Hum Re-Pays An Old Debt To
LTTE In Lahore? -- International Terrorism
Monitor -- Paper No.500
By B. Raman
Six players of
the Sri Lankan cricket team, which had
arrived on a visit to Pakistan, are reported
to have been injured and four policemen
killed when 10 or more persons wielding
hand-held weapons, including hand-grenades,
attacked a bus in which the team was going
to the Gaddafi Stadium in Lahore on the
morning of March 3,2009. The attack has been
recorded on closed circuit TV and should
enable the Pakistani authorities to identify
the terrorists and the organisation to which
they belong. The Sri Lankan Government is
reported to have advised the team to cancel
the visit and return to Sri Lanka.
2. While it is
too early to assess as to who might have
been responsible for the attack and why, one
has to recall past instances of contacts of
the Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam (LTTE)
with the Harkat-ul-Mujahideen (HUM---known
before 1997 as the Harkat-ul-Ansar), a
member of the International Islamic Front (IIF)
of Al Qaeda and the role played by the
commercial ships of the LTTE in the 1990s in
facilitating heroin smugglimg from the
Afghanistan-Pakistan region.
3. In 1993, the
Indian Coast Guard had intercepted an LTTE
ship in which Kittu, a leader of the LTTE,
was travelling from Karachi to the Wanni
region of Northern Sri Lanka. When cornered
by the Coast Guard, the LTTE cadres on board
the ship set fire to it and it sank. Kittu
chose to go down with the ship in order to
avoid falling into the hands of the Coast
Guard. Some members of the crew jumped from
the sinking ship and were arrested and
interrogated. The subsequent investigation
brought out that the ship was carrying a
consignment of arms and ammunition, which
was loaded by the HUM cadres at Karachi, in
the presence of some officers of the
Pakistani Inter-Services Intelligence (ISI)
and Navy.
4. Reports
received in 1994-95 had indicated that the
LTTE had helped the HUM in smuggling arms
and ammunition in its ships to jihadi
elements in Southern Philippines and that in
return for this the HUM and the ISI had
gifted some anti-aircraft weapons and
ammunition and surface-to-air missiles to
the LTTE.
5. Since 9/11,
this source for clandestine arms
procurement and heroin smuggling for the
LTTE has dried up due to the deployment of
NATO ships off Pakistan to prevent any
shipping activity in support of Al Qaeda.
The HUM continues to have an active presence
in the Southern Philippines and the
Harkat-ul-Jihad-al-Islami (HUJI) in the
Arakan area of Myanmar and in Southern
Thailand. One cannot rule out the
possibility of the HUM---and possibly even
the HUJI--- maintaining fraternal ties with
the LTTE despite its Hindu/Christian
background and past anti-Muslim policies in
the areas controlled by it.
6. These are
opportunistic alliances to assist each other
and the fact that the LTTE had followed an
anti-Muslim policy should not come in their
way. In my past articles, I had mentioned
that the ISI's arms gifts to the LTTE
despite its anti-Muslim policies started
after its assassination of Rajiv Gandhi in
May,1991.
7. Against this
background, a possible line of enquiry
should be whether the HUM or any of its
allies in the IIF is repaying a debt to the
LTTE for its past assistance by attacking
the Sri Lankan cricket team.
8. Relevant
extracts from my past articles having a
bearing on this are annexed.
(The writer is Additional
Secretary (retd), Cabinet Secretariat, Govt.
of India, New Delhi, and, presently,
Director, Institute For Topical Studies,
Chennai. E-mail:
seventyone2@gmail.com)
ANNEXURE
In the second
half of 1994, the LTTE had helped the
Harkat-ul-Ansar (since renamed as the
Harkat-ul-Mujahideen), the terrorist
organisation of Pakistan run by the
Inter-Services Intelligence (ISI), in
smuggling at least two shiploads of arms and
ammunition from Karachi for the Moro Islamic
Liberation Front (MILF) of the Southern
Philippines. In return for the LTTE's
assistance in safely carrying these items to
the Southern Philippines, the HUM and the
ISI gave to it an undetermined quantity of
anti-aircraft guns with ammunition and
surface-to-air shoulder-fired missiles. The
LTTE brought these weapons into use for the
first time in April 1995 when it downed two
aircraft of the Sri Lankan Air Force (SLAF)
at Palali. Subsequently, it continued to use
its anti-aircraft capability acquired from
the HUM and the ISI against the SLAF
effectively. It was also reported to have
received replenishments of this capability
in return for assisting the HUM in shipping
to a port in Turkey consignments of arms and
ammunition meant for the Islamic terrorists
in Chechnya.
