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South Asia Analysis Group |
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by B.Raman
If Mr.George Bush Jr is elected the next President of the US in the elections on November 7, 2000, Ms.Condoleezza Rice (popularly known as Condi) is expected to occupy an important position in the new Bush administration either in the National Security Council or in the State Department. What type of a person is she, what is her background and what have been her views on foreign policy issues of interest to India? Born in Birmingham, Alabama, Rice holds a bachelor's degree from the University of Denver, a master's degree from Notre Dame and a doctorate from the University of Denver's Graduate School of International Studies. Rice first came to Stanford in 1981 as a fellow in the arms control and disarmament programme. She was a tenured professor in the university's political science department and was a Hoover Institution national fellow from 1985 until 1986. Mr.Coit Blacker, Deputy Director of Stanford's Institute for International Studies, said of Rice: "She came in 1981 to be a fellow at the arms control and disarmament programme to augment her background in Soviet affairs with a grounding in security issues. I think what struck people at the time was a combination of all the personal stuff charm and very gracious personality . . . a kind of intellectual agility mixed with velvet-glove forcefulness. She's a steel magnolia. She has a wonderful kind of Southern affect in the positive sense a kind of graciousness. But mixed with this is a very steely inner core. She always knows what she wants and is extremely disciplined, both at personal and professional levels-" Following her initial Hoover Institution affiliation, Rice went to Washington, D.C. to work on nuclear strategic planning at the Joint Chiefs of Staff as part of a Council of Foreign Relations fellowship. She came back to Stanford when the fellowship ended. Rice returned to Washington in 1989 when she was director of Soviet and East European affairs with the National Security Council. She also was appointed Special Assistant to the President for national security affairs and senior Director for Soviet affairs at the National Security Council under President George Bush. In those roles, she focussed on Poland and the former Soviet Union. In March 1991, she quit her White House job to serve as Hoover Senior Fellow. Subsequently, she worked at Stanford as Provost from 1993 to July, 1999, when she joined the entourage of Mr.Bush Jr as chief foreign policy adviser. During her stay in Stanford as Provost, she cofounded the Center for a New Generation, an after-school academy in East Palo Alto, California, and became a corporate board member for Chevron, the Hewlett Foundation and Charles Schwab and also a member of J.P. Morgan's international advisory council. Rice is a Council of Foreign Relations member, a National Endowment for the Humanities trustee, and a fellow of the American Academy of Arts and Sciences. She has written numerous articles and several books on international relations and foreign affairs, including "Germany Unified and Europe Transformed: A Study in Statecraft" (Harvard University Press, 1995). Former President Bush reportedly introduced Rice to Mikhail Gorbachev in December 1989 as follows: "This is Condoleezza Rice. She tells me everything I know about the Soviet Union." She later said of her days in the NSC:"I had two bosses whom I adored, both in President Bush and Brent Scowcroft (the National Security Adviser). And the people I worked with - Cheney, Powell, Scowcroft, Baker - it was a magnificent team." When asked about her future after she joined Mr.Bush Jr's entourage, she said: "Ambiguity (about my future) has never bothered me at all. I think that part of it is that I'm pretty religious, and that probably helps to make one less fearful and more optimistic about what's possible. I rather like living with ambiguity." She also described herself as follows: " I am somebody who is very data-driven and analytic. When I see a problem, my first question is, why do we have that problem it's not to accuse others of trying to continue the problem." HER VIEWS AS EXPRESSED BY HER IN AN ARTICLE IN THE "FOREIGN AFFAIRS" (JANUARY-FEBRUARY, 2000) AND IN VARIOUS INTERVIEWS WHAT SHE WROTE/SAID BEFORE MR.BUSH JR.'S NOMINATION AS PRESIDENTIAL CANDIDATE "The U.S. national interest has got to be to keep this remarkable post-Cold War period in which markets and free trade are bringing about more democratic governments. And in order to do that, the United States’ most important and fundamental responsibility is to keep the global peace. So the national interest is to make certain that we can keep the global peace, to make certain that we’re committed to free trade and to make certain that we keep always in our forward screen the march of democratic development. "I think the American armed forces really have three main responsibilities. The first is we are the only army of consequence in the world that can deter "big war." By "big war," I mean war of global strategic significance: the Persian Gulf, the Taiwan Straits, the Korean peninsula. These are wars that if you asked, "What would be the effect of large-scale instability in the Persian Gulf?" -- you look at 40 percent of the world’s oil supply. If you ask, "What would be the effect on the Korean peninsula or the Taiwan Straits?" -- you look at a complete destabilization of the East Asian region and the economies there, and therefore global financial instability. So when you talk about wars of global strategic significance, you are not talking about local conflicts. "Secondly, the Americans have