SRI LANKA: Realities
and options
by B.Raman
One has to analyse the recent meeting of Mr.Erik Solheim, the Norwegian
intermediary, with Prabakaran, the leader of the LTTE, in the
LTTE-controlled Wanni area of Sri Lanka on November 1 and the speech of
Prabakaran on the LTTE's Heroes' Day on November 27,2000, against the
background of the prevailing ground situation, marked by the following
features:
* The post-June strengthening of
the capability of the Sri Lankan Armed Forces through the acquisition
of aircraft from Israel, multi-barrel guns from Pakistan and other
equipment from other countries has not only enabled it to thwart any
LTTE attempt to re-capture Jaffna, but also to make some minor
tactical gains in the form of re-capture of some lost territory from
the LTTE's control. The shaken morale of the Armed Forces has been
restored. But, even these new acquisitions have not enabled the Armed
Forces to roll back the LTTE from the territory occupied by it
pre-July.
* Apart from hit and run raids
on the ground and in the sea and suicide attacks on individual
targets, the LTTE has not been able to mount any major offensive
against the Armed Forces, partly due to manpower shortage and partly
due to depletion of its anti-aircraft ammunition and missiles. The
reported tightening of security measures by countries such as
Thailand, Greece etc to prevent LTTE gun-running and the closer
surveillance of ships owned by the LTTE by Western narcotics control
agencies because of the suspicion of their involvement in narcotics
smuggling at the instance of Pakistani heroin smugglers have created
difficulties for the LTTE in replenishing its stocks. Unable to face
the air strikes from the Sri Lankan Air Force, the only alternative
for the LTTE to neutralise the former's new capability is to destroy
the aircraft on the ground through hit and run raids on the Air Force
bases. While the LTTE has repeatedly demonstrated a capability for
such raids on Sri Lankan Naval establishments, it has not been able to
organise such raids on the Air Force bases, presumably because of
tighter ground security in the Air Force.
The resulting stalemate on the ground
has been accompanied by the following developments at the
political/diplomatic levels, which could be detrimental to the LTTE's
objectives:
* The repeated diplomatic
pressure from Colombo has made the UK and other West European
countries as well as non-European countries such as South
Africa, Myanmar and Thailand more responsive to Colombo's concerns
over the misuse of their territory by the LTTE for political and
terrorism-related activities directed against the Government and State
of Sri Lanka with which they have cordial diplomatic relations and
more willing, than in the past, to consider action against such
activities.
* West Europe-based
non-Governmental and Church Organisations, which in the past
intervened with the Governments of their countries to advise against
any action against the LTTE front organisations operating from their
territory, are increasingly embarrassed by reports of the LTTE's use
of children in its operations against the Sri Lankan Armed Forces,
exploitation of the emotions of women to persuade them to undertake
suicide missions and involvement in narcotics smuggling. They are,
therefore, increasingly reticent to intervene energetically on behalf
of the LTTE front organisations. The LTTE is under pressure from these
organisations to project a more reasonable face of itself.
The picture of greater reasonableness
projected by the LTTE in recent weeks has been the result of these
developments. The indications till now are that it is purely a tactical
ploy and there is no credible evidence of any major change in its
strategic objective of an independent Eelam.
In the past, Prabakaran had reportedly
been telling his followers that he would be betraying the memory of the
hundreds of young boys and girls who willingly embraced death in the
cause of Tamil Eelam, if he compromised on this issue and agreed to a
solution, offering the Tamils less than independence.
He had also been telling them that if
a situation arose making Tamil Eelam impossible, he would rather bite
his cyanide capsule than compromise on this objective and that his
successors would be free to accept a compromise.
However, there have recently been some
reports indicating that he might now be willing to consider an "one
country, two nations, two cultures, two systems and two armies"
formula, under which Sri Lanka would remain one country on paper, with a
Tamil Eelam genuinely autonomous with its own political system and army
(the LTTE converted into its army) forming a proforma part of it, but
these reports have not been corroborated.
Despite the stalling of the LTTE's
offensive against the Sri Lankan Armed Forces and the difficulties faced
by it at the international level, it would be unwise to underestimate
the continued determination of Prabakaran and the motivation of his
cadres to achieve the LTTE's strategic objective. The LTTE has been
thwarted by the Armed Forces for the time being, but not vanquished.
