as a means of controlling and managing competing Departments." "The structure and functioning of the NSC depended in no small degree  upon the interpersonal chemistry between the President and his principal advisers  and Department heads. But despite the relationships between individuals,  a satisfactory organisational structure had to be developed, for  without it the necessary flow of information  and implementation of decisions could not occur.  Although a permanent staff gradually began to take shape, the main substantive work occurred in the Departments." ' For 50 years, 10 Presidents have sought  to use the NSC system  to integrate foreign and defence policies  in order to preserve the nation's security and advance its interests abroad. Recurrent structural modifications over the years have reflected  the presidential management style,  changing requirements  and personal relationships. " 13. In this system, the NSA performs two roles. Firstly, he  or she is the adviser to the President on all matters concerning national security. Secondly, he or she co-ordinates the functioning of the national security mechanism on behalf of the President. For the performance of these tasks, he or she depends on the dedicated NSC staff, who function through various committees consisting of the heads or representatives of the heads of different departments concerned with national security. 14. The orders relating to the NSA also lay down that the Director of the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA), in his capacity as the Director, Central Intelligence, will act as the intelligence adviser not only to the President, but also to the NSC. Similarly, the Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff, acts as the military adviser to the NSC. With the  recent revamping of the US intelligence system, the incumbent of the newly-created post of National Intelligence Director is expected to act as the intelligence adviser to the President as well as the NSC. 15. The important roles assigned to the Director, Central Intelligence, and the Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff, as advisers to the NSC and not to the NSA tended to circumscribe the role of the NSA and keep it confined to the field of foreign policy and, in some instances, defence policy as well. Till 9/11, the role of the NSAs in the fields of internal security, intelligence management  and economic security and well-being was limited to co-ordinating the decision making and implementation process. The NSAs had no advisory role in matters relating to intelligence, internal security and economic policy. Any role in economic matters, however limited,  was taken away by President Clinton  through a newly-created National Economic Council (NEC) to be serviced  by an Assistant to the President for Economic Policy. 16. A study of the background of the NSAs since 1953 would show that the majority of them barring exceptions such as Gen.Colin Powell, Admiral Pointdexter, Brent Scrowcroft, Anthony Lake etc, came from a non-governmental background, who were chosen because of their area expertise and their expertise in foreign policy matters. They felt comfortable dealing with  foreign policy and  State actors. 17. The US has never had as an NSA someone who was an expert in intelligence, internal security or economic matters. The NSAs, with no experience or expertise in these important components of national security, felt uncomfortable dealing with subjects  such as terrorism, law enforcement, the various aspects of internal security, economic security and well-being etc and with non-State actors. They tended to over-focus on foreign policy matters, leaving other aspects of national security, particularly internal security, to their subordinates. The inevitable result: 9/11. One only has to read the   book "Against All Enemies", written by Richard Clarke, who was the  counter-terrorism co-ordinator in the NSC staff before and during 9/11, to see how out of depths Ms.Condoleeza Rice, the then NSA, was in matters relating to counter-terrorism and how helpless she looked. 18. She was essentially a Russian-speaking expert on Russia from the academic  world , who had served with some distinction under Scrowcroft when he was the NSA under Bush Sr, but her exposure to internal security policies and non-State actors-related issues was very limited. After 9/11, the Homeland Security related issues have received much greater attention in the US, but this is yet to be reflected adequately in the composition of the NSC staff and their areas of focus. 19. In the Indian strategic analysts' community, there is an  uncritical admiration for the US national security system as epitomised by the NSC and its staff. They romanticise the American system and attribute to it virtues, which even American analysts do not ascribe to it. These analysts tell us that the NSC and its staff  spend more time focussing on strategic, long-term studies than on tactical fire-fighting tasks which are left to the departments concerned, , whereas, in reality, most of their time is spent on day-to-day fire-fighting than in long-term studies. 