---From my
article of 24. 07. 2001 titled ATTACK ON SRI
LANKAN AIR BASE AT KATUNAYAKE at
http://www.southasiaanalysis.org/papers3/paper284.html
The details also
indicate that the maximum damage to the
planes of the SLAF and the SL Airlines was,
most probably, caused with rocket-propelled
grenade (RPG) launchers of Soviet vintage
which the Afghan Mujahideen, now forming
part of the Taliban, and the Inter-Services
Intelligence (ISI) of Pakistan had captured
in large numbers from the arms depots of
Kabul after the collapse of the Najibullah
regime in April, 1992. In the past, the ISI
and its creation, the Harkat-ul-Mujahideen
(HUM), had supplied at least three
consignments of weapons seized from Kabul,
including the launchers and anti-aircraft
guns and missiles, to the LTTE in return for
its assistance in narcotics smuggling and in
shipping arms consignments to the Muslim
separatists in Southern Philippines and to
the Chechen terrorists in Russia through a
Turkish port.
--- From my
article of 26. 07. 2001 titled THE OMENS
FROM KATUNAYAKE at
http://www.southasiaanalysis.org/papers3/paper285.html
In its fierce
determination to achieve its political
objective of a Tamil Eeelam, a separate
Tamil State encompassing the Northern and
Eastern provinces of Sri Lanka, the LTTE
follows a no-holds-barred approach. It has
had no qualms over letting its fleet be used
for narcotics-running by the heroin barons
of Pakistan and Afghanistan or for gun
running to the Abu Sayyaf and the Moro
Islamic Liberation Front of the Southern
Phillipines by the Harkat-ul-Mujahideen
(HUM) of Pakistan in order to replenish its
coffers and arsenal. It did not hesitate to
accept a consignment of arms and ammunition
from the Inter-Services Intelligence (ISI)
of Pakistan in 1993.
---- From my
article of 29. 04. 2002 titled THE LTTE: The
Metamorphosis at
http://www.southasiaanalysis.org/papers5/paper448.html
India has also an
international obligation under various
international conventions relating to
counter-terrorism and particularly under the
UN Security Resolution No.1373, which was
passed after the 9/11 terrorist strikes in
the US. The UNSC Resolution No.1373 applies
to all international terrorist organisations
and not just to international jihadi
terrorist organisations. The LTTE comes
under the definition of an international
terrorist organisation due to various
reasons. Firstly, it had carried out acts of
terrorism in Indian soil in the past,
including the assassination of Rajiv Gandhi
in 1991. Secondly, it has had contacts in
the past with the Harkat-ul-Mujahideen (HUM)
of Pakistan, which is a founding-member of
Osama bin Laden's International Islamic
Front (IIF) and which is behind many acts of
jihadi terrorism in Indian territory.
Thirdly, it has had contacts in the past
with Pakistan's Inter-Services Intelligence
(ISI). The arms and ammunition carried by
the late Kittu's ship in 1993 were given by
the HUM and were loaded on to the LTTE ship
at Karachi with the complicity of the ISI.
Fourthly, it has had and continues to have
contacts with various terrorist
organisations of West Asia such as the
Hezbollah of the Lebanon. Fifthly, it runs
an international arms smuggling and
procurement network with the help of some
members of the Sri Lankan Tamil diaspora
abroad. Sixthly, the recent investigations
by the Tamil Nadu Police have brought out
that though the LTTE has not used the Indian
territory for an act of terrorism after the
assassination of Rajiv Gandhi, it continues
to use the Indian territory for the
procurement of material required for
improvised explosive devices. Seventhly, it
has set up logistics support sanctuaries in
many countries of the world with the help of
members of the Sri Lankan Tamil diaspora as
well as others sympathetic to it. These
factors oblige India to extend to Sri Lanka
two kinds of assistance----namely,
intelligence-sharing and action against the
LTTE's logistics support sanctuaries in
Indian territory. India has already been
extending such assistance. While
intelligence-sharing cannot be public
knowledge, the details of the recent actions
by the Coast Guard and the Tamil Nadu Police
against the LTTE's procurement activities
are evidence of the Indian co-operation. The
9/11 terrorist strikes also brought about a
recognition by the international community
that terrorism is an absolute evil, whatever
be its cause and objective and should not be
tolerated. Every State, which is a victim of
terrorism, has a right to take all
legitimate self-defence measures to protect
the lives and property of its nationals.
Thus, the Government of Sri Lanka has the
right to take all legitimate measures to
protect its citizens from acts of terrorism.
Such legitimate measures include procurement
of the weapons and expertise required for
counter-terrorism operations from other
countries.
---- Extract from
my article of 2-6-07 titled SRI LANKA &
INDIA: FACING REALITIES at
http://www.southasiaanalysis.org/papers23/paper2261.html