So long as this determination and
motivation remain strong, the Sri Lankan military would have little
chance of overwhelming the LTTE on the ground, whatever be its new
acquisitions and whatever be the difficulties of the LTTE. Colombo has,
therefore, no other alternative but to resume vigorously its search for
a political solution based on imaginative new approaches, which would
satisfy the pride of the Tamils and give them the satisfaction of being
masters of their own destiny, while, at the same time, not hurting the
pride of the Sinhalese and damaging the unity of Sri Lanka.
Prabakaran has never been averse to a
political approach, provided the political dialogue is preceded by the
following steps of de-escalation:
* Mutual cessation of offensive
operations.
* Withdrawal of the Sri Lankan
military into the barracks in Jaffna in order to restore the hurt
pride of the Tamils, with a prior commitment by the LTTE not to take
advantage of the withdrawal for re-occupying Jaffna.
* Lifting of the economic embargoes
imposed by Colombo on the Tamil population supporting the LTTE.
There are no indications that he is
prepared to relent on these conditions. The references in the statements
issued by the LTTE after Mr.Solheim's meeting with Prabakaran and in the
latter's Heroes' Day speech to the LTTE's willingness for
"unconditional talks" and the simultaneous reiteration of its
insistence on prior de-escalation have caused some confusion among
analysts as to the real purport of these statements and speech.
Thus, the statement issued by the
London-based International Secretariat of the LTTE on Prabakaran's
meeting with Mr.Solheim said: "Explaining the politico-military
situation in the North-east, Mr.Pirapaharan blamed the Kumaratunga
Government for having unleashed a genocidal war against the Tamil people
and, as a consequence, the Tamils had suffered enormously. He declared
that the Government was not sincere in seeking a peaceful resolution of
the conflict, but escalating war of aggression against the Tamils.
Discussing about the prospects for peace talks, the LTTE leader
suggested a process of de-escalation of the conflict as a necessary
pre-requisite for a dialogue. By de-escalation, Mr. Pirapaharan meant
the cessation of armed hostilities, the removal of military aggression
and occupation, the withdrawal of the economic embargo and the creation
of conditions of normalcy in the Tamil homeland. The LTTE leader also
insisted that the Sri Lanka Government should take the initiative of
relaxing the conditions of war if they wanted genuine peace. Both the
parties discussed several pertinent issues and the discussions were
cordial and constructive."
The relevant sections from
Prabakaran's speech are cited below:
* "If a permanent political
solution is to be achieved by peaceful means, the Sinhala nation has
to accept certain basic truths about the Tamil people and understand
their basic aspirations. The Tamils of Eelam have a unique ethnic
identity. They are a community of people constituted as a national
formation experiencing a national consciousness of their own. They
have their own lands; a historically constituted territory which is
their homeland. Our people desire only one thing. They want to live
happily in peace in their own lands without being dominated or
harassed by others. The deepest aspiration of our people is to live in
dignity in a political environment where they could rule themselves.
The Sinhalese should try to understand the Tamil aspirations. It is on
the basis of this understanding that a just and permanent solution
could be built up."
* "If the Sinhala nation fails
to redeem itself from the grip of racism and continues its repression
against the Tamils, we have no alternative other than to secede and
form an independent Tamil State".
* "Jaffna does not belong to
the Sinhala nation. Jaffna belongs to the people of Jaffna.
Sovereignty is not a divine right of a State. Sovereignty derives from
the people; it is an inalienable right of a people. It is the people
of Jaffna who has sovereign right over the Jaffna peninsula. The
Sinhala nation cannot impose its sovereignty over the historically
constituted lands of the Tamils by military aggression and occupation.
As the liberation army of our people, we will not allow our
traditional lands to be occupied by alien forces. Whatever the
challenges we have to face, regardless of the obstacles we must
overcome, whichever force opposes us, our liberation movement is
determined to liberate Jaffna".
* "If the Government takes the
initiative, we will respond positively. Our liberation organisation is
prepared to participate in negotiations to find a political solution
to the ethnic conflict through peaceful means. We are not opposed to
peaceful processes of resolving conflicts. Nor are we reluctant to
engage in peaceful dialogue. We are seeking a negotiated settlement
that would be fair, just, and equitable and that would satisfy the
political aspirations of the Tamil people. I explained this position
very clearly when I met the Norwegian peace delegates in Wanni
recently. We are not imposing any pre-conditions for peace talks. Yet,
we insist on the creation of a cordial atmosphere and conditions of
normalcy conducive for peace negotiations. It is practically difficult
for both the parties who have been involved in a savage and bloody war
for the last two decades with mutual animosity and distrust to
suddenly enter into a peace process, while continuing hostilities. It
is precisely for this reason we propose a process of de-escalation of
war leading to cessation of armed hostilities and the creation of a
peaceful, cordial environment".
