Pakistan Army Fires Strategic Broadsides at United States and India

PAKISTAN ARMY FIRES STRATEGIC BROADSIDES AT UNITED STATES AND INDIA

By Dr. Subhash Kapila

Introductory Observations

The Pakistan Army’s military hierarchy seems to have fired strategic broadsides at the United States and India, going by the statements made last week by General Ashfaq Kiyani, Chief of Army Staff (COAS) Pakistan Army and General Tariq Majid, Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff Committee (CJCSC) Pakistan.

The statements of these two top Pakistani Army Generals cannot be ordinarily dismissed as rhetorical saber-rattling in the political governance vacuum that is currently prevailing in Pakistan where the duly elected Government in the February 2008 elections is not being allowed to implant its feet firmly by the obduracy of the discredited Pakistan military ruler General Musharraf not willing to fade away gracefully from the Presidency that he thrice usurped.

Strategic analysis calls for a detailed dissection of the underlying impulses which made both these top Pakistani Army Generals blame the United States for the strategic mess in Pakistan and refusing to “retrain or re-equip” Pakistan Army troops to fight the global war on terrorism.

It needs to be recorded initially itself that with democracy having been restored in Pakistan under United States pressure and a virtual side-lining of the Pakistan Army, there has been a spurt of Taliban/Al Qaeda attacks on US/NATO Forces in Afghanistan on Pakistan’s western flank and similarly a corresponding increase in Pakistan – based infiltration of Islamic Jehadis in Kashmir, on Pakistan’s eastern flank.

It also needs to be reiterated initially itself that without Pakistan Army’s involvement and a nod from the Pakistan Army Generals, this spurt in insurgency/terrorism related violence in Afghanistan and Kashmir cannot take place.

Lately there were enough media reports to indicate that the United States conviction on General Musharraf’s indispensability for US strategic interests was wearing thin and so also in Pakistan Army’s dragging its feet in the global war on terror.

Similarly, India’s National Security establishment long used to giving statements that Pakistan-based terrorism and violence in Kashmir and the rest of India was being initiated by Pakistani elements focused on “derailing India-Pakistan Peace Process” should now refrain from such fudging responses. The harsh reality is that unlike the Pakistani people the Pakistan Army has not changed its perceptions of India.

This paper has been set out as under to analyze the theme under discussion:

Statements Made by General Kiyani, Pak COAS & Related Observations
Statements Made by General Tariq Majid, Pak CJCSC & Related Observations
Pakistan Army Generals Strategic Broadsides Analyzed
United States: The Impact of Pakistan Army Strategic Broadsides
India: The Strategic Implications of Pak COAS Assertions

Statements Made by General Kiyani, Pak COAS & Related Observations

General Ashfaq Kiyani, Pak COAS has been quoted by the respected Pakistan journalist, Ahmed Rashid in a Los Angeles Times feature as follows:

General Kiyani has told US military and NATO officials that the Pakistan Army will not “retrain or re-equip” its troops to fight the counter-insurgency war on the Afghan frontier as demanded by the Americans.
Pakistan will deploy the bulk of its troops on Pakistan’s borders with India and prepare for possible conflicts with traditional enemy India.

Related observations emanating in this report are as follows:

More than 80% of the $ 10 billion aid provided by USA to Pakistan was diverted to buy advanced major weapon systems for the Indian front.
Pakistan Army after its peace deals with Taliban leaders has virtually withdrawn from the seven districts of FATA
Posts vacated by Pakistan Army now stand occupied by Taliban cadres.
The peace deal with the Taliban has only one proviso that they will not attack Pakistan Army troops. There is no proviso that they will not attack US/NATO troops in Afghanistan and therefore the Taliban has now a free run against them.

