Pak Taliban: From A Bunch
Of Suicide Bombers To A Conventional Army --
International Terrorism Monitor -- Paper
No.520
By B. Raman
Like the Neo Taliban of
Afghanistan, the Tehrik-e-Taliban Pakistan (TTP)
has evolved in less than a year from a bunch
of suicide bombers to a conventional army
capable of set-piece, stand and fight
battles with the Pakistani Army and para-military
forces. This conversion has been facilitated
by the recruitment of a large number of
retired Pashtun ex-servicemen living in the
Pashtun tribal belt in the
Federally-Administered Tribal Areas (FATA)
and in the Malakand Division of the
North-West Frontier Province (NWFP). The
Swat Valley and the Buner District, less
than a hundred kms from Islamabad, which was
occupied by the TTP earlier this week
without any resistance from the local
security forces, form part of the Malakand
Division.
2. The agreement signed
earlier this year by the coalition
Government in the NWFP headed by the Awami
National Party (ANP) with Sufi Mohammad of
the Tehrik-e-Nifaz-a-Shariat-e-Mohammadi (TNSM),
which is a constituent unit of the TTP, for
the introduction of Sharia courts covers the
entire Division, consisting of seven
districts and not just Swat. Now that the
agreement, despite strong criticism from
abroad, has been got approved by Prime
Minister Yousef Raza Gilani by the National
Assembly and signed by President Asif Ali
Zardari, the TNSM has lost no time in
expanding its control to areas of the
Malakand Division outside Swat. The
occupation of the Buner district is the
beginning. The occupation of the other
districts will follow.
3. What should be of
great concern to both India and the US is
that the TTP, which was seen till recently
as merely a collection of young suicide
bombers with limited capability for
territorial control and dominance through
conventional forces, has started
demonstrating that it has evolved into a
conventional army, which can fight, occupy
and administer territory. Thus, the TTP has
evolved into a mirror image of the Neo
Taliban. It shares with the Neo Taliban its
objective of fighting for the defeat of the
US-led NATO forces in Afghanistan. At the
same time, it has its own independent agenda
of expanding its territorial and ideological
dominance to other areas of the Pashtun belt
in the NWFP initially and then to non-Pashtun
areas. The Neo Taliban does not approve of
this independent agenda, but does not oppose
it actively.
4. The Pakistan Army
headed by Gen. Ashfaq Pervez Kayani, its
Chief of the Army Staff (COAS), has shown
neither the will nor the inclination to
counter the advance of the TTP and then roll
it back. It is not Kayani’s worries about
what could happen on the Indian border,
which have come in the way of a vigorous
response to the TTP’s military advance. It
is his worries over the continuing loyalty
of the Pashtun soldiers, who constitute
about 20 per cent of the Army, and of the
Frontier Corps and the Frontier
Constabulary, which are responsible for his
anxiety and keenness to make peace with the
TTP. The Frontier Corps and the Frontier
Constabulary consist predominantly of
Pashtun soldiers recruited in the FATA and
the NWFP, officered by deputationists from
the Army. These units have been showing less
and less inclination to fight the TTP. They
have been either avoiding a confrontation
with the TNSM and the TTP or in some cases
just deserting and surrendering to the TTP
units.
5. According to
reliable sources in the Pakistan People’s
Party (PPP), it is pressure from an alarmed
Kayani to reach an accommodation with the
TNSM and the TTP, which set in motion the
negotiations with Sufi Mohammad and the
developments that have followed. The Army
and the para-military forces have already
conceded territorial control to the TTP in
the FATA and in the Malakand Division of the
NWFP. By re-locating his forces and by
reducing the Army’s presence in these areas
already under the domination of the TNSM and
the TTP, Kayani is reportedly hoping to
prevent an ingress of the Pakistani Taliban
into other parts of the NWFP and beyond.
6. The objectives of
the TTP are presently limited to ideological
unity of all Muslims in Pakistan based on
the Sharia and the ethnic unity of all the
Pashtuns in the Af-Pak region to wage a
relentless jihad against the US-led NATO
forces till they vacate Afghanistan. It has
the motivation and intention to extend its
ideological influence to non-Pashtun areas
too, but is not yet in a position to
establish territorial dominance in those
areas. The Muttahida Qaumi Movement (MQM) of
Altaf Hussain apprehends that the TTP wants
to set up a strong presence in Karachi,
which has the largest Pashtun community in
Pakistan after Peshawar.