a responsibility when you have local conflicts that could widen into larger wars in areas of vital strategic interests. "Kosovo would have fit that bill, yes, because we have certain commitments to NATO countries. That’s in NATO’s back yard. The potential for wider war there was pretty significant, and so we had a responsibility to deal with Kosovo. I think the other role for American armed forces is to support the efforts of others who may be capable of intervening when you have large-scale violence but large-scale violence that is localized. And there I would use the example of East Timor, where the Australians were willing to step up to the plate and the United States provided logistical and infrastructure support, transportation support to the Australians. "American soldiers should serve under American command, or in some cases when we have an alliance where the lines of authority are clear, like NATO, I think there’s no problem with American soldiers serving there. American soldiers have served under U.N. mandate several times in our history, but it has generally not been under a blue-helmet command. "The American President has to be able to intervene when he thinks it’s in the interest of the United States to do that. And it may be that there are some conflicts that are so repugnant to us that we do want to intervene. But I myself believe that we are masking something very important when we talk about humanitarian conflicts. Because what we're really talking about are political conflicts that have devastating humanitarian consequences. We’re talking about other people’s civil wars, generally. And yes, people are doing terrible things to each other, but there’s a political problem underneath. And so, if you rephrase the question and ask yourself, "Are we going to get involved in the political conflict in order to try to save lives?" -- that’s a somewhat different question. "My own view is that most of the time we’re going to be better off to support regional actors that are closer to the conflict. I think, for instance, Governor Bush believes that we should have supported Nigeria in Sierra Leone. "We didn’t change the regime in Iraq, but we certainly changed the circumstances on the ground in Iraq. And where military forces are best is when they can go in and change the circumstances on the ground and then get out. What we did in Iraq was to expel Saddam Hussein’s weight, to stop his forward march to Saudi Arabia -- and therefore a significant portion of the world’s oil supply -- and we so disabled his conventional forces that he’s not the threat to his neighbors that he once was. Now, in retrospect, did anyone believe he would still be there? No. But I think we did achieve a great deal through the Gulf War. "I don’t think it was possible in Iraq to remove Saddam Hussein. You would have had to go to Baghdad. The coalition would clearly have frayed at that point. And imagine the United States essentially in the position of having to occupy Baghdad. Might we have had different terms of surrender for him is a different question. Clearly, there were some things that were missed in the war-termination phase, like not permitting him to use helicopters and things like that. But no, I don’t think, even in retrospect, anyone should quarrel with the decision not to try and overthrow him. "The chill that’s emerging from Russia is certainly of concern, particularly the media chill. And there’s no doubt the people in the media are feeling it. "I think that the message to Putin really has to be that the modern effective state is one that can tap the creativity of its people. The modern effective state is one that can use that creativity to join the knowledge economy -- an economy, by the way, in which Russia should have a very big role, given the education level of its people, the skill of the population in mathematics, and so forth. You don’t become a modern state using 19th-century tactics. "It’s just not in Russia’s interest to do some of these things. The centralization of power in the Kremlin away from the regions, for instance. ... I would be the first as a Russian specialist to admit that some of the things that were going on in the regions probably needed to be halted -- the tax evasion, the resource stripping, all of those kinds of things. But eventually Russia has to find an effective and appropriate federal system because the country’s too big to govern from the center. "Putin is very popular. There’s no doubt in my mind that the Russians felt the lack of leadership of Boris Yeltsin’s last three or four years, and that they are glad that someone’s home in the Kremlin. I think that may be some of it. But I don’t think the Russian people are any different from anyone else in wanting to have the ability to have a free press, the ability to have a say about who rules them. But it’s not that much distance between what was true authoritarianism in Russia, and today. And it doesn’t take much to frighten people. "In crisis, I think that he (Mr.Bush Jr) is someone who would bring a tremendous calm to crisis decision-making. He’s an analytical person. He’s someone who asks really hard questions of his advisors when they are recommending various things. I thought to myself, if President Clinton had asked Madeline Albright, ‘Why might you be wrong?’ when she said Milosevic would cave in three days, we might have fought the Kosovo war differently. So a lot of it is asking tough questions so that you get the best decision-making. "American foreign policy in a Republican administration should refocus the United States on the national interest and the pursuit of key priorities. These tasks are: * to ensure that America's military can deter war, project power, and fight in defense of its interests if deterrence fails; "So multilateral agreements and institutions should not be ends in themselves. U.S. interests are served by having strong alliances and can be promoted within the U.N. and other multilateral organizations, as well as through well-crafted international agreements. But the Clinton administration has often been so anxious to find multilateral solutions to problems that it has signed agreements that are not in America's interest. The Kyoto treaty is a case in point: whatever the facts on global warming, a treaty that does not include China and exempts "developing" countries from tough standards while penalizing American industry cannot possibly be in America's national interest. "Similarly, the arguments about U.S. ratification of the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty are instructive. Since 1992, the United States has refrained unilaterally from testing nuclear weapons. It is an example to the rest of the world yet does not tie its own hands "in perpetuity" if testing becomes necessary again. But in pursuit of a "norm" against the acquisition of nuclear weapons, the United States signed a treaty that was not verifiable, did not deal with the threat of the development of nuclear weapons by rogue states, and threatened the reliability of the nuclear stockpile. Legitimate congressional concerns about the substance of the treaty were ignored during negotiations. When faced with the defeat of a bad treaty, the administration attacked the motives of its opponents -- incredibly branding long-standing internationalists like Senators Richard Lugar (R-Ind.) and John Warner (R-Va.) as isolationists. "The United States has many sources of power in the pursuit of its goals. The global economy demands economic liberalization, greater openness and transparency, and at the very least, access to information technology. International economic policies that leverage the advantages of the American economy and expand free trade are the decisive tools in shaping international politics. They permit us to reach out to states as varied as South Africa and India and to engage our neighbors in the western hemisphere in a shared interest in economic prosperity. The growth of entrepreneurial classes throughout the world is an asset in the promotion of human rights and individual liberty, and it should be understood and used as such. Yet peace is the first and most important condition for continued prosperity and freedom. America's military power must be secure because the United States is the only guarantor of global peace and stability. The current neglect of America's armed forces threatens its ability to maintain peace. "Certainly, Republican presidents have not been immune to the practice of pursuing symbolic agreements of questionable value. According to the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, some 52 conventions, agreements, and treaties still await ratification; some even date back to 1949. But the Clinton administration's attachment to largely symbolic agreements and its pursuit of, at best, illusory "norms" of international behavior have become an epidemic. That is not leadership. Neither is it isolationist to suggest that the United States has a special role in the world and should not adhere to every international convention and agreement that someone thinks to propose. "Now the next President will be confronted with a prolonged job of repair. Military readiness will have to take center stage, particularly those aspects that affect the living conditions of the troops -- military pay, housing -- and also training. New weapons will have to be procured in order to give the military the capacity to carry out today's missions. But even in its current state, the American military still enjoys a commanding technological lead and therefore has a battlefield advantage over any competitor. Thus the next President should refocus the Pentagon's priorities on building the military of the 21st century rather than continuing to build on the structure of the Cold War. U.S. technological advantages should be leveraged to build forces that are lighter and more lethal, more mobile and agile, and capable of firing accurately from long distances. In order to do this, Washington must reallocate resources, perhaps in some cases skipping a generation of technology to make leaps rather than incremental improvements in its forces. "The other major concern is a loss of focus on the mission of the armed forces. What does it mean to deter, fight, and win wars and defend the national interest? First, the American military must be able to meet decisively the emergence of any hostile military power in the Asia-Pacific region, the Middle East, the Persian Gulf, and Europe -- areas in which not only our interests but also those of our key allies are at stake. America's military is the only one capable of this deterrence function, and it must not be stretched or diverted into areas that weaken these broader responsibilities. It is the role that the United States played when Saddam Hussein threatened the Persian Gulf, and it is the power needed to deter trouble on the Korean Peninsula or across the Taiwan Strait. In the latter cases, the goal is to make it inconceivable for North Korea or China to use force because American military power is a compelling factor in their equations. "Some small-scale conflicts clearly have an impact on American strategic interests. Such was the case with Kosovo, which was in the backyard of America's most important strategic alliance: NATO. In fact, Yugoslav President Slobodan Milosevic's rejection of peaceful coexistence with the Kosovar Albanians threatened to rock the area's