South Asia Analysis Group  
Papers  

 

Paper no. 161

  

home.jpg (6376 bytes)

 

 

South Asian Regional Security Triangle and the Compulsions Ahead for India

by Rajesh Kumar Mishra

Indian policy-makers have been facing a great challenge today to construct a peace-oriented but pragmatic long-term policy framework in an atmosphere where its neighbour Pakistan is hell bent for MAD (mutual assured destruction) persuasions and China is modernizing itself fast with DF-31 and DF-41 missile programmes along with MIRV (multiple independent re-entry vehicle) potentials. The shadow of the ghost of cold war days are still moving around and the principles of real politik are significantly being included in inter-national agenda.

 Recently held International Defence Exhibition And Seminar (IDEAS 2000 Pakistan) between 14th to 17th November at Karachi with its theme “Arms For Peace” and China as a significant participant could be perceived as catalytic to the rise of arms race in the South Asian region. On 17th November, Sonmiani Tactical Firing Range in Pakistan witnessed an unprecedented show of arms and ammunitions in its full range. Air Officer Commanding of the Southern Air Command Air Marshal Parvez Iqbal Mirza, while boasting the might of Pakistan defence, said to the attending guests that “all Pakistan-made weapons and ammunitions, which was of NATO standard, could not be displayed at the demonstration and only selective weapons would be shown off”. Few remarkable demonstrations at the exhibition were – Super Mashshak Trainer (produced at Pakistan Aeronautical Complex, Kaura), Karakoram-8 advanced jet trainer (co-produced by Pakistan and China), MirageIIIs, mobility display of Al-Khalid and Al-Zarrar main battle tank (a joint venture of Pakistan, China and Ukraine), T-59 IIM tanks, T-85-2APS, Anza MK-11 missiles, Ghauri and Shaheen missiles. Even the Pakistani sources confirm that never before Pakistan had put on display its full range of military might. And unlike any other initiative of Pakistan in the past, these military demonstrations were wedded to “show of strength” configured against India. Also, it was a psychological display of Pakistan’s claim for military self-confidence in the wake of mounting international pressure on Pakistan, especially from the U.S, to go slow on military hardware and to stop abetting the terrorist groups. In such upcoming adverse condition, Pakistan while on the one hand has been trying to reinforce its confidence amongst the Islamic states, on the other hand, apart from the clandestine supports from China, it has been pressing for new strategic and military partnerships.

 Ever since its coming into existence, the fundamental goal of Pakistan’s foreign and defence policies has been of “defiance” of international norms and values and to co-opt the tools that destabilise India’s territorial integrity and domestic tranquility. Defiance of international norms means violating the principles of non-interference in other country’s domestic affairs, or for that matter to launch attack on other’s territory. The nature of Pakistani involvement in Afghanistan during and after the cold war has always been a subject of international criticism and condemnation. Further, Pakistani statesmen and academia for the reasons only known to them are still justifying all previous five misadventures of Pakistan against India. More so, Pakistan is being labeled as supporter to several terrorist outfits round the globe, and considered as a hot pursuant of weapons of mass destruction.

Pakistan’s missile and nuclear development programmes are being increasingly encouraged by the Chinese politics towards the regional strategic triangle involving Pakistan, India and China. Subsequently, the regional adversaries not separately but jointly against India are raising the prospect of an arms race breaking out between India and China. Of course Pakistan has been acting and responding in a manner that definitely exceeds its strategic defence requirements. Hence, it is imperative to the Indian policy-makers to comprehensively understand, analyse and foresee the complexities and contours of Chinese international and regional behaviours.

 Evoking a sense of “mystery and fear” in international relations has long been a significant foreign policy characteristic of China. Historically, it is an aggressive and expansionist state. And in the post cold-war world, with regard to South Asian security environment China is likely to take moves on two basic premises – one related to the Sino-U.S relations, and the other directly linked to India.

 First, while advocating for multi-polar world order, China desires to become a potential alternative centre of power in any given international system. For this reason, despite glaring limitations in technological advancements in China, they inadvertently find the clash of interests with America at almost all the present and prospective conflict areas of the world. South Asia is definitely not any exception to it. The recent improvements in U.S-India ties and the increasing gulf between the U.S and Pakistan are being seen as direct threat to the Chinese predominance in this region. Subsequently the mutual distrust and misperceptions between China and the U.S.A, on the one hand, directly affect the Sino-U.S relations and, on the other hand, indirectly but substantially it would affect the South Asian regional security configurations. It may further provide scope for Pakistan to take more strides towards misadventures against India.

