Paper no. 1655	28. 12. 2005
INTERNATIONAL TERRORISM MONITOR: PAPER NO.7 MARITIME COUNTER-TERRORISM: NEED TO LOOK WEST by B.Raman Addressing a press conference at Islamabad on December 22, 2005,  Dr Franz-Josef Jung, the German Defence Minister, who was on a visit to Pakistan to inspect German defence forces assisting in quake relief operations in Pakistan-occupied Kashmir (POK) and the North-West Frontier Province (NWFP), indicated  that Pakistan would assume command of the Coalition Maritime Security Force (CMSF), which has been operating in the Arabian Sea since the US-led invasion of Afghanistan in 2001, from April 2006. The CMSF consists of ships from the US and other NATO countries, Pakistan and from the member-countries of the Gulf Co-operation Council (GCC). While the Pakistan Army has been kept out of the coalition land forces operating against the Taliban and Al Qaeda in Afghan territory, ships of the Pakistan Navy have been actively participating in the CMSF, which, inter alia, monitors the activities of Al Qaeda and the International Islamic Front (IIF) in the seas of this region.. However, Pakistan has been refraining from playing any role in the maritime counter-terrorism operations, which are meant to protect the oil industry, terminals and pipelines of Iraq against terrorist attacks mounted from the sea. 2. The German Minister said that Germany would provide to Pakistan the necessary assistance in equipment and training before its Navy assumed command of the CMSF. According to Maj-Gen. Shaukat Sultan, who is the Director-General of Inter-Services Public Relations, "the task of the CMSF will be two-fold, i.e. to carry out anti-terrorist activities to ensure that terrorists do not use the sea for travelling and also to ensure a role in anti-narcotics activities." Pakistan will be nominating a Rear-Admiral, who will operate for five months from the NAVCENT (Naval Central Command) headquarters in Bahrain. 3. According to a media briefing given at Manama, Bahrain, on June 1, 2005, by Vice-Admiral David Nichols of the US Navy, who is the commander of the coalition maritime forces and in that capacity responsible for Maritime Security Operations (MSO) in the areas coming under the responsibility of the US Naval Central Command (NAVCENT), 45 ships, 25 of them belonging to the US Navy, have been participating in the MSO in this area. He described their role as "to patrol 2.5 million square miles of international waters to conduct integrated and coordinated operations with a common purpose:  to preserve the free and secure use of the world’s oceans by legitimate mariners, and prevent terrorists from attempting to use the world’s oceans as a venue for attack or as a medium to transport personnel or material " He further described their task as "pressurizing the environment through MSO". He added: “Pressurizing the maritime environment describes an effect we’re trying to have out there which deters the terrorists from using the maritime environment because they know we’re out there; they know we’re keeping a careful eye on what’s going on.” The coalition force is responsible for conducting MSO in international waters in the Arabian Gulf, the Arabian Sea, the Gulf of Oman, the Gulf of Aden, the Indian Ocean, and the Red Sea. 4. The coalition maritime forces, coming under the command of NAVCENT, have been divided into two Task Forces, named Task Force 150 and Task Force 152. Task Force 150 was set up before 9/11 after the Al Qaeda attack on USS Cole, the US naval ship, in October, 2000 off Aden. Its initial task was confined to protecting high-value shipping in the Gulf of Aden region After 9/11, it was made responsible, under Operation Enduring Freedom, for MSO in an area stretching from the southern edge of the Suez Canal to the Straits of Hormuz and down the east African coast to Kenya, about 2.5 million square miles. Task Force 152 covers the central and southern regions of the Gulf. 5. Task Force 150 has ten or more frigates or destroyers from the US, the UK, France, Germany, Italy, Spain, Canada, Pakistan, Australia and New Zealand. The ships forming part of the Task Force and its command are rotated every four or five months. It is learnt that so far six ships of the Pakistan Navy had served in the Task Force on rotation. The Commander of the Task Force (CTF) and his staff of about 20 function either from a ship of the country to which the CTF belongs or from the NAVCENT headquarters in Bahrain. To facilitate inter-operability, the Task Force uses CENTRIXS, a US web-based communications system. Normally, the ships operate within their own waters, but come out of them for joint exercises or joint operations. Thus, the Pakistani ships forming part of the Task Force generally operate in Pakistani territorial waters or exclusive economic zones and come out only for joint exercises or operations. It is their responsibility