fragile ethnic balance. Eastern Europe is a patchwork of ethnic minorities. For the most part, Hungarians and Romanians, Bulgarians and Turks, and even Ukrainians and Russians have found a way since 1991 of preventing their differences from exploding. Milosevic has been the exception, and the United States had an overriding strategic interest in stopping him. There was, of course, a humanitarian disaster looming as well, but in the absence of concerns based on the interests of the alliance, the case for intervention would have been more tenuous. "What if our values are attacked in areas that are not arguably of strategic concern? Should the United States not try to save lives in the absence of an overriding strategic rationale? The next American President should be in a position to intervene when he believes, and can make the case, that the United States is duty-bound to do so. "Humanitarian intervention" cannot be ruled out a priori. But a decision to intervene in the absence of strategic concerns should be understood for what it is. Humanitarian problems are rarely only humanitarian problems; the taking of life or withholding of food is almost always a political act. If the United States is not prepared to address the underlying political conflict and to know whose side it is on, the military may end up separating warring parties for an indefinite period. Sometimes one party (or both) can come to see the United States as the enemy. Because the military cannot, by definition, do anything decisive in these "humanitarian" crises, the chances of misreading the situation and ending up in very different circumstances are very high. This was essentially the problem of "mission creep" in Somalia. "The President must remember that the military is a special instrument. It is lethal, and it is meant to be. It is not a civilian police force. It is not a political referee. And it is most certainly not designed to build a civilian society. Military force is best used to support clear political goals, whether limited, such as expelling Saddam from Kuwait, or comprehensive, such as demanding the unconditional surrender of Japan and Germany during World War II. It is one thing to have a limited political goal and to fight decisively for it; it is quite another to apply military force incrementally, hoping to find a political solution somewhere along the way. A President entering these situations must ask whether decisive force is possible and is likely to be effective and must know how and when to get out. These are difficult criteria to meet, so U.S. intervention in these "humanitarian" crises should be, at best, exceedingly rare. "This does not mean that the United States must ignore humanitarian and civil conflicts around the world. But the military cannot be involved everywhere. Often, these tasks might be better carried out by regional actors, as modeled by the Australian-led intervention in East Timor. The U.S. might be able to lend financial, logistical, and intelligence support. Sometimes tough, competent diplomacy in the beginning can prevent the need for military force later. Using the American armed forces as the world's "911" will degrade capabilities, bog soldiers down in peacekeeping roles, and fuel concern among other great powers that the United States has decided to enforce notions of "limited sovereignty" worldwide in the name of humanitarianism. This overly broad definition of America's national interest is bound to backfire as others arrogate the same authority to themselves. Or we will find ourselves looking to the United Nations to sanction the use of American military power in these cases, implying that we will do so even when our vital interests are involved, which would also be a mistake. "Small powers with everything to lose are often more stubborn than big powers, for whom the conflict is merely one among many problems. The lesson, too, is that if it is worth fighting for, you had better be prepared to win. Also, there must be a political game plan that will permit the withdrawal of our forces -- something that is still completely absent in Kosovo. "Although the United States is fortunate to count among its friends several great powers, it is important not to take them for granted -- so that there is a firm foundation when it comes time to rely on them. The challenges of China and North Korea require coordination and cooperation with Japan and South Korea. The signals that we send to our real partners are important. Never again should an American President go to Beijing for nine days and refuse to stop in Tokyo or Seoul. "For America and our allies, the most daunting task is to find the right balance in our policy toward Russia and China. Both are equally important to the future of international peace, but the challenges they pose are very different. China is a rising power; in economic terms, that should be good news, because in order to maintain its economic dynamism, China must be more integrated into the international economy. This will require increased openness and transparency and the growth of private industry. The political struggle in Beijing is over how to maintain the Communist Party's monopoly on power. Some see economic reform, growth, and a better life for the Chinese people as the key. Others see the inherent contradiction in loosening economic control and maintaining the party's political dominance. As China's economic problems multiply due to slowing growth rates, failing banks, inert state enterprises, and rising unemployment, this struggle will intensify. "It is in America's interest to strengthen the hands of those who seek economic integration because this will probably lead to sustained and organized pressures for