 Second, China desires to remain the sole “power” state in the Asian region. The rapid growth in Indian economy, especially its IT sector, together with the convincing progress in Indian defence advancements pose direct threat to the Chinese dominance in the region. Whether India is being referred directly or not in the Chinese world propositions, it is a fact today that India matters a lot to the Chinese strategic thinkers. Now, it is understandable by several means that Beijing could face considerable, if not devastating, reaction if anything done undesirable or against the vital interest of New Delhi. After all, future possibility of ‘engagement’ or ‘containment’ depends mainly in the development of India’s strategic build-ups.

 Chinese moves to contain the Indian strength are based on its policy of “encirclement of India”. Long back in 1983 U.S intelligence agencies had reported that China had transferred a complete nuclear weapon design of 25 KT nuclear bomb to Pakistan and had been helping to Pakistani centrifuge programme. Again in 1986, it was revealed that China sold Tritium (that is used to achieve fusion in a nuclear device) to Pakistan and Chinese scientists assisted Pakistan with the production of weapons-grade fissile material (Uranium) at A.Q.Khan laboratory, Kahuta. Further, in 1991, Wall Street Journal reported that Pakistan was buying nuclear-capable M-11 missiles from China. In addition, apart from the controversial Chinese sale of 5000 ring magnets, China has also been involved in transferring M-9 missiles to Pakistan. Thus, China has long been recklessly providing Pakistan with nuclear technology, conventional weaponry and missile systems to keep Pakistan’s ambitions high against Indian defence preparedness. Subsequently, by keeping the Pakistan-India hostility alive, China acts on the two-pronged foreign policy towards India.

 Further, towards its policy of “encirclement of India”, China has also established a radar base in Coco island (belonging to Myanmar) that is only a gunshot away from the Indian Andmand and Nicobar islands. More so, recently the Indian Coast Guards that raised apprehensions across the Indian line of defence interrupted a Chinese trawler fitted with modern electronic surveillance equipments off the Indian shores. In addition, it has been widely reported of Chinese move of deployment of nuclear forces in Tibet and other bordering provinces and the advancements towards Chinese DG-25 missiles are being specially planned as counter move to Indian development of Agni II and III missiles. It has also been reported that a further upgrade of Hong Niano-3 (HN-3) is now being developed with range increased to 2.500Km for ship, submarine and aircraft launch.

 India’s Concern:

 India’s motivation towards its strategic defence build-up flies in the face of conventional wisdom with recently achieved vigour of deterring the Chinese threat of “encirclement of India”. And the proclamation of the Indian Defence Minister George Fernandes just after the launch of Agni II that “with this launch, no one, from anywhere, will dare to threaten us from now”, wisely stages India at a considerable level across the spectrum of rivaling strengths in the South Asian region. Although Indian moves for weaponisation programmes are primarily driven by the combined hostile attitudes of its neighbours, this may further lead Pakistan to more destructive engagements against India. The present environment of this region is so complicated, that even after a decade since the end of cold war, the western and Indian scholars have been facing difficulty in coming out with any definitive future trend in the South Asian strategic arrangements.

In such volatile circumstances, the Standing Committee on Defence in its Report projects the level of Indian defence readiness as “The Kargil conflict of 1999 has been referred as wake-up call”. It includes the long -term vision and planning for enhancing the defence capabilities. No doubt, the real and immediate need for India today is a solid back up of conventional hardware. Priorities are to be delimited for the speedy acquisition of defence equipment and technologies. Overestimation of indigenous potential in a given period of time may lead to further delays and might cost wastage of valuable resources. Areas of strengths and weaknesses are to be carefully drawn and closely monitored for effective conventional warfare in time of need.

 No doubt, it is proud to hold ‘minimum credible nuclear deterrence’, but at the same time ‘ignorance’ or ‘negligence’ on its ‘command and control’ mechanism part may prove fatal for the nation. Only an effective inter-linkage within C-3I (Command, Control, Communication and Intelligence) could really boost the inner strength in holding the “nuclear button”, and to maintain some level of ascertained minimum deterrence capability.

 As far as dealing with international environment is concerned, tough task ahead for India is to maintain and build better India-U.S relations and to re-strengthen the hands of cooperation with Russia.  It is always preferable for India to go for constructive engagement with China along with other interested partners than to seek Pakistani engagement only due to domestic compulsions. Last but not least, at first, to have a healthy relationship with China, India needs to break the mental blockade of its past experience. After all, now onwards India is a declared nuclear weapon power state with an emerging strong economy.

 24.11.2000