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Paper no. 3068
24-Feb-2009
Guest Column By Commodore R. S. Vasan
Admiral Sureesh Mehta, the Chief of the Naval Staff sounded a stern warning on 18th February 2009, about the possibility of nuclear weapons being smuggled in to the country through the ever increasing container traffic. The warning was issued at a seminar to discuss Port Development and related security issues.
At one level, there is nothing new in the warning. Similar warnings were issued post 9/11 by US and other maritime analysts who expected the seas to be the next medium for transportation and manifestation of terror. It is this fear that prompted the US to examine the issues related to container security and work on whole range of options to introduce regimes/codes such as the ISPS, CSI, PSI, RMSI, and MSO. All these were aimed at addressing concerns of proliferation and terror from the sea. At another level, the statement by the CNS can only be looked at as a renewed call about the potential ever present dangers at sea, particularly in the wake of recent developments in our neighbourhood with the blurring involvement of both the state and non state actors in perpetrating acts of terrorism.
This paper examines the related issues of Container security and proliferation security concerns in the light of the debate following the remarks of the Chief of the Naval Staff. With globalisation and increased traffic, more and more cargo today is shipped by use of containers also called twenty food equivalent units (TEU). The number of containers being used for transportation through the seas annually is estimated to be in the region of 2,50,000 million TEUs. This number is mind boggling and would add to the security concerns of any logistic chain.
The logistic chain is a long one crisscrossing the globe on many seas and ports through dynamic changing environment. The warnings relate to the possible use of containers for transportation of contraband, illegal weapons, dirty bombs and even stowaways who through the medium of seas could be transported illegally from one port to another destination.
US Response:
The measures adopted by the US post 9/11 are indeed noteworthy. The US which was instrumental in influencing the signatories of the IMO to adopt the International Ship and Port Security (ISPS) code post 9/11 also foresaw the possibility of the use of containers by terrorists. This is what that gave raise to Container Security Initiative (CSI). The US by its own legislation insisted that the containers bound for its ports would need to be screened by an US approved process. It also required the posting of US officials who would over see the operations in the port of origin outside the US.
The entire related issues of container security from the first point of loading to transportation by rail/road/interlinking waterways till it reached the port of origin were examined in depth and measures implemented to render the process fool proof. The measures included certification of the agencies who were involved in the loading, cargo handling, electronic scanning, use of RFIDs, tamper proof seals and remote monitoring/tracking of the containers. With all the measures incorporated, US aimed to insulate itself from the possible dangers of misuse of the containers for terrorist acts against its citizens and property. In addition to the Container Security Initiative, the provisions of ISPS for enhancing safety and security levels on ships and port were also used extensively to ensure that the US Coast Guard and port authorities had ample time to check out the details of the entire cargo, ownership, ports of transit, crew manifest and such like.
The US made it mandatory for ships calling at their ports to report all the details of voyage, cargo, crew etc., four days (96 hours) before the Estimated Time of Arrival (ETA). The concerned port/security agency therefore had ample time to scrutinize the ship, its cargo, crew credentials and cross check the data base prior to permitting entry in to a port. If there were any doubts, the ship could be intercepted/stopped/boarded/examined/quarantined. The standard terminology used was Visit, Board, Search and Seizure (VBSS) operations. Since the containers were already cleared by the US rep in the port of origin, the concerned agencies only examined additional details of the ship that was to dock in one of its port. Further precautions were taken to examine if the ship visited any of the non ISPS compliant port during its passage, which meant that the risk quotient was increased with the number of non ISPS ports visited by the ship. Conversely, if all the ports visited were ISPS cleared, then there would be lesser inspections and smoother passage in to the American port thus cutting down on delays. The representative was positioned only if there was mututal agreement between the two countries on this aspect according to CSI.
If that was not the case, the concerned country was required to ship the entire cargo to another port that was CSI compliant. For many years, containers from India bound for US were routed through Colombo as there were many reservations in India about the provisions of CSI. However, it has been reported that JNPT port in Mumbai has now been cleared by the Government to be a CSI compliant port that would allow shipping of containers with out any transhipment through another port. All the major ports in the country are now ISPS compliant and are required to follow the statutory requirements in terms of security measures in ports, ships and at facilities provided in a port. However, all the ports do not meet the CSI requirement stipulated by US. When this factor is examined in the context of present threats, it is clear that all the containers which are exported from countries that are not ISPS /CSI compliant could be ticking dynamites waiting to explode in a port of destination in India. Despite the ISPS, India does not have security system architecture on the lines of US to prevent the misuse of containers. What is also important to note is that the cargo from even CSI cleared ports would always be suspect when it was not meant for US in the absence of similar mechanism between any two trading nations.
On the specific issue of nuclear bombs or weapons of mass destruction being brought in by containers, US again took the lead in starting the Proliferation of Security Initiative (PSI) precisely aimed at preventing the use of seas for transportation of such cargo. While not being an international instrumentality on the same lines as the ISPS, this was an initiative by which, the US could stop and board a vessel suspected to be involved in proliferation activities in any part of the world including the high seas. USA has formalized this obligation with many nations to allow the right to search and examination even on the high seas to prevent proliferation activities. India in the past has resisted being a signatory to the PSI quoting sovereignty issues. Many nations also felt that it would infringe on the rights of the freedom of the seas as enshrined in the United Nations Conventions on the Laws of the Sea (UNCLOS). They also felt that not being a UN approved mandate, it is only aimed perhaps at thwarting Iran’s nuclear ambitions.
In the context of United nations, PSI draws its strength from some of the United Nations Security Council Resolutions emanating notably from UNSCR 1540 which specifically demands that "all States shall take and enforce effective measures to establish domestic controls to prevent the proliferation of nuclear, chemical, or biological weapons and their means of delivery, including by establishing appropriate controls over related materials…"
Operative thrust underlined in paragraph 10 of UNSCR 1540 requires all states in accordance with their national legal authorities and legislation and consistent with international law - to take cooperative action to stop, impede, intercept and otherwise prevent the illicit trafficking in nuclear, chemical or biological weapons, their means of delivery and related materials.
With the establishment of the Coastal Command (Full details of the size and shape of this initiative are not yet available in the public domain), it should be possible to have assertive policies at least in the territorial waters and the Exclusive Economic Zone. The state would be in a position to impose such restrictions on passage and inspection of vessels, large, medium or small; both Indian and Foreign to bring about a greater degree of security in all our ports, fishing harbours, and installations along the coast. Time is also perhaps ripe to re examine the issue of PSI and CSI .
Coming back to the warnings of the naval chief, even if it was repetitive, it is clear that he was referring to both the CSI and the PSI in the same breath and was reiterating the importance of maritime security in all its dimensions in the present context. If there are serious objections to this US led initiatives such as the PSI, there is a need to have laws of the land that would meet the provisions of UNSCR 1540 and more to protect lives and property in our country irrespective of the medium of transportation. More importantly, there is an urgent need for shoring up the maritime security apparatus by re evaluating the ‘means and methods’ that have proved to be inadequate in the past to prevent abuse of the seas around us for both overt and covert terror attacks.
(The author is presently the Head, Strategy and Security Studies at the Center for Asia Studies at Chennai and can be contacted at rsvasan2010@gmail.com)
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