THE PEACE TRAIN BLAST:
FORENSIC TRAIL - INTERNATIONAL TERRORISM MONITOR--- PAPER
NO. 194
By B. Raman
In terrorism-related cases involving the use of
improvised explosive devices (IEDs), the break-through in
the investigation often comes from the forensic, documentary
and other trails left by the terrorists. The successful
investigation and prosecution of the Mumbai blasts of March,
1993, by the Mumbai Police was attributable to the forensic
trail left by the terrorists in the form of one unexploded
IED and some abandoned hand-grenades and AK-47 rifles and
documentary trail in the form of the entry of their real
names in the passenger manifests of the flights by which
they went to Pakistan for training and fled to Dubai after
the explosions.
2. The success of the London Police in identifying the
perpetrators of the blasts of July 7, 2005, was made
possible by the films of the closed circuit TV in the
railway stations in which the terrorists had boarded the
trains, which they blew up. The even greater success of the
British investigators in respect of the planned, but
unsuccessful blasts of July 21, 2005, was made possible by
the fact that the IEDs malfunctioned.
3. The difficulties faced by the Delhi Police in the
investigation of the blasts of October 29, 2005, in a market
of Delhi and by the Mumbai Police in the investigation of
the suburban train blasts of July, 2006, are due to the fact
that there was no malfunctioning of the IEDs and, as a
result, there was no forensic break-through. The Mumbai
blasts are considered a highly-sophisticated operation
because there was not a single failure and the terrorists
had taken great pains to cover up their tracks. As a result,
the Police have been forced to rely on interrogation of
suspects and narco-analysis. These, though important, do not
have the same credibility in the eyes of international
experts. Hence, the continued skepticism abroad in accepting
the conclusions of the Mumbai Police.
4. The blasts on the Delhi-Attari Samjotha Express
(Peace Express) on the night of February 18, 2007, are
remarkable for the success as well as the failures of the
terrorists. Their diabolic success is evident from the fact
that two of the IEDs, reportedly attached to bottles
containing incendiary material, functioned without a mishap,
causing a carnage in which 67 passengers---mostly Indian and
Pakistani Muslims---perished. Their surprising failure is
evident from the fact that at least a half of their IEDs
failed to explode and has been recovered by the railway
authorities. According to some reports, they had planted a
total of five IEDs of which three failed to function.
According to others, they had planted four IEDs, of which
two failed.
5. These IEDs recovered intact can provide the
investigators with a valuable forensic trail in the form of
fingerprints, the identification of the explosive material
used, and the origin of the explosive material, detonators,
timers and the suitcases in which the IEDs and the bottles
containing the incendiary material were kept. So many
failed IEDs should normally be a surprise in the case of
well-trained, clued-up and experienced terrorists. The
perpetrators of the London blasts of July 7, 2005, had these
qualities and, as such, they did not have a single failure.
The perpetrators of the attempted blasts of July 21, 2005,
in London did not have these qualities and hence failed. The
failures of the perpetrators of Deewana could indicate a
possibility---remote at present--- that they were new to
this business of terrorism---either new recruits of old and
well-established organisations or new recruits of new
organisations. A systematic follow-up of the forensic trail
left by them should help in determining their identity in
course of time.
6. One does not know whether the platform of the old
Delhi station from which the train left has a closed circuit
TV. If it had, an examination of the film should help in
identifying persons, who were carrying suit cases similar to
the one recovered from the train. Once this train leaves
Delhi, no passenger can board it in the intermediate
stations till it reaches Attari on the Indo-Pakistan border.
It has, therefore, been presumed by many analysts that the
perpetrators must have placed the suit-cases containing the
IEDs at the Delhi railway station. The other possibility is
that the perpetrators might be having accomplices in the
railway staff and might have used them to have the
suit-cases placed at the intermediate stations.
(The writer is Additional Secretary (retd),
Cabinet Secretariat, Govt. of India, New Delhi, and,
presently, Director, Institute For Topical Studies, Chennai.
E-mail:
itschen36@gmail.com)