PAKISTAN-UNITED STATES STRATEGIC DENOUEMENT:
INDIA’S POLICY OPTIONS
By Dr. Subhash Kapila
Introductory Observations
India’s foreign policy options on Pakistan
and the fundamental flaws in the premises of
India’s foreign policy imposed at the
highest levels of foreign policy formulation
and decision-making were once again on full
display during the Foreign Ministers Meeting
in the last week of July 2011 in New Delhi.
In the bleak political landscape that
dominates Pakistan-India Peace Dialogues for
the last six decades, Indian media and its
strategic community went overboard in
terming the July Meeting as a new spring in
Pakistan-India relations and some described
it as a new beginning. It was neither, as
the current Foreign Ministers Meeting in New
Delhi was nothing more than a repeat of past
performances. Nothing substantial was
achieved with the focus more on the
attractive personality of the first woman
Foreign Minister of Pakistan and her
sartorial preferences. This was to be
expected in the absence of any substantial
headway being ever made in such Peace
Dialogues in the last two decades.
Pakistan and India ‘manufacture’ these
spasmodic Peace Dialogues to continue in the
good books of the United States for their
own respective reasons. The United States
too has had a vested interest in these
manufactured dialogues as long as it served
US national security interests vis-à-vis
Pakistan.
Hopefully with Pakistan now virtually in
jettisoning its strategic partnership with
the United States, new dynamics could
overtake the fundamental premises of
India-Pakistan Peace Dialogues.
Notwithstanding that India needs to dispense
with its present unrealistic policy premises
that impel it to seek Peace Dialogues with
Pakistan.
In January 2011 in my Paper entitled “
Pakistan’s Abysmal Decline: India’s Policy
Options (SAAG Paper No. 4286 dated 20
January 2011, ) I had outlined four policy
options for India and recommended the last
policy option, Option IV as “Disengagement:
Ignore Pakistan, Maintaining Only Minimal
Diplomatic Relations” as the most preferred
option contextually.
India’s foreign policy towards Pakistan
since 2004 stands characterized by two
striking features. The first one was that
India’s foreign policy on Pakistan stood
outsourced to the United States where
India’s national security interests stood
subordinated to United States predilections
to pander to the strategic sensitivities of
the Pakistan Army on Kashmir and India’s
legitimate strategic interests in
Afghanistan.
The second characteristic of India’s foreign
policy on Pakistan was heavily dominated by
the Indian Prime Minister’s personal
obsession with the policy preference of
peace at any cost with Pakistan,
irrespective of its negative impact on
India’s national security interests and
Indian security. In pursuance of this
objective he seems to have been supported by
India’s National Security Adviser right from
Havana, to Sharm al Shaikh and Thimpu.
Both of these luminaries stood severely
disconnected from prevailing Indian public
opinion as were the liberalist glitterati
that adorns South Delhi drawing rooms and
were active advocates of the establishment’s
policy formulations on Pakistan.
However since January 2011 when my last
Paper on India’s policy options on Pakistan
was published and August 2011 the political
and security environment in South Asia and
more importantly within Pakistan itself has
changed drastically.
Pakistan’s abysmal decline continues to be a
constant but with the overall strategic and
political environment in South Asia making a
nose-dive with the strategic denouement in
Pakistan-United States strategic partnership
becoming frayed and untenable.
United States and Pakistan in mid-2011 can
be said to be in a Cold War with each other
with each passing day throwing new
irritants. Despite the rhetoric, the harsh
reality today is that the United States is
in no position to retrieve Pakistan from its
inevitable implosion.
Significantly, for the first time in the
history of United States-Pakistan relations
the Pakistan Army is in an openly
adversarial mode and resentful of the United
States and to this trend when it is added
that the surrogates of the Pakistan Army are
Jihadi terrorist groups, the end message is
ominous for both the United States and
India.
Since India’s foreign policy on Pakistan was
strongly predicated on United States
strategic interests in Pakistan and with the
United States itself now engaged in a
painful reappraisal of its policy
formulations on Pakistan after the events of
May 2011, it becomes imperative for India to
recast its policy approaches on Pakistan.
India’s political leadership need no longer
be weighed down by erstwhile United States
policy perspectives on Pakistan but now
recast its Pakistan formulations strictly
based on India’s national security
interests.
Once again one even at the cost of
repetition from earlier Papers some critical
and essential points need to be
re-emphasized as India rightfully
reappraises the premises of its own Pakistan
policy formulations.
