DAWN IN J & K?
by B.Raman
A lesson from Vietnam and Afghanistan was the inadvisability of
assessing ground situations largely on the basis of a statistical
analysis of encounter and body counts.
There are intangibles--not
quantifiable--- which are equally, if not more important, such as
perceptions, feelings, morale, motivation and other indicators of the
state of mind.
A purely statistical analysis of the
post-Kargil ground situation in Jammu & Kashmir could depict a
misleadingly pessimistic picture and fail to focus on the first signs of
an evolution in the state of mind of the population. The features of
this evolution are:
* The Pakistani propaganda
about the inevitability of a battle fatigue in the Indian security
forces is no longer accepted by the people. The morale of the Armed
forces is as high as ever and there has been an improvement in Police
morale. There has been an increase in intelligence flow due to greater
interactions between the Police and concerned sections of the
population.
* There is growing concern in
the population over what they describe as Pakistan's Afghanisation of
the situation, marked by a plethora of mercenary groups with no
commonly shared political objectives and with their
religious/sectarian agenda assuming primacy over the political agenda
of the indigenous groups.
* There are incipient signs of
a militancy and violence fatigue in the population. Afghanistan has
already passed through two decades of darkness and death, with no
light at the end of the tunnel. The awesome prospects of a similar
scenario in Kashmir, if Pakistan and the mercenary groups have their
way are causing increasing concern.
* There is a realisation that the
international community, already concerned over the mess in
Afghanistan, is not prepared to countenance Pakistan's agenda, which
could create a similar mess in J & K.
This evolution has led to serious
re-thinking in the indigenous groups, resulting in a desire for giving
primacy to a search for a political solution in preference to the
militancy, which is proving counter-productive for the ordinary people.
In this context, one cannot fault the
initiative of the Govt. of India for a cease-fire during the holy
fasting period of Ramdan in the hope that the Government's gesture would
find an echo from the indigenous militant groups as well as from the
Pakistani military regime, in the form of a decline in violence and
terrorism and Pakistani instigation of it.
Similar hopes in July-August during
the short-lived cease-fire announced by the Jammat-e-Islami (JEI)
controlled Hizbul Mujahideen (HM) were belied due to the following
reasons:
* Gen. Pervez Musharraf, the
self-styled Chief Executive of Pakistan, who initially cleared the
HM's cease-fire offer, subsequently succumbed to pressure from the
religious forces and fundamentalist Army officers led by Lt.Gen.
Mohammed Aziz, the then Chief of the General Staff (CGS), and asked
the HM to wriggle out of its offer.
* Qazi Hussain Ahmed, the Amir of
the JEI, who reportedly gave signs of moderation during his meetings
with the US State Department officials in Washington, reverted to his
extremist line on his return to Pakistan under pressure from the
pro-Wahabi groups such as the Markaz Dawa Al-Irshad and its militant
wing called the Lashkar-e-Toiba, the Harkat-ul-Mujahideen (HUM) and
the Al Badar.
It is believed that the US, which is
keen to break the logjam, has been working through various channels:
* Through intermediaries reputedly
close to Gen.Musharraf, whose advice he values, in order to make him
more assertive in preventing a negative outcome of the Govt. of
India's gesture.
* Through sustained interactions
with the JEI. There is reportedly a realisation in the State
Department that the past policy of avoiding interactions with the
religious extremist forces in Pakistan and with the Taliban has not
been helpful in the US' counter-terrorism efforts. While the US
diplomatic missions in Pakistan have, even in the past, been
interacting with prominent personalities of the JEI and the
Jamaat-ul-Ulema Pakistan of Maulana Fazlur Rahman in Pakistani
territory, State Department officials in Washington were not easily
accessible to personalities of these organisations visiting the US.
The visit of the Qazi to the State Department was reportedly the first
since the 1980s by a religious-political leader from Pakistan. The US
has also intensified interactions with the Taliban in Pakistani
territory and in New York where the Taliban has an office. However, it
continues to avoid active interactions with the pro-Wahabi
organisations.
Would these parallel efforts of New
Delhi and Washington lead to a positive outcome of New Delhi's gesture
and prevent Islamabad from coming in the way of a dialogue between the
indigenous militants and the Govt. of India?
The indicators so far are not yet
definitive one way or the other. The reactions from J & K have been
encouraging, but from Pakistan have been halting and ambivalent. Gen.
Musharraf's first year in office clearly brought out his inability to
resist pressure from the Islamic extremist forces and the
fundamenmtalist group in the Army on various issues--domestic as well as
external concerning India, the US and the Taliban.
After the HM's ceasefire retreat under
pressure from these elements, he shifted Lt.Gen.Aziz from the GHQ to
Lahore and in the recent reshuffle in the Pakistan Air Force (PAF) he
has superceded officers known for their proximity to Lt.Gen.Aziz,
resulting in their exit.
These moves have not been resisted by
these fundamentalist Army officers, who continue to give signs of
solidarity with Gen. Musharraf. This should not, however, be misread to
mean that his position has now been strengthened and that he could,
therefore, be more assertive in relation to the J & K issue now than
he was in July-August and break out of his past rigidities and strike
out a new conciliatory path.
One has to keep one's fingers crossed.
(1-12-00)
(The writer is Additional Secretary
(retd), Cabinet Secretariat, Govt. of India, and, presently, Director,
Institute For Topical Studies, Chennai. E-Mail: corde@vsnl.com
)