* "Our call for de-escalation
and normalisation of civilian life should not be misinterpreted as
pre-conditions. We want the talks to proceed from a stable foundation
in a cordial atmosphere of mutual trust so that it could turn out to
be a constructive engagement".
It is apparent from a careful reading
that when they mention their willingness for unconditional talks, they
mean talks without political pre-conditions such as the talks being held
within the parameters of the new devolution proposals worked out by the
Government, but their insistence on prior military de-escalation
remains.
Mr.Solheim has, however, avoided using
the word pre-conditions while describing his talks with Prabakaran to
Colombo pressmen on November 2. He said: " The talks were serious,
frank, open and we consider them very useful. We consider Mr.Prabakaran
as serious and dedicated (to a negotiated settlement). He did not set
any pre-conditions, but we discussed how the initial phase could come
about and what measures could be taken by the different parties to build
such a trust that peace talks are possible."
During a subsequent visit to New Delhi
in the third week of November, Mr.Solheim spoke of "simultaneous
and reciprocal actions by the two sides" to create a conducive
atmosphere for a dialogue. It has been reported that he has put forward
a step-by-step de-escalation proposal under which, as a first step,
Colombo would remove the economic embargoes in return for the LTTE's
release of the Sri Lankan security forces personnel detained by it.
Even in the event of the two sides
agreeing to this, it is doubtful if the Sri Lankan Army would agree to a
cessation of its operations against the LTTE and the withdrawal of its
troops in Jaffna to the barracks.
The responses from different sections
of the Sri Lankan political and military leadership to the November
developments have been marked by a calculated lack of enthusiasm.
Maj.Gen.Lionel Ballagalle, the Army
chief, told the Foreign Correspondents' Association of Colombo on
November 11: " We should not stop fighting until we come to an
agreement (on the resolution of the conflict). Suspicion remains in our
minds (about the LTTE's intentions). It is up to him (Prabakaran) to
convince us."
Mr.Ratnasiri Wickramanayake, the Prime
Minister, told the "Sunday Island" newspaper on November 22:
" We will not welcome terrorists being brought forward by anybody
to the conference table with conditions. But if the terrorists are
prepared to give up terrorism and come into the political mainstream,
then, of course, it is a different scenario altogether."
While the President, Mrs. Chandrika
Kumaratunga, has refrained from commenting substantively on the
Solheim-Prabakaran talks, Mr.Lakshman Kadirgamar, her Foreign Minister,
who is believed to reflect her views, said in an interview on November
18: " If those are the conditions, they are totally unacceptable
and there will be no movement whatsoever….. In theory, if talks begin,
one should be able to talk about all kinds of possibilities, except, on
our side, one thing is completely ruled out. We will not open any kind
of discussion on a separate State. All talks must be short of
that."
While the Government has refrained
from reacting substantively to Prabakaran's speech, Prime Minister
Wickramanayake has hinted in an interview that if the LTTE agreed to
give up terrorism and enter the peace process, he would not stand in the
way and that, in such an eventuality, the question of the possible
extradition of Prabakaran to India would assume lower priority.
Thus, the position as prevailing today
seems to be as follows:
* The LTTE is prepared for talks
with the Government if there are no political pre-conditions from
either side and if its military pre-condition for a de-escalation is
accepted by the Government.
* The Government is not
prepared to accept the LTTE's military pre-condition and is, at the
same time, proposing a political pre-condition that the agenda would
cover only devolution and not separation.
Under such circumstances, the
prospects of an immediate forward movement towards talks do not seem
bright. Unless and until the LTTE is able to replenish its stocks of
anti-aircraft ammunition and missiles or neutralise the Air Force's
newly-acquired capability through ground attacks on the Air Force bases,
any spectacular change in the ground situation in its favour is
unlikely. On the other side, the Sri Lankan military will continue to
face difficulties in converting the military stalemate into a decisive
victory, even if it receives more arms and ammunition from abroad. The
current stalemate ensures that neither side would be able to force the
other to come to the negotiating table on its terms.
The main cause for concern to the LTTE
at present is that any shift in international perspectives to its
detriment may affect its ability to mobilise financial and arms supplies
from abroad and thereby impair its ability to keep fighting in the long
run. The recent posture of reasonableness could be attributed to this,
but one should not exaggerate the seriousness of this concern or
under-estimate the resilience of the LTTE to find a way out.