20. Apart from the pre-1988 success against the erstwhile USSR in Afghanistan and the collapse of international communism, how many other strategic successes can you attribute to the NSC and its staff? Vietnam, Iran, 9/11, post-9/11 developments in Afghanistan, Pakistan and Iraq are not testimonials to the good functioning of the US national security system. THE BRITISH MODEL 21.  The Cabinet Secretary was the linchpin of the British model as it existed before 9/11 and co-ordinated the functioning of the national security  apparatus, including the intelligence agencies, civilian as well as  military. He was assisted in this task by the  Permanent Secretaries Committee on the Intelligence Services,  the Chairman of the Joint Intelligence Committee (JIC), who wore a second hat as  Director, Security and  Intelligence Matters, and the heads of the set-ups for disaster and consequence management. . The JIC Chairman was responsible for the assessment of the intelligence provided by the agencies, for monitoring their performance  and for co-ordinating physical security. 22. The Cabinet Secretary had a very limited role in the formulation and implementation of foreign  and defence policies, which were largely managed by the respective political and professional heads of the Foreign Office and the Defence Department. The Cabinet Secretary's role was more as a facilitator and co-ordinator of national security policy-making than as an adviser to the Prime Minister on foreign and security policies. 23. Post-9/11, the need for a dedicated co-ordinator of security and intelligence, who would not be involved in the day-to-day running of the intelligence and security agencies and who would not be burdened with other responsibilities as the Cabinet Secretary was, was felt.  Accordingly, Prime Minister Tony Blair created in 2002 a post of Security and Intelligence Co-ordinator and Permanent Secretary in the Cabinet Office to take over from the Cabinet Secretary the responsibilities till then performed by the latter in matters relating to security and intelligence. It was, however, laid down that he would report to the Cabinet Secretary and through him to the Prime Minister. The order creating the post said: "This new Permanent Secretary Post is being created to enhance the capacity at the centre of Government to co-ordinate security, intelligence anbd consequence management matters  and to deal with risks and major emergencies should they arise. " 24. His functions were laid down as follows: The Principal Accounting Officer for a Single Intelligence Account (that is, preparation of a consolidated budget for all the intelligence agencies). Chairing the Permanent Secretaries' Committee on the Intelligence Services (PSIS), which advises on intelligence collection requirements, on the agencies' programmes and expenditure, and on co-ordination issues  such as the promotion of joint working between the agencies and other Departments. Chairing the Central Official Committee to ensure the implementation of CONTEST, the Government's five-year counter-terrorism strategy. Deputy Chair of the Civil Contingencies Committee. Co-chairing the US-UK Joint Contact Group on Homeland Security. Chairing the Official Committee on Security to ensure the implementation of the Government's Protective Security Strategy. (that is, physical security) Oversight of the Civil Contingencies Secretariat  and support for the Home Secretary  in his role as the Chair of the Civil Contingencies Committee. 25. It was also laid down that  the JIC Chairman  will report  to the Cabinet Secretary and the Prime Minister in matters relating to intelligence assessment and to the Security and Intelligence Co-ordinator in all other matters. 26.The order creating the post of Security and Intelligence Co-ordinator also stipulated as follows: " The appointment of the Security and Intelligence Co-ordinator does not affect the statutory relationships  between the heads of the intelligence agencies and their Secretaries of State  nor the statutory sole responsibility  of the agency heads for the direction of the operations of their agencies and their right of access to the Prime Minister." 27. Both the incumbents of this post since its creation came from the Home Office. Sir David Omand, the first holder of this post, had previously served as the Director of the Government Communications Headquarters (GCHQ), the technical intelligence agency,  Deputy Under Secretary of State For Policy at the Ministry of Defence, Chairman of the Government's Centre for Management and Policy Studies and Permanent Secretary at the Home Office. 28. Bill Jeffrey, who succeeded Sir David and is the present incumbent of the post, had served as the Deputy Head  of the Economic and Domestic Secretariat in the Cabinet Office, Political Director in the Northern Ireland Office and then as Director-General of Immigration and Nationality. 