Paper no. 1551

27. 09. 2005

IRAN’S NUCLEAR PROGRAMME: THE WESTERN OPPOSITION IS MORE GEO-POLITICAL THAN LEGAL

By Dr. Subhash Kapila

Introductory Observations

Iran’s nuclear programme is being vehemently opposed by the United States and more visibly from 2003 onwards.  In the process the United States has co-opted the European powers – France, Germany and the UK (EU-3) to enter into negotiations with Iran to dissuade Iran from what the Western countries perceive as Iranian ambitions for a nuclear weapons programme.

Things have come to a head in September 2005, when the United States and the EU-3 are trying to prevail over the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) to make a referral to the United Nations Security Council (UNSC) to enable UN sanctions being imposed on Iran. This effort is being taken to prevent Iran from re-processing nuclear fuel.

Iran has steadfastly refuted United States and Western charges that its nuclear programme is directed towards nuclear weapons. Iran maintains that under the Non Proliferation Treaty, to which it is a signatory, it is legally permissive to enrich uranium for civilian nuclear energy programmes. Iran remained in dialogue with EU-3 for two years and has fully cooperated with IAEA.

Analysing the maze of background material available on the subject and the recent outpourings of stated positions, declarations and amplifications, some significant issues that emerge, are highlighted below.

United States Double-Standards on Iran’s Nuclear Programme:

On analysis, one is constrained to term it as such when the following  two aspects are examined:

  • United States-Iran nuclear cooperation-the historical record.
  • United States reactions to the Pakistani nuclear weapons programme.

Historically, it was the United States which substantially set Iran on its nuclear progamme course as the following chronology would indicate: 

  • 1967. USA lays the foundation of Iran’s nuclear programme by providing a 5 megawat nuclear research reactor for the Tehran Nuclear Research Center
  • 1968. Iran signs NPT. USA draws a plan to construct 23 nuclear power stations by 2000, in an accord with the Shah of Iran
  • 1975. US National Security Decision Memorandum 292 signed by Henry Kissinger entitled “US-Iran Nuclear Cooperation.” It detailed sale of $ 6 billion worth of nuclear equipment to Iran

Significantly in 1976, President General Ford took two important decisions on Iran’s nuclear programme (and which have a bearing on today’s debate) as follows:

  • Iran, in a US Presidential Directive was offered the option of US-built reprocessing facility for extracting plutonium from nuclear reactor fuel. This deal for building and operating the US-origin facility was for a complete “nuclear fuel cycle”.
  • This directive stated that: “introduction of nuclear power will both provide for the growing needs of Iran’s economy and free remaining oil reserves for export or conversion to petrochemicals.”

This United States sponsored Iranian nuclear programme came to an abrupt end in 1979 with the Iranian Revolution and remained suspended till the 1990s on termination of the 1981-1988 Iraq-Iran War. It was only in 1995 that Russia stepped-in to complete the half-constructed Bushehr nuclear plant. By 2002, the United States focus on Iran’s nuclear program was brought under close scrutiny. 

The United States lays itself open to charges of double standards on Iran’s nuclear programme as follows: 

  • Nuclearised Iran with full potential for weaponisation was acceptable to USA, under the Shah of Iran
  • Iran’s nuclear programme under the present regime is unacceptable to USA
  • There was no questioning then that Iran’s energy needs could be met by oil/gas and that there was no need for civilian nuclear energy

Comparatively, the United State’s double standards on nuclear progammes emerge sharper when America’s attitudes on Pakistan’s nuclear programme are taken into account