An encouraging development for the
LTTE would be the recent turn of events in Tamil Nadu. While the reports
of a nexus between the LTTE and Veerappan lack corroboration, the recent
events relating to the kidnapping of Rajkumar, the film actor, and the
use of "Tamil nationalist" and pro-LTTE elements by the
Government of Tamilnadu and possibly also of Karnataka for securing his
release have shown the extent to which the LTTE has succeeded in
rehabilitating itself in the minds of at least some sections of the
Tamils.
Their number is as yet small, but what
should be a matter of concern is the trend towards less reticence in
talking favourably or sympathetically of the LTTE and its demand for
Tamil Eelam. This trend has received a fillip from the activities of
pro-LTTE leaders such as Mr.Vaiko of the MDMK and Mr.P.Nedumaran of the
Tamil Nationalist Movement. Mr.Vaiko has been comparing the Tamil Eelam
movement to the Palestinian movement and Mr.Nedumaran to the Bangladesh
movement in 1971.
It is understood that in his public
meetings, Mr.Nedumaran has been asking: The Bengalis of West Bengal were
not called anti-national for supporting the Bangladesh movement; why are
the Tamils of Tamil Nadu being called anti-national for supporting Tamil
Eelam and the LTTE?
He refers to the alacrity with which
the Government of India, according to him, went to the humanitarian
assistance of the Gujaratis of Uganda during the days of Idi Amin and of
the Punjabis of Kuwait in 1991, and criticises what he describes as a
lack of similar alacrity when the victims are Tamils as in Myanmar in
the 1960s and in Sri Lanka now. He makes no distinction between the Sri
Lankan Tamils and the Indian Tamils. For him, what is material is the
cultural and not the territorial origin.
These arguments do appeal to some
sections of the Tamils in Tamil Nadu, but it would be difficult to
quantify them.
The Government of India's policy has
to have a mix of diplomatic, political and humanitarian components.
The diplomatic component should ensure
that external forces, even if they be benign as in the case of Israel
and Norway, do not take advantage of Colombo's requirements of arms and
ammunition and India's inability to play the role of a facilitator of a
dialogue between the Government and the LTTE to develop pockets of
influence in Sri Lanka, either for themselves or as surrogates for other
powers such as the US, which could be detrimental to India's long-term
interests.
The political component should focus
on continuously nudging the Government of Sri Lanka and other political
parties towards a negotiated solution, which would substantially meet
the aspirations of the Tamils without endangering the unity of Sri
Lanka. While doing this, the Government of India should avoid
identifying itself with any particular devolution or other political
formula. There cannot be a political solution to the ethnic conflict
without the participation of the LTTE. How to moderate the LTTE's
policies and actions without according acceptability to Prabakaran is a
question, which is inconvenient, but unavoidable. There is no easy
answer to this now, when public opinion in India, including Tamil Nadu,
is strongly against Prabakaran, as the suspected master-mind behind
Rajiv Gandhi's assassination, but this question has to be kept
continuously under examination.
The humanitarian component is no less
important, particularly from the point of view of the sensitivities of
the people of Tamil Nadu. It has three dimensions:
* Greater attention to the
problems and grievances of the Tamils of Indian origin in the
plantation areas.
* More energetic responses to
the perceived havoc which the Sri Lankan Navy has been causing to the
lives and livelihood of a large number of families of Tamil fishermen
in the Southern coastal areas under the pretext of counter-LTTE
operations. There was already a feeling of hurt in sections of Tamil
Nadu over the action of the Government of India in handing over
Kachathivu to Sri Lanka without heed to its impact on the livelihood
of Tamil fishermen. This is being aggravated now by the actions of the
Sri Lankan Navy.
* Greater articulation of the
Government of India's concerns over the humanitarian impact of the
economic embargoes allegedly imposed by the Sri Lankan Army on the
Tamil population, perceived to be sympathetic to the LTTE. The
magnitude of this problem has to be carefully studied before
articulating a policy response. A close interaction with the
International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC), which has an active
presence in that area, should help in ascertaining the real facts of
the situation before New Delhi reacts.
The diplomatic and political
components have to be handled discreetly in low profile, but the
humanitarian component has to be addressed more visibly and vocally so
that the people of Tamil Nadu know what the Government of India is
doing.
(11-12-00)
(The writer is Additional Secretary
(retd), Cabinet Secretariat, Govt. of India, and, presently, Director,
Institute For Topical Studies, Chennai. E-mail: corde@vsnl.com)