29. The Security and Intelligence Co-ordinator has no role in foreign and defence policy matters. The Prime Minister has in his office an Adviser on Foreign Policy. He assists the Prime Minister during his meetings with foreign dignitaries,  advises him on foreign policy matters and undertakes any special diplomatic tasks assigned to him by the Prime Minister. He has no role as the co-ordinator  of foreign policy formulation and implementation. This task continues to be performed by the political and professional heads  of the Foreign Office. Recently, Prime Minister Tony Blair has reverted to the practice which prevailed before the Falklands War of  nominating a serving officer (William Ehrman) of the foreign service to function as the Chairman of the JIC. 30. Thus, post-9/11, the British Prime Minister has three senior officials assisting him in matters relating to national security----- the Adviser on Foreign Policy,  the Security and Intelligence Co-ordinator in respect of intelligence, internal security, crisis management and disaster management, and the JIC Chairman in respect of assessment of intelligence. While the Adviser on Foreign Policy  reports directly to the Prime Minister, the other two report through the Cabinet Secretary, who continues to be the linchpin of the national security mechanism. The Adviser to the PM on Foreign Policy  and the Security and Intelligence Co-ordinator are both members of the JIC. 31. While the JIC Chairman has a dedicated staff  called the Joint Intelligence Organisation to help him in the assessment of intelligence and in performing other tasks relating to the intelligence agencies, the Adviser on Foreign Policy and the Security and Intelligence Co-ordinator do not appear to have any dedicated staff. The Adviser on Foreign Policy makes use of the available staff in the Prime Minister's office and the Co-ordinator is serviced by the staff of the Cabinet Office. 32. The British model is thus characterised by an avoidance of excessive institutionalisation of the national security apparatus in order to retain a certain flexibility, a preference for serving officers to perform the roles of co-ordination and as foreign policy advisers instead of retired officers and non-governmental experts, an attempt to preserve the position of the Cabinet Secretary as the linchpin of the national security mechanism and to refrain from weakening the leadership role of the Departments concerned with national security in their respective policy domains and of the heads of the intelligence agencies and avoidance of any changes, which could come in the way of the privileged one-to-one relationship between the Prime Minister and the heads of the intelligence agencies, even while keeping them under the administrative control of the departments of which they are  part--- the Home Office in respect of the Security Service (MI-5) and the Foreign Office in respect  of the Secret Intelligence Service (SIS---MI-6) and the GCHQ. THE ISRAELI MODEL 33. The Israeli model, of which not many details are available, seems to be patterned more after the US model, while avoiding the excessive structurisation of the US in order to retain flexibility in  policy making and implementation. There is a post of NSA to the Prime Minister created in 1999. He is assisted by four Deputy NSAs, of whom one looks after foreign policy, one after security policy, one after operational matters and one is responsible for administration and accounts. One does not know  what kind of staff they have to service them and how they function. THE INDIAN MODEL 34. Till 1999, in India too, as in the UK, the Cabinet Secretary was the linchpin of the national security mechanism and exercised his leadership role in national security matters through the Committee of Secretaries and the JIC. However, in contrast to the UK, the role of the Indian Cabinet Secretary was  circumscribed by the following factors: The heads of the Intelligence Bureau, the internal intelligence agency, and the Research & Analysis Wing (R&AW), the external intelligence agency, enjoyed greater autonomy of functioning than their counterparts in the UK and had the same privileged direct access to the Prime Minister as their UK counterparts. The control of the Home Secretary over the IB was limited to administrative and financial matters, with practically no control over operational and policy matters. Similarly, the control of the Cabinet Secretary over the R&AW  was limited to administrative and financial matters, with very little say in operational and policy matters. As in the USA during the years of the Kennedy and Johnson Administrations, many important decisions in foreign policy and national security matters were taken by the Prime Minister of the day during informal consultations with a small group of confidantes, with the Cabinet Secretary playing very little role in such consultations. Among those who played an important role  in this informal consultations preceding important decision-making, one could mention V.K.Krishna Menon, the then Defence Minister, and B.N.Mullick, the then Director of the IB, during the prime ministership of Jawaharlal Nehru,  D.P.Dhar, P.N.Haksar, T.N.Kaul, the then Foreign Secretary, R.N.Kao, the then head of the R&AW, and G.Parthasarathi, a former journalist turned diplomat, during the prime ministership of Indira Gandhi and Shri Gopi Arora, an Indian Administrative Service officer serving in the Prime Minister's Office, Shri Ronan Sen, an officer of the Foreign Service then serving as the Joint Secretary in the PMO, Shri G.C.Saxena, the then chief of the R&AW, and  Shri A.K.Verma, who also became the chief of the R&AW