political liberalization. There are no guarantees, but in scores of cases from Chile to Spain to Taiwan, the link between democracy and economic liberalization has proven powerful over the long run. Trade and economic interaction are, in fact, good -- not only for America's economic growth but for its political aims as well. Human rights concerns should not move to the sidelines in the meantime. Rather, the American President should press the Chinese leadership for change. But it is wise to remember that our influence through moral arguments and commitment is still limited in the face of Beijing's pervasive political control. The big trends toward the spread of information, the access of young Chinese to American values through educational exchanges and training, and the growth of an entrepreneurial class that does not owe its livelihood to the state are, in the end, likely to have a more powerful effect on life in China. "Although some argue that the way to support human rights is to refuse trade with China, this punishes precisely those who are most likely to change the system. Put bluntly, Li Peng and the Chinese conservatives want to continue to run the economy by state fiat. Of course, there should be tight export controls on the transfer of militarily sensitive technology to China. But trade in general can open up the Chinese economy and, ultimately, its politics too. This view requires faith in the power of markets and economic freedom to drive political change, but it is a faith confirmed by experiences around the globe. "Even if there is an argument for economic interaction with Beijing, China is still a potential threat to stability in the Asia-Pacific region. Its military power is currently no match for that of the United States. But that condition is not necessarily permanent. What we do know is that China is a great power with unresolved vital interests, particularly concerning Taiwan and the South China Sea. China resents the role of the United States in the Asia-Pacific region. This means that China is not a "status quo" power but one that would like to alter Asia's balance of power in its own favor. That alone makes it a strategic competitor, not the "strategic partner" the Clinton administration once called it. Add to this China's record of cooperation with Iran and Pakistan in the proliferation of ballistic-missile technology, and the security problem is obvious. China will do what it can to enhance its position, whether by stealing nuclear secrets or by trying to intimidate Taiwan. "China's success in controlling the balance of power depends in large part on America's reaction to the challenge. The United States must deepen its cooperation with Japan and South Korea and maintain its commitment to a robust military presence in the region. It should pay closer attention to India's role in the regional balance. There is a strong tendency conceptually to connect India with Pakistan and to think only of Kashmir or the nuclear competition between the two states. But India is an element in China's calculation, and it should be in America's, too. India is not a great power yet, but it has the potential to emerge as one. "The United States also has a deep interest in the security of Taiwan. It is a model of democratic and market-oriented development, and it invests significantly in the mainland's economy. The longstanding U.S. commitment to a "one-China" policy that leaves to a future date the resolution of the relationship between Taipei and Beijing is wise. But that policy requires that neither side challenge the status quo and that Beijing, as the more powerful actor, renounce the use of force. U.S. resolve anchors this policy. The Clinton administration tilted toward Beijing, when, for instance, it used China's formulation of the "three no's" during the President's trip there. Taiwan has been looking for attention and reassurance ever since. If the United States is resolute, peace can be maintained in the Taiwan Strait until a political settlement on democratic terms is available. "Some things take time. U.S. policy toward China requires nuance and balance. It is important to promote China's internal transition through economic interaction while containing Chinese power and security ambitions. Cooperation should be pursued, but we should never be afraid to confront Beijing when our interests collide. "Russia presents a different challenge. It still has many of the attributes of a great power: a large population, vast territory, and military potential. But its economic weakness and problems of national identity threaten to overwhelm it. Moscow is determined to assert itself in the world and often does so in ways that are at once haphazard and threatening to American interests. "The picture is complicated by Russia's own internal transition -- one that the United States wants to see succeed. The old Soviet system has broken down, and some of the basic elements of democratic development are in place. People are free to say what they think, vote for whom they please, and (for the most part) worship freely. But the democratic fragments are not institutionalized -- with the exception of the Communist Party, political parties are weak -- and the balance of political power is so strongly in favor of the President that he often rules simply by decree. Of course, few pay attention to Boris Yeltsin's decrees, and the Russian Government has been mired in inaction and stagnation for at least three years. Russia's economic troubles and its high-level corruption have been widely discussed in recent months; Russia's economy is not becoming a market but is mutating into something else. Widespread barter, banks that are not banks, billions of rubles stashed