WILL BUSH TAKE PAKISTAN OUT OF THE DOG
HOUSE?
by B.Raman
In his speeches and observations before his election as the US
President, Mr.George Bush (Jr) indicated that the five major foreign
policy priorities of his administration would be:
* Relations with the big powers. He
mentioned in particular China and Russia and, to a lesser degree,
India too.
* A fresh look at the nuclear
security issues.
* Greater attention, than under the
Clinton Administration, to the USA's relations with the Western
Hemisphere.
* Trade issues and, in particular,
China's role in the World Trade Organisation (WTO) and the US role in
the NAFTA.
* Peace in West Asia without
jeopardising Israel's security.
Policies of political leaderships
often change from campaign rhetoric to on-the-chair coming to terms with
reality. This is so in all democracies and particularly so in the US.
One had seen how Mr. Bill Clinton's 1991 anti-China rhetoric was
transformed to on-the-chair pragmatism during his first administration
and uncritical fascination and cordiality in his second, even to the
extent of projecting China as the USA's strategic partner.
Similarly, Mr.Clinton's indifference
to India in the first term was transformed to admiration and
understanding in the second, despite the short spell of coolness after
the Pokhran II nuclear tests.
How a particular policy evolves from
its pre-election formulation to its in-office application depends on the
ground circumstances and on the personalities responsible for giving
effect to it not only at the top level, but also at the middle level. It
also depends on the web of relationships which a President develops with
various sections of movers and shakers in the political and economic
spheres in his bid for office and how he repays the political debt he
owes to them.
A number of ground circumstances
contributed to the change in the US policy towards India in Mr.Clinton's
second administration--- the influence of the Information Technology
(IT) industry, with its positive outlook of India, on the policies of
the Clinton administration; the disenchantment of large sections of US
academics and other moulders of public opinion with Pakistan, their
reservations over the wisdom of Mr.Clinton's uncritical embrace of China
and their belated understanding of the new India, which was emerging on
the horizon, self-confident, not shy of asserting its national interests
and national concerns and not hesitant to do what needed to be done to
protect its interests; and the active role of the Americans of India
origin in correcting distorted images of India among US policy-makers
and opinion-moulders .
There were three other equally
important factors, which contributed to this transformation:
* The more active role of the State
Department in policy-formulation towards South Asia after the
departure of Mr.William Perry as the Defence Secretary and the decline
of the role of the Pentagon, with its past emotional attachments to
Pakistan because of its role as an US ally during the major part of
the Cold War.
* The coming into office in the
State Department during Mr.Clinton's second administration of
Mr.Thomas Pickering, Mr.Strobe Talbott and Mr.Karl Inderfurth, who
steered the State Department's policy towards India away from the
malign negativism injected by Ms.Robin Raphael during Mr. Clinton's
first term.
* The fact that during Mr. Clinton's
two terms, the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) was headed throughout
by non-professionals inducted from outside the Agency, who were able
to bring to bear on policy formulation a more objective evaluation not
unduly influenced by gratitude for Pakistan's surrogate role of the
past and particularly during the Afghan war.
The pronouncements of Mr.George Bush
and Ms.Condoleezza Rice, reportedly his likely choice as his National
Security Adviser, on India, China. Pakistan and nuclear issues have
been more favourable to India than those of Mr.Clinton and his aides
were during his 1991 and 1996 election campaigns. Their pronouncements
have been marked by:
* Greater reservation towards China,
which is viewed not as an actual or potential strategic partner, but
as a strategic competitor still to make the transition from
authoritarianism to democracy.
* A greater understanding of the
concerns, expressed or unexpressed, of Taiwan, Japan and other
regional powers vis-à-vis China.
* A better appreciation of India's
concerns vis-à-vis China and of the impact of these concerns on
India's nuclear and other defence-related policies and of the need for
the US to take note of these concerns in its policy-formulation.
* An admiration of the Indian
democracy and the underlining of its likely emergence as a major
regional and global power and the consequent need for forging better
relationships with India.
* The need to break from the past
practice of viewing Indian policy through the narrow prism of nuclear
non-proliferation and Kashmir.
Gen. Colin Powell, the new Secretary
of State -designate, has not been as expressive and as forthcoming in
his articulation of what should be the new Administration's policy
towards India and has not been as vocal in his expression of
reservations towards China as Mr.Bush's election platform and Ms. Rice's
statements have been, but since he played an active role in the drafting
of the platform and in advising Mr.Bush on foreign policy issues, it
would be reasonable to assume that he shares their views.
Could there be a dilution of the
importance hitherto attached to India during the conversion of these
pre-election pronouncements into policy formulations after assuming
office? While it would be difficult to answer this question now, certain
likely changes in the ground circumstances and personalities, such as
the following, could have an impact:
* The possible retrieval by the
Pentagon of its past role in policy-making on South Asia consequent
upon the appointment of Gen. Powell as the Secretary of State and the
election of Mr.Dick Cheney, former Defence Secretary, as the
Vice-President.
* A similar retrieval by the CIA of
its role if the Agency professionals, who won their spurs in the
Afghan war, are favoured by Mr.Bush for appointments to top posts in
the CIA and the National Security Council.
* The attitude of those who would be
replacing Mr. Pickering, Mr.Talbott and Mr.Inderfurth in the State
Department.
* Mr.Bush's political debt to the
oil and gas lobby, reportedly a major contributor to his campaign
funds. This lobby, in the past, has had greater interest in Pakistan
than in India. While the IT lobby backed India all the way, the oil
and gas lobby may not do so.
* Feelings of loyalty to allies,
past and present, who had stood by the US in the past, are more
pronounced in the Republican Party than in the Democratic Party. In
the writings and pronouncements of conservatives close to the
Republican Party, the expression of such nostalgic feelings has not
been confined only to Pakistan, but also to the Mujahideen groups of
Afghanistan, who did the US bidding in the 1980s.
The IT industry in the US, which has
contributed to the phenomenal doubling of US productivity, continues to
be upbeat in its outlook on and attitude towards India and no US
President, Republican or Democrat, can ignore its views and resist its
pressures. The non-governmental community of analysts in the US too
share the positive attitude towards India. As such, one has no reason to
fear any diminution of the goodwill for India in Washington's
policy-making circles.
At the same time, one cannot be
certain that Pakistan will continue to be in the dog house to which it
had been consigned by the Clinton Administration after the military
seized power.
However, the Republicans have always
advocated a much stronger line against state-sponsors of terrorism and
narcotics-smuggling than the Democrats. It was Mr.George Shultz, the
Secretary of State under Mr.Ronald Reagan, and Mr.George Bush (Sr), the
Vice-President, in his capacity as the Chairman of the Special Task
Force on Terrorism set up by Mr.Reagan, who had defended the right of a
State-victim of State-sponsored terrorism to retaliate, militarily or
covertly, against the sponsoring State if the diplomatic approaches
fail. It was during the administration of Mr.George Bush (Sr) as the
President in 1992 that the CIA recommended the declaration of Pakistan
as a State-sponsor of international terrorism, but Mr.Clinton, to whom
the recommendation was referred by Mr.Bush, did not accept it and,
instead, merely kept Pakistan in a list of suspected State-sponsors of
international terrorism for six months without imposing any penalties
against it. It is, therefore, important that the aides of the new
administration remain fully posted on this subject.
18.12.2000
(The writer is Additional Secretary
(retd), Cabinet Secretariat, Govt. of India, and, presently, Director,
Institute For Topical Studies, Chennai. E-mail: corde@vsnl.com)