subsequently, and Shri M.K.Narayanan, the then Director of the IB, during the prime ministership of Rajiv Gandhi. The post-1982 institutionalisation of the role of  Senior Adviser to the Prime Minister in national security matters. R.N.Kao under Indira Gandhi  and Shri G.C.Saxena under Rajiv Gandhi performed this role after they had retired from service. Their role was restricted to national security matters and did not extend to foreign policy though Indira Gandhi did depend upon Kao for performing certain diplomatic tasks of a confidential and sensitive nature  through his contacts at the senior levels of the intelligence communities of other countries As Senior Advisers, Kao and Shri Saxena  functioned from the office of the Cabinet Secretary, but they did not have to report to him. This practice of appointing a Senior Adviser on Security was discontinued in 1990. 35. It was under Rajiv Gandhi and  Shri V.P.Singh as Prime Ministers that a tentative beginning was made to revamp the Indian national security mechanism by borrowing and adapting to Indian requirements certain features of the NSC mechanism of the USA. The exercise remained a non-starter. 36. On coming to office as Prime Minister  in 1998, Shri A.B.Vajpayee set up a special Task Force headed by Shri K.C.Pant and consisting of Shri Jaswant Singh and Air Commodore (retd) Jasjit Singh, the then Director of the prestigious Institute of Defence Studies and Analyses (IDSA), to study the national security mechanisms prevalent in other countries and to submit recommendations on a  revamping of the Indian system. Such a revamping was considered necessary in view of the emergence of India as a nuclear power and its expected emergence as a major power of the region, if not the world. 37. The details of the recommendations of the Task Force are not available and one does not know to what extent they were accepted. After examining the recommendations, the Government set up a revamped national security mechanism in 1998-99, the main features of which were: A National Security Council chaired by the Prime Minister and consisting of a small number  of members of the Cabinet to discuss in depth national security issues and take decisions. A Strategic Policy Group (SPG) headed by the Cabinet Secretary and consisting of the professional heads of the Ministries concerned with national security and  the chiefs of the intelligence agencies and the Armed Forces to work out policy/decision options and submit them to the NSC for consideration. A National Security Advisory Board (NSAB), consisting of non-governmental experts, to provide policy inputs to the National Security Council Secretariat (NSCS). The NSCS to service the work of the NSAB, the SPG  and the NSC and to take over the role of assessment of intelligence and co-ordination of the functioning of intelligence agencies, previously performed by the JIC, which ceased to have a separate and independent existence. The creation of the post of NSA to oversee the functioning of the new mechanism and to advise the PM and the NSC in national security matters. 38. This was a mix of features from  the American and British models. The ideas of the NSC, the NSA, the NSCS and the NSAB were borrowed from the US model. The NSAB was patterned after the National Intelligence Council of the CIA, a body of non-governmental experts to prepare long-term studies, without getting involved in day-to-day national security issues. The NSCS was patterned after the NSC staff in the US. The SPG was meant to retain the role of the Cabinet Secretary in national security policy making and co-ordination, as in the UK. 39. The working of this new system during the last six years has come in for the following criticism: SELECTIVE IMPLEMENTATION: The NSC did not meet even once and  the previous as well as the present Governments preferred taking major decisions on national security at meetings of the Cabinet Committee on Security and not in the NSC. NEGLECT OF STRATEGIC ISSUES: One of the purposes of setting up the NSC system was to provide an institution for bringing about a strategic, long-term approach to policy and decision making. The idea was that the new system should focus on such strategic issues, leaving the day-to-day tactical handling to the Ministries concerned. In actual practice, the new system over-focussed on tactical issues to the neglect of strategic policy-making. WEAKNESSES IN THE ASSESSMENT MACHINERY: A bane of the Indian national security mechanism  has generally been the weak analytical capability. The merging of the JIC with the NSCS has proved counter-productive by removing even the limited analytical capability which we had before 1998. The independence and objectivity of the assessment process has been affected by entrusting the same body with the responsibility for assessment and follow-up action thereon. FAILURE OF NSCS TO COME UP TO EXPECTATIONS: The NSCS has failed to develop the kind of expertise required  on a broad range of national security issues in order to be able to make a meaningful contribution to the decision and policy-making process. It tends to work more as a post office for collecting the views of other departments/agencies, collating and analysing them and passing