UNITED STATES POLICIES IN SOUTH ASIA UNDER
BUSH:
continuity is expected
Dr. Subhash Kapila
The United States Presidential election in 2000
has been remarkable in more ways than one and the prominent reason being
that it was a cliff-hanger victory with the final results emerging after
weeks of court battles. This weeks-long tussle gave a field day for
foreign policy analysts, academia and the media to indulge in speculation
on the perspectives of US foreign policy of either Presidential candidate
becoming a winner.
On emergence of President-elect George W. Bush’s
victory this debate then turned on the analysis of the background , views
and utterances of the Bush Administration’s key appointments, i.e., Vice
President Dick Cheney, Secretary of State Gen. Colin Powell, Defence
Secretary Rumsfield and National Security Adviser Condoleeza Rice. Indian
foreign policy analysts and media reacted even to the adverse fallout
should Shirin Tahir Kheli become Assistant Secretary of State for South
Asia reminiscent of Robin Raphael.
Views and policy stances of key aides do matter
in the formulation of US foreign policy, but they are not the last word on
the subject. US foreign policy formulations are impacted heavily by:
* Political interest groups and power centers.
* Economic interests of US multinationals.
* Institutional views of the US State Dept. and Pentagon.
The above factors provide a more stable template
to rest any analysis of US foreign policies in South Asia under the incoming
new Bush Administration.
US Priorities in South Asia: Perceptions of
political Interest Group and Power Centres
Representative of the views of this important
segment of US policy machinery, were the salient points made by Marshal
Bouton of the Asia Society in September 2000 on an Indian TV Programme.
These were:
* Bipartisan consensus exists in USA for
better relations with India. All sections of US society are
represented in the consensus.
* Emerging better Indo-US relations- not
individuals based but on increasing convergence of interests between
the two nations.
* Institutional linkups now exist in Indo-US
relations
* Fundamental change has taken place in US
perceptions of India. India is no longer seen as confined to South
Asia but central to Asian balance of power.
Additional proof of this bipartisan support for
strengthening Indo-US relations and recognition of India’s achievements
was the resolution in the US House of Representatives passed on November
1999 by a vote of 396 to 4, congratulating India on successful
completion of election.
The Indian Prime Minister’s statement during
his September 2000 visit to USA as both nations being ‘natural allies’
drew well-received bipartisan support.
From September 2000 to January 2001 no adverse
developments have taken place to sour Indo-US relations. If that is so,
analytically, it can be said that:
* In South Asia, Bush Administration’s
policies would continue to reflect the bipartisan support in USA for a
better and broader Indo-US relationship.
* The record of earlier Republican
administrations, those of Presidents Reagan and Bush Sr. of
recognition of India as the pre-eminent power in South Asia, is likely
to be built upon more prominently under the incoming Bush
Administration.
*Contemporaneous factors of Asia Pacific
Security environment would generate upgradation of India’s
priorities in United States policies towards South Asia.
Economic Interests of US Multinationals in South
Asia
US Multinationals have been an important
determinant of US foreign policy. The functioning of a National Economic
Council at the apex level parallel to the national Security Council is
indicative of the high priority given to US economic interests.
In South Asia, India’s size, its vast market,
industrial infrastructure and economic potential as compared to the
smaller nations of the region, wound ensure her primacy today in US
multinational’s plans, and hence in US foreign policy. The economic and
strategic potential of India’s IT industry and its dovetailing with US
businesses are an irresistible draw.
Even in the comparative China-India context India
is gradually gaming ground it terms of investment with special reference
to IT. China’s heartland is saturated with US, Japanese and South Korean
investments. China’s current drive for foreign investments in her
western region, i.e., Xinjiang etc for strategic reasons, may not allure
US investments - the reason being that political stability of these
peripheral regions of China despite rigid Chinese control, is not assured.
India is a politically stable democracy with
contiguity and easy accessibility to the Middle East and South East Asia
offers better investment opportunities. India could therefore expect that
its economic importance would be a strong factor in Bush Administration’s
South Asia foreign policy.
If India could put her act together in removing
bureaucratic hurdles and red tape from foreign investment proposals
processing (hopefully the ENRON deal was an exception), there would be no
dearth of US investors. Added to this would be acceleration of India’s
infra structural developments divorced from government control which again
would be a major draw for US investments.