This Paper would like to examine the
following aspects in this direction:
• Peace with Pakistan Politically
Desirable But Strategically Impossible
• Pakistan’s Major Impediments on
Peace with India: Pakistan Army-ISI-Jihadi
Outfits
• Indian For eign Policy
Establishment Needs to Learn Lessons from
United States Policy Experiences on Pakistan
• Pakistan’s Changed Foreign Policy
Preferences Following Pakistan-United States
Strategic Denouement
• India’s Foreign Policy on
Pakistan: Imperatives for Revision of
Perspectives and Course Corrections
Peace
With Pakistan Politically Desirable But
Strategically Impossible
Peace with Pakistan is an eminently
desirable political objective and has been
relentlessly pursued by India for years
without any visible progress. The same
cannot be said of Pakistan’s intentions and
motives.
The major reason besides others is that
India’s and Pakistan’s narratives on
peaceful relations between the two are
opposing and contradictory. India’s pursuit
of peace with Pakistan is a political
objective based on the presumption that
Pakistan is a “Normal State” and therefore
peace with Pakistan is achievable with
patient and sustained dialogue engagement.
Pakistan’s narrative for peace with India is
primarily determined by strategic objectives
right across the board ranging from Kashmir
to Siachin. Every issue is weighed by
Pakistan in terms of strategic losses and
gains and its policy establishment’s
compulsive obsession that Pakistan is a
strategic co-equal of India.
While space exists in pursuance of political
objectives for mutual concessions, no space
is available for negotiating concessions
when Pakistan’s objectives in Peace
Dialogues with India are determined by
strategic objectives.
The very contentious issues that Pakistan
raises as disputes in Peace Dialogues are
strategic for India too and no Indian
Government can politically afford to
compromise on them. On strategic issues
Indian public opinion is very sensitive and
no Indian Government can be in a state of
“severe disconnect” from Indian public
opinion.
More fundamentally, how can Peace Dialogues
between Pakistan and India move successfully
when the strategic aims of the Pakistan Army
which controls Pakistan’s policy approaches
towards India are militarily aimed at
downsizing India by asymmetric warfare in
Kashmir and Pakistan Army surrogates
terrorists attacks enveloping Heartland
India. If that was not enough Pakistan
Army’s overdrive to expand its nuclear
weapons arsenal to outstrip India are not
indicators of a ‘Normal State” .
Pakistani Foreign Ministers when they come
for Peace Dialogues with India do not come
with mandates of the Pakistani President or
their Prime Minister. They come with the
heavy baggage of the dictates of a
historically virulent Anti-Indian Pakistan
Army. Peace with India nowhere figures in
the strategic vision of the Pakistan Army.
Pakistan’s Major Impediments on Peace with
India: Pakistan Army-ISI-Jihadi Outfits
Pakistan constantly propagates a myth which
the Indian policy establishment gulps down
without questioning and that is that
Pakistan-India Peace Dialogues are disrupted
by non-state actors indulging in terrorists
attacks against India.
Further Pakistan and some
Pakistan-apologists within India indulge in
a constant refrain that the India-Pakistan
Peace Process should not be interrupted by
such attacks and made non-interruptible.
Pray may one ask as to whom within Pakistan,
choreographs, finances, facilitates and
provides logistics backing to such non-state
actors in their terrorist attacks and
bombings in India in a well calibrated
campaign. The answer is obvious but yet
overlooked by the Indian policy
establishment by stopping short of naming
the real culprits.
The culprits and major impediments which
forestall any India-Pakistan Peace Process
arise from the unholy trinity of the
Pakistan Army-ISI-Jihadi Outfits set up by
the Pakistan Army and patronized by them as
an instrument of asymmetric warfare against
India and also an instrument of state
policy
Unless the people of Pakistan gather the
will to smash this unholy trinity and shake
off the stranglehold of the Pakistan Army
over Pakistan’s foreign policy, peace
between India and Pakistan is neither
politically or strategically impossible.
Indian Foreign Policy Establishment Needs to
Learn Lessons from United States Policy
Experiences on Pakistan
United States policy experiences on Pakistan
contextually available currently should
aptly illuminate the minds and thinking of
India’s political leaders and policy
establishment.
Whether the United States admits or not but
the fact is that the following lessons
emerge from the United States policy
experiences on Pakistan:
• The Pakistan Army which solely
determinates Pakistan’s foreign and
strategic policies is not a reliable entity
in terms of external pledges and
commitments.