them on to the SPG. There is very little innovation and new thinking in the policy-making process, the ground work for which has to be done in the NSCS. WEAK FOLLOW-UP AND COORDINATION: The follow-up action on the decisions of  the Cabinet Committee on Security  on the recommendations of the SPG has been weak. While the NSCS does the ground work for the examination of issues by the SPG, once a decision has been taken by the Cabinet Committee on Security, it has limited responsibility for the follow-up action and for coordinating and monitoring the implementation of the decisions. This job is done by the office of the Cabinet Secretary. In the USA, once a decision is taken  by the NSC on a policy paper put up by the NSC staff, it is the responsibiklity of the staff to have necessary Presidential directives issued and to ensure implementation. WEAK CONTROL OVER THE NSCS: The NSCS does the ground work for the examination of national security issues by the SPG, but the Cabinet Secretary, who presides over the SPG meetings and takes the necessary follow-up action, has very little control over the functioning of the NSCS and is hence not in a position to improve the quality of its performance. The NSCS is headed by the Deputy National Security Adviser (DNSA), an officer of the rank of Secretary to the Government. He is accountable to the NSA and not to the Cabinet Secretary. Initially, the NSCS was part of the Cabinet Secretariat, but in 2002, it was transferred to the PMO. WEAK CONTROL AND COORDINATION OF THE INTELLIGENCE AGENCIES:  On the recommendation of the Special Task Force on the Revamping of the Intelligence Apparatus set up by the Government in 2000 under the chairmanship of Shri G.C.Saxena, the responsibility for monitoring and co-ordinating the performance of the intelligence agencies has been entrusted to the NSA. He is  assisted in this task by the NSCS. Neither the NSCS nor  the DNSA have expertise in  intelligence matters. As  a result, the performance of this task continues to be weak and without focus. UNSATISFACTORY PERFORMANCE OF THE NSABs: The NSABs were meant to ensure a continuous flow of non-governmental advice and inputs of a strategic nature  for decision making. This purpose was defeated by the predominance of retired Government servants in it  and by the inadequate representation given in it to those who have never had any association with the Government, either as serving or retired officers. The NSABs were New Delhi-centric with excessive representation for New Delhi-based experts and with very little representation for experts from other parts of India, who could have brought in the perspectives of different States. They lacked focus and were left to fend for themselves with no carefully laid-down terms of reference.  EXCESSIVE CONCENTRATION OF RESPONSIBILITIES IN ONE INDIVIDUAL: The decision of Shri A.B.Vajpayee to combine the duties of the Principal Secretary to the PM and  the NSA in the same officer (Shri Brajesh Mishra) proved counter-productive. As the Principal Secretary to the PM, he was responsible for the smooth functioning of the Prime Minister's Office and for monitoring all developments in the country---whether security related or not--- on behalf of and for the benefit of the Prime Minister. This was by itself a more than a full-time job. The entrustment to him of the additional responsibilities relating to the smooth functioning of the national security mechanism resulted in the dilution of the attention paid to national security tasks. Under Shri Vajpayee, the NSA was responsible for facilitating and co-ordinating policy and decision making  in respect of national security, for monitoring and co-ordinating the functioning of the  intelligence agencies, for the smooth functioning of the nuclear command and control mechanism and for discharging special diplomatic responsibilities relating to India's relations with China, Pakistan, the USA, Russia and other major powers. Shri Brajesh Mishra's (he is a retired officer of the Indian Foreign Service) familiarity and comfort level with foreign policy related issues and his relative unfamiliarity  with internal security related issues led to unsatisfactory results in matters concerning internal security, which has in recent years become the most important component of our national security. The consequence: Positive results in the field of foreign policy due to the  effective leadership role played by him, but not so satisfactory results in the field of internal security. Moreover, the effective discharge of internal security responsibilities in a federal state like India demands familiarity and acquaitenceship with those in charge of security and law enforcement in the States of the Federation. Neither the NSA nor his Deputy, who was also from the Foreign Service, enjoyed this kind of familiarity and acquaintanceship. They largely remained strangers to  those responsible for security and law enforcement in the States. 