Institutional Views of US State Department and
Pentagon
The US State Dept. and the Pentagon, conditioned
by long years of cold war based foreign policy formulations are apt to
accord Pakistan a disproportionate priority in US policies in South Asia.
The same could be said of Indian policy planners with their non-alignment
fixations. However, a number of major Indian developments seem to have
changed the traditional attitudes of the State Dept. and the Pentagon,
however grudgingly, and these are:
* India’s nuclear weaponisation in1998 and
her concurrent development of IRBMs, with ICBMs to follow.
* India’s potential to develop a triad
based nuclear deterrence.
* India’s appreciable space programme
developments.
* Kargil was 1999 in which India for the
first time demonstrated the will to use power even in the ‘limited
war’ context, i.e., use of air power in Kargil and move both the
Western and Eastern naval fleets to the North Arabian sea.
The last two years have also witnessed an
institutional link-up between USA and India in terms of structured
dialogues at various levels and coordination of policy initiatives on
issues like terrorism, Afghanistan etc.
Since these institutions provide continuity and
stability to US foreign policy formulations, it can be expected that the
agenda will not change with the change of Administration. On the contrary
with a Republican Administration more cognizant of India’s role in the
Asian balance of power the institutional policy directions of the United
States may gain more vigour in establishing a more broad-based
relationship with India.
The Pakistani Factor
Pakistan for far too long has been an obsessive
factor in Indian policy formulations. This led to the viewing and analysis
of South Asian policies especially those of USA through the Pak-centric
prism. External powers perforce have to view South Asia as a whole and
then reach conclusions of relative priorities between India and Pakistan.
India today should feel assured that its power potential, not withstanding
Pakistan’s nuclear weaponisation, stands well recognised. External
powers (leaving China for the present)may have other interests in
Pakistan, independent of South Asia, and these must be conceded.
United States perceptions of South Asia currently
operative dwell on the following points:
* Pakistan as a nation state in South Asia
should not be allowed to disintegrate as a failed state. It would
create regional instability.
* Pakistan, while no longer a ‘front-line’
state in US perceptions, however has potential to serve US interests
in the Central Asian context and also in the Gulf region.
* Pakistan, if possible, should not be
allowed to be Talibanised.
* Pakistan’s nuclear weapons waywardness
should be kept under control.
India can hardly argue against such legitimate
policy objectives of the United States, vis-a-vis Pakistan. India must
recognise that unlike China’s inconsistent drive to build up Pakistan as
the ‘regional spoiler’ and strategic counterweight, the United states
has done no such thing in the post cold war period.
Going by historical precedence of the last
Republican Administrations of Reagan and Bush Sr., India’s pre-eminence
in South Asia could be expected to be accorded a more broad-based and
strategic recognition by President-elect Bush, not withstanding US
interests in Pakistan.
Conclusion
South Asia is unlikely to get top priority
earlier on in President Bush’s foreign policy initiatives. Subjects
likely to be addressed soon after inauguration would be those that
critically affect US security interests. Theatre Missile Defence(TMD) and
China would demand early attention of President Bush as policy nuances and
decisions are likely to be different from those of the Clinton
Administration.
India in the meantime cannot afford to become
impatient in terms of drawing President Bush’s attention. Indian
interlocutors would have to work hard to establish rapport with their new
counterparts. India also needs to guard against being co-opted by China
and Russia on the much hackneyed "multi-part" bandwagon. Multi-polarity concepts or undue criticism of TMD do not serve India’s
national interests. At any rate the TMD is not directed against India.
The year 2000 marked a strategic shift in Indo-US
relations. In March 2000 during his visit to India, President Clinton in
the ‘Vision Statement’ for the 21st century spoke of a ‘natural
partnership’ between the two nations. In September 2000 during his visit
PM Vajpayee described USA and India as ‘natural allies’. President
Bush’s South Asia policies cannot be expected to deviate from this
vision, especially when these sentiments enjoy bipartisan support in USA.
President Bush can be expected to add more substance, acceleration and
broad-based relationship during his administration.
11.1.2001