Statements Made by General Tariq Majid, Pak CJCSC & Related Observations

An ISPR (Pakistan) press release covering General Majidi address to the 7^th Shangrila Dialogue in Singapore recently quotes him as follows:

“The cumulative effect of happenings in the West Asia, sledge-hammer approach of the coalition forces in contiguous Pashtun areas of Afghanistan, cross border missile strikes causing civilian deaths in FATA and tendency of some of the Western countries to micro-manage our counter-terrorism policies have created a perception that the global war on terrorism is directed at Muslims.”
General Majid further elucidated that this approach was stoking tribal revenge and drawing-in Islamic fighters from elsewhere to join the anti-American struggle.

Related observations attributed to General Majid include (1) Strategic goal of security stabilization continues to be elusive despite tactical and operational successes (2) Overall security situation has become more complex and tenuous as challenges to Pakistan’s domestic stability and regional stability have become complex and manifold.

Pakistan Army Generals Strategic Broadsides Analyzed

The strategic broadsides by the two top Pakistan Army Generals have to be viewed at two levels, namely (1) The timing of their broadsides, and (2) The content of their broadsides.

The timing of the Pakistan Army Generals broadsides is ominous. These assertions have emerged against the background of the following developments hovering in Pakistan: (1) Pakistan Army stands marginalized, if not fully, in the direct governance of Pakistan as a result of democracy coming to Pakistan under US pressure (2) Pakistan Army’s concerns that its traditional bold on Pakistan’s foreign and defense policies may get diluted with the civil political government gradually getting firmly implanted (3) Overwhelming Pakistani mass support for democracy in Pakistan (4) Pakistan Army’s dismal image in Pakistani public perceptions as a result of its consistent failures in military operations in FATA against the Taliban (4) The General Election verdict this year was against General Musharraf and implicit in this was a rejection of Pakistan Army grip on Pakistani’s governance.

The content of the Pakistan Army top Generals strategic broadsides have to be viewed again at two levels, namely in the external context and in the domestic context.

In the external context, the content of the strategic broadsides seems to be conveying the following messages: (1) The Pakistan Army and its apex military hierarchy is not in agreement with or in synchronization with the United States global war on terror (2) The Pakistan Army resents American intrusion in Pakistan Army’s decision-making and conceptual planning of the operations in FATA and on the Afghan frontier (3) The Pakistan Army would not like to project the image of being pro-American.

The most significant message from General Kiyani, Pak COAS to the United States, when he asserts that Pak Army will not “retrain or reequip” its troops to fight in the Afghan frontier is "that the Pakistan Army is opting out of the United States global war on terrorism”.

This virtually amounts to a rejection by the Pak Army COAS of the strategic alliance forged between USA and Pakistan post 9/11 to fight the global war on terror. Strangely, the media went the whole hog to project General Kiyani as pro-US and the United States preferred choice to be the COAS after Musharraf. The facts now seem to be otherwise.

In the domestic context, these assertions by the Pakistan Generals are wishing to convey: (1) That they are not a part of General Musharraf’s Coalition against Terrorism (2) They are not a party to the US anti-Islamic war and (3) By doing so they wish to preserve the support of the Islamic fundamentalists within Pakistan for the Pakistan Army when reclaiming power in the future.

Tangentially analyzed, it could also be stated that this is a veiled message to Pakistan’s civil society and liberal groups that the Pakistan Army can defy United States dictates and implicit in this is also a message that if need be the Pakistan Army can regain its political grip over Pakistan’s governance, despite any US pressures.

United States: The Impact of Pakistan Army Strategic Broadsides

The impact on the United States has to be viewed both in the context of overall impact in the future of US-Pakistan relations and more immediately in the impact on US/NATO military operations in Afghanistan.

In the context of overall impact on the future of US-Pakistan relations what can be said is that if the Pakistan Army follows through scrupulously on the assertions made by its two top Generals, the prospects appeal to cast shadows on the US-Pakistan strategic relationship and Pakistan’s strategic utility to serve US security interests in the region.

For the United States, its top strategic priorities are to restore stability and order in Iraq and Afghanistan. With Pakistan Army Generals asserting that are going to opt out from the global war on terrorism, it is a matter of military concern but not terribly destabilizing militarily for the United States. It has many other options to achieve success in Afghanistan despite Pakistan Army non-cooperation.