• Pakistan Army Chiefs from General
Zia to General Musharraf and now General
Kayani reneged on strategic pledges made to
the United States.
• Pakistan Army’s military
adventurism propensities ere not confined to
India only. It extended to Afghanistan and
against United States Forces in
Afghanistan.
Since 2007 the United States has attempted
to shore up the civilian government in
Pakistan. President Zardari’s attempts to
normalize relations with India with US
blessings stand neutralized by the Pakistan
Army.
Pakistan as a nation-state under the grip of
the Pakistan Army is not a trustworthy
political entity for substantive peace
talks. The repetitive resumption of Peace
Dialogues between Pakistan and India were so
far choreographed by the Pakistan Army to
create impact in Washington and not for any
substantive gains on peace in South Asia.
With the United States now remaining a faint
blip on Pakistan Army’s radar it is open to
question whether the Pakistan Army would
have now even the faintest of urges for
peace with India.
Further, if the Pakistan Army could not
prove itself as a loyal and trustworthy
entity for the United States on whose
munificence the Pakistan Army depended for
its lifelines, how can the Pakistan Army be
expected to remove the trust-deficit in
Pakistan-India relations?
Pakistan’s Changed Policy Preferences
Following United States-Pakistan Strategic
Denouement
Pakistan since 2007 and with General Kayani
firing strategic broadsides against both the
United States and India put both nations on
notice that both relationships were
henceforth going to be churned up by the
Pakistan Army.
The United States was blinded in not taking
due notice due to its dependency of
logistics compulsions of its Afghanistan
operations on Pakistan. India with no such
compulsions reflexively continued to
outsource its Pakistan policy to Washington
and the Indian Prime Minister’s personal
obsession with peace at any cost with
Pakistan.
Both India and the United States stood
checkmated by Pakistan from2007 to 2011. It
is now only that the United States has woken
up to the emerging realities while the
Indian policy establishment is still in the
erstwhile stupor induced by the United
States in terms of India’s Pakistan policy
formulations.
Pakistan policy establishment from 2007 has
cashed on its strategic nexus with China
both as a pressure point against the United
States by playing the China Card and
requesting China to put military pressures
on India so that its military diversion of
troops from Pakistan’s Eastern borders to
Afghan border does not militarily imbalance
Pakistan.
When the dots are joined, this policy from
2007 onwards become apparent with China
ratcheting up pressures on Arunachal Pradesh
as Southern Tibet, increased incursions in
the Ladakh Sector, and move of Chinese
Troops into Pakistan Occupied Kashmir under
the guise of construction teams.
Pakistan had made its strategic preferences
clear that when cornered strategically it
would opt for China even against the United
States. This was being forewarned in my
Papers of the period.
Post-Abbottabad military operations by the
United States, Pakistan was clear that it
now stood fully cornered by the United
States, and it therefore went into an
overdrive with its leaders and military
hierarchy making a beeline for Beijing,
Kabul, Teheran, Ankara and Riyadh.
Pakistan in pursuance of its changed policy
preferences is now in the process of
crafting an Iran-Pakistan-Afghanistan
Strategic Triangle and a China-Iran Pakistan
Strategic Triangle.
Both these changed policy preferences of
Pakistan’s foreign policy have in attendance
significant strategic implications for India
and need to be seriously evaluated by
India’s policy establishment.
India’s policy prism on Pakistan can no
longer be confined to a bilateral context.
India’s Pakistan Policy and the premises
prompting Peace Dialogues with Pakistan have
now acquired wider context and with the
exception of China, it seems that Pakistan
is now adding a Pan-Islamic context to its
policy stances against India and the United
States.
India’s Foreign Policy on Pakistan:
Imperatives for Revision of Perspectives and
Course Corrections
India’s foreign policy on Pakistan must
revise its perspectives on Pakistan as per
the emerging strategic realities in August
2011 and these are:
• United States capabilities to
influence Pakistan’s foreign policy through
its leverages over the Pakistan Army stand
severely curtailed after May 2011 and future
perspectives do not suggest that the
situation can be retrieved by the United
States in its favor.
• The spin-off from the above is
that India can no longer expect the United
States to exercise restraining influences on
the Pakistan Army to curb its proxy war and
terrorism against India which was one policy
expectation that the present Government
banked heavily upon.
• Pakistan’s revised foreign policy
preferences indicate a staking out of new
strategic turf which by its nature is more
adversarial to the United States.