  • Pakistan’s nuclear programme was nuclear weapons-centric and not for civilian energy, right from the beginning
  • USA  has consistently adopted a permissive attitude to Pakistani nuclear weapons programme
  • The United States has till today not penalized Pakistan for WMD proliferation, including to Iran where Pak centrifuges with enriched uranium have been found.
  • The Pakistan WMD proliferation to North Korea, Libya and Iran was done at the highest levels of the Pakistan Government.  The Pakistani nuclear programme has been in the tight control of Pakistani Army Chiefs including General Musharraf.  Dr A Q Khan was only a tool.  As late as 2002, when General Musharraf was firmly in power, it is reported that British MiI-5 in an operation at Pakistan High Commission had discovered evidence that Pakistan was still continuing with WMD proliferation.
  • The United Sate has brazenly condoned these deadly transgressions and would like the world to believe that Musharraf is above board.
  • Pakistan as a “Failed State” and  a “Rogue State” was considered acceptable to have nuclear weapons because geo-politically there was no other nuclear counterfoil against India, in South Asia

The United States case on Iran’s nuclear programme thus gets weakened and loses conviction for the rest of the international community.

Western Opposition to Iran’s Nuclear Programme More Geo-political Than Legal:

The United States particularly, and the EU-3 generally, oppose the present Iranian nuclear programme more for geo-political reasons than any legalities arising from infringement of NPT provisions.

This emerges from the preceding discussions. Iran’s geography has not changed, its demography has not changed and its Shia religious majority has not changed. What has changed significantly since 1979 is its political system and governance. So the reason for United States opposition to Iran’s nuclear program is its present regime.

The question that is pertinent is that if tomorrow the present regime is replaced by a US-backed regime, would the United States withdraw its objections then? 

United States strategic concerns, geo-politically, over possible Iranian nuclear weapons were earlier Israel-centric. Today, Pakistan’s objections to a nuclear-armed Iran have additionally entered the United States strategic calculations. 

Geo-politically, Iran’s nuclear program should not be really of much strategic concern to France and Germany in particular. There stimuli may be more commercial, in that Iran under their formulations would become dependent on these countries for nuclear materials to run sanitized Iranian nuclear power stations.

The Iranian Case For a Nuclear Pragramme:

The salient points of the Iranian case for a nuclear programme as covered in the Iranian President’s speech at the UN in mid-September 2005 are as under:

  • Iran has an inalienable right to produce nuclear energy
  • Under the NPT, Iran has the right to a nuclear fuel programme. The peaceful use of nuclear energy without a nuclear fuel cycle is an empty proposition
  • Islam precluded Iran from having nuclear weapons(In fact, in 1979, Ayatollah Khomeini  had ordered closure of the Bushehar nuclear  project terming it an un-Islamic)
  • It is outside the NPT and not acceptable to Iran that other countries should produce nuclear fuel and then Iran should buy from them for its civilian nuclear energy programme
  • Called for universal nuclear disarmament and creation of Nuclear Weapons Free Zone in the Middle East
  • Rejecting US-EU-3  demand to halt uranium enrichment in exchange for economic and other incentives

Elsewhere, Iranian officials and official documents have maintained that: 

  • “Iran rejects the proposal of Iran permanently renouncing its right to  develop nuclear technology”
  • “Based on IAEA criteria there are no technical or judicial grounds for the referral of the Iran dossier to the UNSC”
  • “Iran believes that the Iranian nuclear programme is being treated with political consideration than a technical  approach which the UN specialized agency (IAEA) is expected to take”
  • “The UN agency (IAEA)  has been influenced by a political programme against Iran”
  • “We are an NPT signatory and have complied with all regulations and safeguards of international agencies”

Reassuring the international community, President Mahmoud Ahmedinejad has offered: 

  • Other countries to participate in Iran’s nuclear program to prove that Iran is not producing nuclear weapons
  • Iran was willing to cooperate in far reaching steps, even outside the NPT, but without foregoing Iran’s right to a nuclear fuel cycle

All of the above indicates that:

  • Iran firmly believes that  it is legally permitted by the NPT to undertake the full nuclear fuel cycle for civilian energy purposes
  • Iran will not be coerced by US and Western pressure to forego her rights
  • Iran is prepared to react to any extreme steps by external powers