7. Confronted with the
worsening ground situation in the NWFP and
with the danger of a possible collapse of
the strategy of President Barack Obama even
before it was taken up for implementation,
the US is acting like a cat on a hot tin
roof. There have been understandable cries
of alarm not only from Hillary Clinton, the
Secretary of State, and Robert Gates, the
Defence Secretary, but also from White House
spokesmen. Cries of alarm and the
preparation of yet another national
intelligence estimate on Pakistan alone will
not help. What is urgently required is a
national intelligence estimate on US
policy-making towards Pakistan, which has
been leading it from one critical situation
to another.
8. A study of the
course of US policy-making would show how
those Pakistani leaders who are toasted one
day as frontline allies against extremism
and terrorism turn out to be either
accomplices of terrorism or capitulators to
terrorists and extremists the next day.
Pervez Musharraf belonged to the first
category. Zardari belongs to the second.
Despite nearly 60 years of close US
interactions with the political and military
leaderships in Pakistan, the US has not been
able to acquire any enduring influence over
policy-making circles in Islamabad. The US
has very little to show in terms of changed
policies in Islamabad in return for its
unending pampering of successive regimes in
Islamabad with the injection of more and
more money and military equipment. The time
has come to stop pampering, but there is a
reluctance in the Obama Administration---as
there was in the preceding Bush
Administration--- to do so due to fears that
a stoppage of US assistance and pampering
may result in a failed state with the
control of its nuclear arsenal falling into
the hands of the jihadis.
9. Unfortunately, the
situation in Pakistan has reached a stage
where the outcome---ultimate jihadi control
of the State and its nuclear arsenal--- may
be the same whatever the US does----whether
it continues pampering or stops doing so. It
is a thankless dilemma. It is easy to
criticize the US strategy or the lack of it,
but difficult to suggest a viable
alternative. The starting point of an
alternative strategy has to be a cordon
sanitaire around the areas already under the
control of the TTP and a crash programme for
the economic development of the Pashtun
areas not yet controlled by the Taliban.
Obama’s plans to spend billions of dollars
in the areas of the FATA already under the
control of Al Qaeda and the Taliban would
produce no enduring results except to waste
the US taxpayers’ money. This money should
be better spent on immunizing those areas
where the influence of the Taliban has not
yet spread.
10. An equally
important point of the strategy should be to
step up the US Predator strikes in the FATA
and to extend them to Swat in order to keep
the Al Qaeda and Taliban elements running
for cover all the time and make it
difficult for them to plan new strikes and
get them executed.
11. The third point of
the strategy should be to restore to the
Intelligence Bureau of Pakistan its original
role of primacy as the internal intelligence
and internal security agency of Pakistan.
Over the years, the IB has been reduced to
the position of a powerless appendage of the
Inter-Services Intelligence (ISI) and its
top ranks militarized through the induction
of serving and retired military officers.
This has to be reversed.
12. These are medium
and long-term measures, which would take
time to produce results. The questions
requiring an immediate response is how to
protect Pakistan from itself. How to stop
the advance of the Taliban? How to confront
it ideologically? For this purpose, the US
needs objective allies in Pakistan. It has
none so far. It has been working through
opportunistic allies in the army and the
political parties. They will accept all the
money from the US, but will not produce
results.
13. The objective
allies have to be found in the Pashtun
community. All the talk in Washington DC
about their being good Taliban and bad
Taliban is ridiculous. But there are good
Pashtuns and bad Pashtuns. The US should
urgently identify the good Pashtuns and
encourage and help them to take up the fight
against the Taliban ideologically. After the
elections in Pakistan in March last year, I
had pointed out that the ANP, which came to
power in Peshawar, was a party of good
Pashtuns and that the US should work through
it, forgetting its past links with the
Communists in Afghanistan and the erstwhile
USSR. I was given to understand that a
couple of ANP leaders did visit Washingtin
DC, but beyond that nothing further was
done. Now the ANP-led Government in Peshawar
has conceded ideological victory to the TNSM
in Swat. Despite this, the US should persist
with cultivating it and other good Pashtun
elements in parties such as the Pakhtoonkwa
Milli Awami Party (PMAP) of Mehmood Khan
Achakzai. They constitute the progressive
component of the Pashtun community and they
need to be strengthened and encouraged to
counter the Taliban. The present US policy
of depending on repeatedly failed elements
in the Army and in the mainstream political
parties is not working. The regional Pashtun
forces have to be encouraged to take up the
fight against the Taliban.
14. The survival of Al
Qaeda in the FATA and the rise and spread of
the TTP are due to support from large
sections of the Pashtun community. The
resistance to them has to come from the
Pashtun community. It cannot come from the
likes of Zardari, Gilani and Kayani.
(The
writer is Additional Secretary (retd),
Cabinet Secretariat, Govt. of India, New
Delhi, and, presently, Director, the
Institute For Topical Studies, Chennai.
E-mail:
seventyone2@gmail.com
)