But what such a development would seriously call in question is that the stupendous strategic and political investments in the Pakistan Army as a force of stability that the United States has made so far were misperceived and a strategic failure.

In terms of US involvement and commitment to Afghanistan, this new Pakistani development would call for:

Committing increased force levels of US/NATO troops in Afghanistan
Military sealing-off of the Afghanistan-Pakistan border on the Afghan side
Use Russian and Central Asian routes for supporting of military operations in Afghanistan
US military strikes on Taliban/Al Qaeda bases within Pakistan
Speeding up training and equipping of the Afghan National Army
Co-opting Russia and India in nation-building efforts in Afghanistan
Increased technical surveillance and revamping intelligence setup

The past record of over-reliance of USA on Pakistan for US military operations in Afghanistan was a myth which now stands dispelled. In a series of papers of this Author in the past it was stressed that the Pakistan Army was “double-timing” the United States in Afghanistan

India: The Strategic Implications of Pak COAS Assertions

India’s foreign policy and strategic approaches towards Pakistan in the last eight years and more particularly in the last four years have been pathetic. A couple of months ago India’s National Security Advisor was quoted as giving good testimonials to Pak Army COAS on assuming his appointment.

General Kiyani from the Indian point of view should be free to assert anything against the United States and US policies, but if in the same context he asserts that the bulk of the Pakistan Army would be deployed on the borders against India as the traditional enemy then strategically it becomes a different kettle of fish.

Implicit in General Kiyani’s latest assertions are (1) Pakistan Army does not view or expect or would work for any normalization of relations with India (2) Pakistan Army would continue to impedes any normalization process (3) Pakistan Army is still engaged in an arms race with India with 80% of the US $ 10 billion aid diverted to purchase of advanced weapon systems to be used on the India front.

Under General Kiyani the Pakistan Army’s changed manifestations that have emerged lately have been: (1) Kashmir resurrected as a confrontational issue by Kiyani (2) Four years old ceasefire in Kashmir breached by Pakistan Army by firing incidents along the LOC in Kashmir. (3) Increased Jehadi infiltration in Kashmir (4) Major terrorism incidents in rest of India continue with traditional frequency (5) Targeted killing of Indians by Taliban in Afghanistan who were involved in development projects there.

The above trend can be expected to intensify. Pakistan Army was so far quiet on the frontiers with India because of Pak Army deployments on the Afghan frontier. With re-deployments back to concentrations on the Indian frontiers, the Pakistan Army can be expected to intensify its proxy was against India.

The present Indian Government has to revise its strategic formulations and also revise its mythical over-investment and trust in Pakistan Army’s commitment to peace with India.

India also has to ponder whether there is any Chinese role in the re-assertion of Pakistan Army intransigence against India.

Concluding Observations

Pakistan’s political dynamics are currently in a state of flux, as the old order of Pakistani military regimes “yieldeth” reluctantly to the new order of civilian democratic regimes.

The strategic broadsides at USA and India seem to be an attempt to re-invent Pak Army's strategic utility to USA, though in a perverse manner i.e being counted by their nuisance value.

The United States enjoys tremendous strategic and political leverages in Pakistan and the region. It may be tolerant of such transgressions, but upto a limit. Beyond a point, the United States can be expected to act sternly with the Pakistani Generals should they endanger US security interests in Afghanistan through their Taliban proxies.

India with no coercive capabilities against Pakistan because of a lack of the will to use power in the past, has to be vigilant and pro-active in dealing with Pakistan Army transgressions. Any Pakistan Army military adventurism on the LOC in Kashmir or terrorism against India needs to be met with sharp Indian ripostes.

(The author is an International Relations and Strategic Affairs analyst. He is the Consultant, Strategic Affairs with South Asia Analysis Group. Email:drsubhashkapila@yahoo.com)