abroad and in mattresses at home, and bizarre privatization schemes that have enriched the so-called reformers give Moscow's economy a medieval tinge. "The problem for U.S. policy is that the Clinton administration's embrace of Yeltsin and those who were thought to be reformers around him has failed. Yeltsin is Russia's President and clearly the United States had to deal with the head of state. But support for democracy and economic reform became support for Yeltsin. His agenda became the American agenda. The United States certified that reform was taking place where it was not, continuing to disburse money from the International Monetary Fund in the absence of any evidence of serious change. The curious privatization methods were hailed as economic liberalization; the looting of the country's assets by powerful people either went unnoticed or was ignored. The realities in Russia simply did not accord with the administration's script about Russian economic reform. The United States should not be faulted for trying to help. But, as the Russian reformer Grigori Yavlinsky has said, the United States should have "told the truth" about what was happening. "Now we have a dual credibility problem -- with Russians and with Americans. There are signs of life in the Russian economy. The financial crash of August 1998 forced import substitution, and domestic production has increased as the resilient Russian people have taken matters into their own hands. Rising oil prices have helped as well. But these are short-term fixes. There is no longer a consensus in America or Europe on what to do next with Russia. Frustrated expectations and "Russia fatigue" are direct consequences of the "happy talk" in which the Clinton administration engaged. "Russia's economic future is now in the hands of the Russians. The country is not without assets, including its natural resources and an educated population. It is up to Russia to make structural reforms, particularly concerning the rule of law and the tax codes, so that investors -- foreign and domestic -- will provide the capital needed for economic growth. That opportunity will arise once there is a new government in Moscow after last December's Duma elections and next June's presidential election. But the cultural changes ultimately needed to sustain a functioning civil society and a market-based economy may take a generation. Western openness to Russia's people, particularly its youth, in exchange programs and contact with the private sector and educational opportunities can help that process. It is also important to engage the leadership of Russia's diverse regions, where economic and social policies are increasingly pursued independently of Moscow. "In the meantime, U.S. policy must concentrate on the important security agenda with Russia. First, it must recognize that American security is threatened less by Russia's strength than by its weakness and incoherence. This suggests immediate attention to the safety and security of Moscow's nuclear forces and stockpile. The Nunn-Lugar program should be funded fully and pursued aggressively. (Because American contractors do most of the work, the risk of the diversion of funds is low.) Second, Washington must begin a comprehensive discussion with Moscow on the changing nuclear threat. Much has been made by Russian military officials about their increased reliance on nuclear weapons in the face of their declining conventional readiness. The Russian deterrent is more than adequate against the U.S. nuclear arsenal, and vice versa. But that fact need no longer be enshrined in a treaty that is almost 30 years old and is a relic of a profoundly adversarial relationship between the United States and the Soviet Union. The Anti-Ballistic Missile Treaty was intended to prevent the development of national missile defenses in the Cold War security environment. Today, the principal concerns are nuclear threats from the Iraqs and North Koreas of the world and the possibility of unauthorized releases as nuclear weapons spread. "Moscow, in fact, lives closer to those threats than Washington does. It ought to be possible to engage the Russians in a discussion of the changed threat environment, their possible responses, and the relationship of strategic offensive-force reductions to the deployment of defenses. The United States should make clear that it prefers to move cooperatively toward a new offense-defense mix, but that it is prepared to do so unilaterally. Moscow should understand, too, that any possibilities for sharing technology or information in these areas would depend heavily on its record -- problematic to date -- on the proliferation of ballistic-missile and other technologies related to WMD. It would be foolish in the extreme to share defenses with Moscow if it either leaks or deliberately transfers weapons technologies to the very states against which America is defending. "Finally, the United States needs to recognize that Russia is a great power, and that we will always have interests that conflict as well as coincide. The war in Chechnya, located in the oil-rich Caucasus, is particularly dangerous. Prime Minister Vladimir Putin has used the war to stir nationalism at home while fueling his own political fortunes. The Russian military has been uncharacteristically blunt and vocal in asserting its duty to defend the integrity of the Russian Federation -- an unwelcome development in civil-military relations. The long-term effect on Russia's political culture should not be underestimated. And the war has affected relations between Russia and its neighbors in the Caucasus, as the Kremlin hurls charges of harboring and abetting Chechen terrorists against states as diverse as Saudi