to ensure that there is no act of maritime terrorism in their waters. The ships of the Task Force have specially trained boarding parties with rigid hull inflatable boats. Digital cameras are used to record documents or items of equipment on boarded vessels and the photographic evidence is then passed on to the Coalition Intelligence Fusion Cell in Bahrain by CENTRIXS for immediate analysis. The Coalition Intelligence Fusion Cell in Bahrain has a staff of about 15 naval personnel from about 12 countries. It is responsible for the analysis and assessment of the information collected by the ships and their boarding teams. The Task Force performs four tasks---intelligence collection, analysis and assessment; proactive follow-up action; reactive follow-up action; and theatre security co-operation. As part of its intelligence collection role, it develops and maintains close relations with the maritime communities (fishermen and other seafarers) using the seas of the region. 6. There have been many instances of maritime terrorism in the waters to the West of India since 1985 carried out by the Palestinians, the LTTE and the Chechens. The acts of maritime terrorism carried out by the Palestinians and the Chechens were confined to acts such as hijacking of ferries and holding the passengers in custody in order to achieve demands of a tactical nature, attacks from the sea on coastal military targets etc. The LTTE developed a dreaded Sea Tigers wing, which specialised in suicide tactics such as ramming explosives-laden boats against chosen targets on the coast, in ports or on the sea. The Al Qaeda attacks on the US Naval ship, USS Cole, in October,2000, and on the French oil tanker Limberg in October,2002---both off Aden--- were in emulation of the tactics developed  by the LTTE and involved ramming a boat laden with explosives. 7. Among illustrative incidents of maritime terrorism in the waters to the West of India before 9/11, one could mention the following: The hijacking of the Italian-flagged cruise ship P/V Achille Lauro in 1985 off Port Said, Egypt, by terrorists of the Palestine Liberation Front (PLF), who held the ship with 180 passengers and 331 crew members on board, hostage, demanding the release of 50 Palestinian prisoners in Israeli jails. They killed an invalid Jewish American passenger, before negotiating the release of the rest of the hostages against their safe passage. In 1994, the LTTE shipped 50 metric tons of TNT and ten metric tons of RDX explosives on board one of their own freighters, operated by a front company called Carlton Trading, from a Ukrainian Black Sea port via the Turkish Straits to Sri Lanka. It also hijacked in 1997 a freighter called "Stillus Limassul", loaded with more than 30,000 81mm mortar rounds, worth over three million dollars. The owning and operation by the LTTE and by the PKK, the Kurdish organisation, of ocean-going ships, which were normally used for legitimate commercial activities and, when needed, also for facilitating acts of terrorism like hijacking, arms transport and seizure. In January 1996, nine pro-Chechen gunmen (six Turks of Abhkaz origin, two Chechens, and an ethnic Abkhaz from Georgia) hijacked a Turkish ferry in the Black Sea and kept 255 passengers and crew hostage for three days. They threatened to blow up the vessel and their hostages, but released the ferry and the passengers after negotiations with the Turkish authorities. The Turkish authorities had alleged that in order to draw attention to the Chechen cause, the hijackers had earlier considered blowing up one of the two suspension bridges over the Bosphorus with explosives in order to block the Strait to traffic.  8. However, none of these incidents, though serious by themselves, could be described as mass casualty or mass destruction or mass damage terrorism. The intelligence and security agencies were alerted to the dangers of acts of catastrophic maritime terrorism by the arrest of the organizer of the Limburg attack, a Saudi national of Yemeni origin called Abd al Rahman al Nashiri, who was also suspected to have been involved in the attack on the USS Cole. His interrogation brought in information about Al Qaeda's preparations to attack ships in the Mediterranean and elsewhere using tactics such as ramming, blowing up medium-sized ships near other vessels or at ports, attacking large vessels such as supertankers from the air by using explosive-laden small aircraft, and attacking vessels with underwater demolition teams using limpet mines or with suicide bombers. During his interrogation, Nashiri also reportedly revealed that if warships became too difficult to approach, tourist ships could be targeted. Amongst the documents reportedly captured from him was one giving details of Western Cruise ships, which could be attacked if a suitable opportunity presented itself. His interrogation brought out that Al Qaeda had also planned an operation to bomb American and British warships in the Strait of Gibraltar, off the northern coast of Morocco. 