40. The new Government headed by Dr.Manmohan Singh came to office with a promise to correct the inadequacies in the national security mechanism. It appointed   J.N.Dixit, former Foreign Secretary, as the NSA and created an additional and independent post of Special Adviser to the Prime Minister on Internal Security to which post, it appointed Shri M.K.Narayanan, former Director of the IB. Dixit was not given additional responsibilities as the Principal Secretary to the PM. A separate officer was appointed to that post. 41. There are no indications that any serious effort has been made so far  to address the deficiencies noticed in the functioning of the new national security mechanism set up in 1998-99 and to have them corrected. The creation of the new post of Adviser on Internal Security has definitely laid the ground work for more focussed attention to internal security, but in the absence of a dedicated staff of his own, the NSA as well as the Adviser on Internal Security have both to depend on the NSCS for the effective discharge of their responsibilities. But, the NSCS is accountable to the NSA and it should not be a surprise if it gives priority to the  requirements of the NSA in external matters than to those of the Adviser on Internal Security in internal matters. If an Adviser on Internal Security has to be effective, he has to have a say in the monitoring and co-ordination of the  performance of the intelligence agencies, but this task continues to be performed by the NSA. 42. Dixit, being a Foreign Service officer, was perceived by some analysts and sections of the general public as following on the footsteps of his predecessor by over-involvement in foreign policy related issues  resulting in inadequate attention to other issues. As a result, the public perception is that there has been no qualitative improvement in the functioning of the national security mechanism since the new Government came to power in May last. 43. After the tragic death of Dixit in harness on January 3,2005, the Government has asked Shri Narayanan to hold additional charge as the NSA before it makes up its mind on the successor to Dixit. This interregnum should be utilised to examine whether any changes in the existing system are required. While making such an examination, the following points have to be kept in mind: With no apparent change in Pakistan's policy of continuing to wage a proxy war against India in order to get Jammu and Kashmir, with the continuing spread of Maoist terrorism to more and more areas in the country and with the unrest in the North-East showing little signs of abating,  the internal security, intelligence and military components of national security would continue to need maximum attention. Consequently, any NSA would not be as effective as he or she ought to be, unless he has the required familiarity with these components. The  expertise in matters relating to these components of national security in the NSCS  has to be strengthened and the independence, objectivity and vigour of the assessment process has to be restored either by separating the JIC mechanism from the NSCS or through other means. The Prime Minister does require an expert in the diplomatic component of national security to handle the on-going back channel negotiations with Pakistan and China and for interacting continuously with his counterpart in the USA. A back-channel negotiator drawing his authority directly from the Prime Minister and enjoying his confidence and not subject to the kind of leakages which are not unusual in the Foreign Office would find greater acceptance from our foreign interlocutors than a run of the mill diplomat from the Foreign Office. Is it advisable to make a water-tight division between internal and external security at a time when there is an increasing realisation of the need for an integrated approach to national security? In 1983, Indira Gandhi bifurcated the JIC and created two JICs---one for internal security and the other for external security. Her hopes that this would result in better attention to internal security were belied. Rajiv Gandhi reversed her decision and merged the two. 44. How to achieve our objectives? By continuing  to follow the US model despite the inadequacies noticed so far, hoping that the new incumbent as the NSA would be able to sort out the inadequacies in course of time? By separating the diplomatic and the other components of national security and entrusting the  responsibilities to two different experts as the British have done?  By abolishing the post of the NSA as suggested by some and reverting to the pre-1999 model of the Cabinet Secretary co-ordinating the national security mechanism  by acting through the respective heads of the Ministries concerned? 45. After 9/11, it has been accepted practically in all the countries of the world that the Governments do  need  a single nodal point  for  dealing with national security issues and that the expert in charge of this should not have any responsibility for the day-to-day running of the various ministries and departments performing national security related tasks. Reversion to the pre-1999 model would, therefore, be retrograde.  (The writer is Additional Secretary (retd), Cabinet Secretariat, Govt. of India, New Delhi, and, presently, Director, Institute For Topical Studies, Chennai, and Distinguished Fellow and Convenor, Observer Research Foundation, Chennai Chapter. E-mail: corde@vsnl.com )
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