Arabia, Georgia, and Azerbaijan. The war is a reminder of the vulnerability of the small, new states around Russia and of America's interest in their independence. If they can become stronger, they will be less tempting to Russia. But much depends on the ability of these states to reform their economies and political systems -- a process, to date, whose success is mixed at best. "As history marches toward markets and democracy, some states have been left by the side of the road. Iraq is the prototype. Saddam Hussein's regime is isolated, his conventional military power has been severely weakened, his people live in poverty and terror, and he has no useful place in international politics. He is therefore determined to develop WMD. Nothing will change until Saddam is gone, so the United States must mobilize whatever resources it can, including support from his opposition, to remove him. "The regime of Kim Jong il is so opaque that it is difficult to know its motivations, other than that they are malign. But North Korea also lives outside of the international system. Like East Germany, North Korea is the evil twin of a successful regime just across its border. It must fear its eventual demise from the sheer power and pull of South Korea. Pyongyang, too, has little to gain and everything to lose from engagement in the international economy. The development of WMD thus provides the destructive way out for Kim Jong il. "President Kim Dae Jung of South Korea is attempting to find a peaceful resolution with the north through engagement. Any U.S. policy toward the north should depend heavily on coordination with Seoul and Tokyo. In that context, the 1994 framework agreement that attempted to bribe North Korea into forsaking nuclear weapons cannot easily be set aside. Still, there is a trap inherent in this approach: sooner or later Pyongyang will threaten to test a missile one too many times, and the United States will not respond with further benefits. Then what will Kim Jong Il do? The possibility for miscalculation is very high. "One thing is clear: the United States must approach regimes like North Korea resolutely and decisively. The Clinton administration has failed here, sometimes threatening to use force and then backing down, as it often has with Iraq. These regimes are living on borrowed time, so there need be no sense of panic about them. Rather, the first line of defense should be a clear and classical statement of deterrence -- if they do acquire WMD, their weapons will be unusable because any attempt to use them will bring national obliteration. Second, we should accelerate efforts to defend against these weapons. This is the most important reason to deploy national and theater missile defenses as soon as possible, to focus attention on U.S. homeland defenses against chemical and biological agents, and to expand intelligence capabilities against terrorism of all kinds. "Finally, there is the Iranian regime. Iran's motivation is not to disrupt simply the development of an international system based on markets and democracy, but to replace it with an alternative: fundamentalist Islam. Fortunately, the Iranians do not have the kind of reach and power that the Soviet Union enjoyed in trying to promote its socialist alternative. But Iran's tactics have posed real problems for U.S. security. It has tried to destabilize moderate Arab states such as Saudi Arabia, though its relations with the Saudis have improved recently. Iran has also supported terrorism against America and Western interests and attempted to develop and transfer sensitive military technologies. "Iran presents special difficulties in the Middle East, a region of core interest to the United States and to our key ally Israel. Iranian weaponry increasingly threatens Israel directly. As important as Israel's efforts to reach peace with its Arab neighbors are to the future of the Middle East, they are not the whole story of stability in the region. Israel has a real security problem, so defense cooperation with the United States -- particularly in the area of ballistic missile defense -- is critical. That in turn will help Israel protect itself both through agreements and through enhanced military power. "Still, it is important to note that there are trends in Iran that bear watching. Mohammad Khatami's election as President has given some hope of a new course for a country that once hosted a great and thriving civilization -- though there are questions about how much authority he exercises. Moreover, Khatami's more moderate domestic views may not translate into more acceptable behavior abroad. All in all, changes in U.S. policy toward Iran would require changes in Iranian behavior. "America is blessed with an extraordinary opportunity. It has had no territorial ambitions for nearly a century. Its national interest has been defined instead by a desire to foster the spread of freedom, prosperity, and peace. Both the will of the people and the demands of modern economies accord with that vision of the future. But even America's advantages offer no guarantees of success. Foreign policy in a Republican administration will most certainly be internationalist; the leading contenders in the party's presidential race have strong credentials in that regard. But it will also proceed from the firm ground of the national interest, not from the interests of an illusory international community. America can exercise power without arrogance and pursue its interests without hectoring and bluster. When it does so in concert with those who share its core values, the world becomes more prosperous, democratic, and peaceful. That has been America's special role in the past, and it should be again as we enter the