9. The 9/11 terrorist strikes and the precision and the evil ingenuity with which they were planned and executed created a wave of alarm about the likelihood of similar strikes at coastal and maritime targets. Since 9/11, there is hardly any discussion, governmental or non-governmental, on threats to national security and to international peace and security in which possible threats from maritime terrorism do not figure prominently.Post-9/11 scenario-building exercises have invariably included scenarios involving possible catastrophic acts of maritime terrorism. Four of these possible scenarios are or should be of major concern to national security managers: First, terrorists hijacking a huge oil or gas  tanker and exploding it in mid-sea  or in a major port in order to cause huge human, material and environmental damage. There were 67 reported attacks on oil and gas tankers by pirates during 2004. This despite the stepped-up patrolling by the Navies of different countries. What pirates with no ideological motive and with no suicidal fervour can do, ideologically-driven suicide terrorists can do with equal, if not greater, ease. Second, terrorists hijacking an oil or gas tanker or a bulk-carrier and exploding it or scuttling it in maritime choke-points such as the Malacca Strait in order to cause a major disruption of energy supplies and global trade. There were 52 reported attacks on bulk carriers by pirates during 2004. If the pirates can do it despite naval patrolling, so can the terrorists. Three, terrorists smuggling weapon of mass destruction material such as radiological waste or lethal chemicals or even biological weapons in a container and having it exploded through a cellular phone as soon as the vessel carrying the container reaches a major port. Four, sea-borne terrorists attacking a nuclear establishment or an oil refinery or off-shore oil platforms. 10. Maritime counter-terrorism has received considerable attention in India, but till now the focus has naturally and mostly been on maritime counter-terrorism and security in the waters off Sri Lanka and in the Malacca Strait. There has been inadequate attention to terrorist threats of a strategic nature from the seas to the west of India---- whether from the Gulf, the Arabian Sea, the Strait of Hormuz or the Mediterranean. 11. Over 80 per cent of the terrorist organisations with a capability for maritime terrorism operate in the areas and seas to the West of India. Over 90 per cent of successful maritime terrorism strikes have taken place in the areas and seas to the West of India. Israel has been the largest single victim of maritime terrorism in the Mediterrannean, with nearly 60 strikes by organisations such as the Hamas, the Hizbollah, the Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine (PFLP) etc. The only two successful strikes and one unsuccessful attempt by Al Qaeda were off Aden. Almost our entire energy supplies come from this area. The security of the Malacca Strait has limited relevance for our energy security, whereas our entire energy security depends on maritime security in the areas to the West of India. 12.. One would have, therefore, expected that the concentration of our maritime counter-terrorism efforts would have been on building a database of capabilities, threats and risks from the areas and seas to the West of India, adopting a vigorous proactive policy of co-operation with the navies of this region and developing preventive and termination capabilities, which would have relevance in the areas to the West of India. Unfortunately, this is not so. 13. The Americans do not want our Navy playing any proactive role in maritime security in the waters to the West of India lest it cause any undue concern in the minds of Pakistan. They, therefore, try to keep our Navy   confined to the East and the Malacca Strait. We seem to be happy to go along with this role. This has to change. 14. It is high time the Indian Navy starts paying more attention to threats of maritime terrorism that could arise from the West. Presently, the deployment of a large number of naval ships belonging to the US-led coalition has thwarted any other serious incident of maritime terrorism after the suspected Al Qaeda attack on Limburg in October, 2002 and the attacks on oil terminals in Iraq post-April, 2003. We should not leave the protection of our shipping and our energy supplies totally in the hands of the US-led coalition. We should develop our own capabilities and networking with the countries of the region. (The writer is Additional Secretary (retd), Cabinet Secretariat, Govt. of India, and, presently, Director, Institute For Topical Studies, Chennai. E-mail: itschen36@gmail.com)
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