In case, US pressure on Iran are extraordinarily pressed, then Iran could possibly opt out of the NPT 

International Divisions in Approaches to the Iranian Nuclear Programme Crisis: 

The developments pertaining to the Iranian nuclear programme in the last few weeks and months suggest that:

  • The issue is being turned into a crisis by the opposition of the United States and Western countries, who demand economic sanctions by the UNSC against Iran, and possibly intervention to stop Iran from a possible nuclear weapons programme.
  • Divisions exist in the international community  on the approaches to be adopted to dissuade Iran.
  • Russia, China, India and some other countries favour an approach of dialogue and consensus as opposed to a confrontationist approach to Iran
  • Developing countries of the Non-Aligned Movement maintain that developed countries cannot indulge in nuclear apartheid and deny nuclear programmes including the full nuclear cycles for Iran’s civilian nuclear energy needs

Strong opposition from Russia and China and reservations by India are thwarting the US-EU move for a swift referral by IAEA to the UNSC on this issue.  It has led now to an IAEA vote where Iran would be referred to UN but not before November 2005, in case no solution is found through negotiations.

Even a referral by IAEA to UNSC, if it goes through, would witness many  prolonged discussions in the United Nations in opposition to US moves.

United States and Western Case against Iran’s Nuclear Programme Gets Diluted – Factors:

  • Reports by the International Institute of Strategic Studies (London) and US Central Intelligence Agency indicate that Iran could be more than 10 years away from nuclear weaponisation
  • Reports by IAEA that it has not found any “Smoking Gun” in Iran to indicate that a nuclear weaponsisation programme is underway in Iran. It also states that neither USA nor any other Western country has brought any concrete evidence before IAEA
  • United States record of a historical campaign against Iraq on similar grounds of WMD programs, leading to unleashing of Gulf War II and then not finding any evidence  till date
  • Geo-political and geo-economic considerations prompt Iran’s figuring in the strategic matrix of  Russia, China and India (see this authors paper ( SAAG  Paper No 1284 dated 09-03-2005) entitled: “Iran in the Strategic Matrix of Russia, China and India: An Analysis”
  • Iran’s leverages in the form of its military potential in the Gulf Region, sizeable Shia communities in Gulf Kingdoms whose religious loyalties are with Iran and Iran’s control over global oil prices. Despite US military predominance, Iran could cripple oil flows from the Gulf with its present military assets.

Concluding Observations

History seems to be repeating itself, with the United States and UK, obsessed with Iran’s probable nuclear weapon programme – both these countries were similarly obsessed with the Iraqi WMD programme.  It led to Gulf War II and with US and UK forces in military occupation of Iraq, no evidence has still been uncovered. General Collin Powell, then US Secretary of State has now admitted that it was a painful experience to discover that he had argued the case in UN, based on wrong information and wrong official assessments made available on Iraq WMDs. Iraq has consequently turned into an unmitigated disaster for USA

Iran is a totally different entity, and any undue haste to obtain United States end-objectives in Iran may lead to consequences more disastrous for American desires to remain embedded in the Middle East.  See this author’s paper (SAAG  Paper No 1298, dated on 25-03-2005) entitled: “Iran in United States Military Cross-Hairs: Brief Analysis of the End Game” 

Legally, Iran’s case is conceded as strong both in terms of NPT Statutes and the Additional Protocol. The IAEA till date has not been provided any factual evidence by the United States that Iran has an ongoing nuclear weapons programme.

Geo-politics is determining United Sates stances on Iran’s nuclear programme.  Iran as a regional power in the making, reinforced with a possible ‘basement nuclear bomb’ could knock out all the props of United States strategy in the Middle East, namely, Israel, Turkey and Pakistan.

(The author is an International Relations and Strategic Affairs analyst. He is the Consultant, Strategic Affairs with South Asia Analysis Group. Email drsubhashkapila@yahoo.com) 

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