next century." WHAT SHE SAID AT THE REPUBLICAN PARTY'S NOMINATING CONVENTION ON AUGUST 1,2000 "Mr.Bush believes that America has a special responsibility to keep the peace -- that the fair cause of freedom depends on our strength and purpose. He recognizes that the magnificent men and women of America's armed forces are not a global police force. They are not the world's 911. "They are the strongest shield and surest sword in the maintenance of peace. If the time ever comes to use military force, President George W. Bush will do so to win -- because for him, victory is not a dirty word. "George W. Bush will never allow America and our allies to be blackmailed. And make no mistake; blackmail is what the outlaw states seeking long-range ballistic missiles have in mind. It is time to move beyond the Cold War. It is time to have a President devoted to a new nuclear strategy and to the deployment of effective missile defenses at the earliest possible date. George W. Bush knows that America has allies and friends who share our values. As he has said, the President should call our allies when they are not needed, so that he can call upon them when they are needed. "He understands the power of trade to create jobs at home and extend liberty abroad. "The George W. Bush I know is a man of uncommonly good judgment. He is focused and consistent. He believes that we Americans are at our best when we exercise power without fanfare or arrogance. He speaks plainly and with a positive spirit. In the past year, I have had a glimpse of what kind of President he will be. "I traveled with him to Mexico and saw the respect he has gained from its leaders and the affection he has won from its people. When he enters office, he will know more about our neighbor Mexico than any President in our history. He speaks to the Mexican people not just in the language of diplomacy but in their native tongue. "I have watched him explain America's interests to the Russian Foreign Minister, while assuring him that a peaceful Russia has nothing to fear from America. "He told the South African President of his hope for peace and prosperity in Africa. "I know that he understands the complexities of our relationship with China. He believes that conflict between our nations is not inevitable. Yet he recognizes the challenge that the Chinese Government poses to our interests and values and the irresistible demand for liberty that can be unleashed by freer trade with its people. "And he has joined the bipartisan tradition of support for Israel's quest for enduring peace with its neighbors. "George W. Bush will work with Congress so that America speaks with one voice. He has demonstrated in this campaign that he will never use foreign policy for narrow partisan purposes. "The United States cannot lead unless the President inspires the American people to accept their international responsibilities. George W. Bush will inspire us, because he understands who we are. "He knows that we are an innovative people who find kinship with those in other nations who are entrepreneurial in spirit. "He realizes that we are a nation that has been forged not from common blood but from common purpose -- that the faces of America are the faces of the world. It has not been easy for our country to make "We, the people" mean all the people. Democracy in America is a work in progress -- not a finished masterpiece. "But even with its flaws, this unique American experience provides a shining beacon to peoples who still suffer in places where ethnic difference is a license to kill. "And George W. Bush understands that America is special among nations. That throughout our history, people everywhere have been inspired to flee tyranny and the constraints of class to gain liberty and pursue happiness in this great land." WHAT SHE SAID IN INTERVIEWS AFTER THE NOMINATION "One example to which I would
point is the Middle East for which there is bipartisan support for more
than 30 years. And I would assume that there would be little change in
foreign policy concerning the Middle East. Much of the difference
between the two would be between allies and how much emphasis is placed
on our allies, how to push for free trade and there would be other areas
which would be more important in Governor Bush's foreign policy than in
Vice President Gore's. I would point to Latin America and the bilateral
relationship with Mexico. "It is absolutely in America's
interest to have a strong and stable Russia, particularly one that is
democratic and prosperous. But if we have learned anything in the last
several years it is that a romantic view of Russia -- rather than a
realistic one -- did nothing to help the cause of stability in Russia.
Now what do I mean? Pouring IMF funding into an unreformed and corrupt
economy in fact weakened Russia and helped to lead to the 1998 crash. So
realism with Russia is the best way to encourage a stable and prosperous
Russia. We must support real economic reform, not pretend economic
reform and ultimately Russia has enough resources including a highly
educated population to be able to create conditions to attract private
investment, but the hard work of creating a fair tax code and rooting
out corruption really is up to the Russians. They understand this and I
think resent the United States for having failed to speak up when
economic reform was not taking place. "It's amazing what good diplomacy
can achieve when you know what your interests are and pursue them
consistently and persuasively. (The collator is Additional
Secretary (retd), Cabinet Secretariat, Govt. of India, and presently,
Director, Institute for Topical Studies, Chennai. E-mail: corde@vsnl.com)
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