Blow To Attempts To Form Neo-LTTE -
International Terrorism Monitor---Paper No.
548
By B. Raman
The post-Prabakaran
attempts by some never-say-die sections of
the Sri Lankan Tamil diaspora across the
world to resurrect the Liberation Tigers of
Tamil Eelam (LTTE) suffered a blow on August
6, 2009, when the Malaysian security
agencies handed over to their Sri Lankan
counterparts Kumaran Pathmanathan (known as
KP), whom they had reportedly picked up from
a hotel a few hours earlier.
2. It was
suspected by investigation and intelligence
agencies for some years that KP was residing
in Malaysia and operating clandestinely from
there with the help of LTTE sympathisers in
the local Tamil community-----of Sri Lankan
as well as Indian origin. For nearly 20
years he was a great asset to Prabakaran and
the LTTE not because of any special
political acumen he had, but because of his
ability to work clandestinely without
attracting much public attention to himself.
3. He emerged as
the alleged main brain behind the LTTE's
vast arms procurement, gun running, arms
piracy from ships in mid-sea,
money-laundering and commercial shipping
network. The LTTE would not have been able
to develop its capability as a conventional
fighting force to the extent it did but for
his alleged clandestine work. In connection
with this, he travelled frequently and
extensively in South-East Asia, East Europe
and South Africa. He kept way from West
Europe (except Greece and Cyprus) and North
America for fear of being caught by the
local intelligence agencies, but from his
base in Malaysia he allegedly guided the
arms procurement and money-laundering
networks in those areas too.
4. The fact that
Prabakaran gave him a free hand in handling
the cash flows from the shiping fleet,
alleged narcotics smuggling and alleged
extortions from the members of the Tamil
diaspora and in negotiating the prices of
the arms and in arranging the shipping
schedules indicated the confidence he had in
KP.
5. It used to be
alleged that the Malaysian authorities
avoided acting against him because of the
support enjoyed by him in sections of the
local Tamil community. His low profile and
his ability to keep his mouth shut helped
him in ensuring that the local security
agencies would not act against him.
6. All this
changed in January this year when Prabakaran
appointed him as the in-charge of the
international relations department of the
LTTE. One does not know why Prabakaran chose
him for this job. Outside Malaysia, KP had
no political contact. He was not a
well-known and well-respected figure in the
international community of human rights
organisations. He could not have travelled
to the West without fear of being arrested.
He was no Anton Balasingham. Nor was he a
Thamilselvan. He was allegedly in some
aspects a Sri Lankan Tamil version of Dawood
Ibrahim. Dawood is a mafia leader. KP is
not. But Dawood and KP allegedly had
similar capabilities for gun running and
money-laundering.
7. After his
nomination to this post, the previously
discreet and low-profile KP became
increasingly high profile. He started
interacting with journalists and
non-governmental organisations from his safe
sanctuary in South-East Asia. After the
death of Prabakaran, he became the
self-promoted head of a group of Sri Lankan
Tamils in the diaspora, who tried to
resurrect the LTTE as an organisation wedded
to the same objective of an independent
Tamil Eelam as was the organisation headed
by Prabakaran, but advocating a non-violent
movement to achieve this objective.
8. One does not
know what real following he commanded in the
diaspora and who were the people prepared to
support him.However, one knows that there
are elements in the diaspora who continue to
hope that the LTTE will rise again like
Phoenix and resume the march to the goal of
an independent Eelam. Probably, some of them
rallied round him.
9. The Sri Lankan
Government was interested in getting him
even before KP started this move for a neo-LTTE.
The Sri Lankan agencies' campaign against
the LTTE was not over with its defeat and
the decimation of most of its leadership. A
lot of work still remains to be done like
identifying its supporters in the diaspora
and its secret bank accounts abroad and
getting them frozen, identifying the various
arms smuggling channels exploited by it and
determining how the LTTE succeeded in
smuggling the clandestinely procured
weaponry, including the aircraft, into Tamil
territory without being detected by the
intelligence agencies of different
countries, including India and Sri Lanka.
10. There is a
need for a total and painstaking
reconstruction of how the LTTE operated
abroad and how it was able to acquire the
position it did. Such a reconstruction would
not be possible without a thorough
interrogation of KP. The Sri Lankan
authorities, therefore, mounted a diplomatic
drive for getting hold of KP. This drive was
focused on South-East Asia. Their drive
ultimately succeeded and the Malaysian
authorities reportedly picked him up and
handed him over to Sri Lanka.
11. His thorough
interrogation would be necessary not only
for finding out about the past, but also for
finding out about the future plans of the
die-hard elements in the diaspora.
12. The
Government of India should be interested in
interrogating him in connection with the
assassination of Rajiv Gandhi in May,1991,
and the attempted gun-running by the LTTE
from Pakistan in 1993 in an LTTE ship in
which Kittu was travelling. When an Indian
Coast Guard ship intercepted it, the crew
set fire to the ship,which went down. Kittu
and some others chose to go down with the
ship. Some others tried to escape and were
arrested. The full story of this incident of
gun-running by the LTTE from Pakistan is
not yet known. KP may also know about any
arms procurement cell of the LTTE still
present in South India, but dormant.
(The writer is Additional Secretary (retd),Cabinet
Secretariat, Govt. of India, New Delhi,
and,presently, Director, Institute For
Topical Studies, Chennai. E-mail:
seventyone2@gmail.com)