• Pakistan’s new strategic turf in
foreign policy preference offers no space
for its new strategic partners to exercise
strategic restraint against India which was
erstwhile being exercised by the United
States’
All of the above factors negate the
long-held premises of India’s foreign policy
formulations on Pakistan.
Referring back to the Options I to Options
IV of my Paper referred above, Option I of
‘Persisting in Continuation of United States
Template” currently gets ruled out
conclusively. Option II of “Adopt the
Intellectuals Advisory of Pakistan
Appeasement at Any Cost” which was a
corollary of the above fostered by the
United States within India also currently
becomes irrelevant when the United States
itself is absorbed in redefining US
relationship with Pakistan necessitated by
the widening ‘trust-deficit’ with Pakistan
and Pakistan’s new foreign policy
preferences to offset its strategic
cornering by the United States.
However the situation is not all that
gloomy for the Indian policy establishment
in terms of future options and
course-corrections provided it reads the tea
leaves correctly in terms of emerging
perspectives on Pakistan and as a prelude
dispensing with its existing mindsets on
peace with Pakistan at any cost.
Pakistan cornered strategically by the
United States and forging new strategic
partnerships as an alternative would be
plagued by strategic uncertainties till such
time its new relationships concretize.
Rightfully, Pakistan at the same time should
be revaluating the contentious strategic
content of its policy formulations on India
bereft of the United States prop and US
pressures on India.
Rightfully, in view of contextual strategic
circumstances the Indian policy
establishment should expect and let it be
known to Pakistan in subtle political
signaling that it has to transform its
approaches to India to one of greater
amenability by shedding or softening the
strategic content of its India policy
objectives to one of political and economic
content.
Till such time strategic realities dawn on
the Pakistan policy establishment that peace
in South Asia is not a one way street and
that Pakistan Army has no alternative but to
tango with India for peace in South Asia,
Options III and IV stated in my Paper
referred above remain as the only viable
policy options for the Indian policy
establishment.
Option III “Subsidize and Assist in Economic
Development of Pakistan and Promotion of
Democracy” a factor ignored by the Pakistan
Army, remains relevant and irrefutable. This
course correction is rightfully aimed at
winning the hearts and minds of the
Pakistani masses and especially the 30%
young generation.
Option IV “Disengage and Ignore Pakistan,
Maintaining Only Minimal Diplomatic
Relations” is not aimed at the Pakistani
public for whom all Indians wish well. This
course correction is aimed at the Pakistan
Army and its supporting establishment that
peace with India is only possible when the
Pakistan Army sheds its grip on Pakistan’s
foreign policy and governance and thereby
allowing Pakistan to emerge as a “Normal
State”.
It needs to be emphasized that “Ignore
Pakistan” does not imply ignoring the
Pakistani peoples but ‘Ignore the Pakistan
Army’ and hoping in the process that
Pakistani peoples themselves realize that
for Pakistan to emerge as a “Normal State” a
mass movement would be required to force the
Pakistan Army to revert to the barracks,
submit to civilian political control and the
evolving of democracy in its purest
connotations in Pakistan.
The Indian Prime Minister was quoted as
stating some time back that “If I can
succeed in normalizing relations between
India and Pakistan, as they should prevail
between two normal states, I would consider
my job well done”.
Well said Mr. Prime Minister but the biggest
flaw in India’s policy making is that it
assumes that Pakistan is a “Normal State”.
Pakistan is not a “Normal State” and the
Indian policy establishment has remained
blind to this reality in the pursuit of
outsourcing its Pakistan policy to
Washington.
Hence the validity of Options III and IV
stand and should be adopted as valid course
corrections till such time the Pakistani
peoples reclaim Pakistan and transform it
into a “Normal State”.
Concluding Observations
“Peace with the Pakistani Peoples” is a
noble political objective for India to
pursue in terms of good neighborliness.
However, the Indian policy establishment
should not fudge this precept by resorting
to its current fixations with “Peace With
Pakistan”, implicit in which is indirectly
pandering to Pakistan Army’s hold over
Pakistan’s India policy.
India’s Prime Minister has on many occasions helplessly remarked on Pakistan that
India cannot choose its geographical neighbors and that India has to deal with
whomsoever is in power in Pakistan. This is
a feeble response. India as the predominant
Power in South Asia may not be able to
choose its neighbors but as a powerful
country it can chose when and with whom in
Pakistan it needs to deal with in Pakistan’s
prevailing power structure.
Many times in my past Papers I have stressed
that “Pakistan’s Democracy is a Strategic
Imperative for India” and this is
irrefutable. India has the political and
strategic endurance to await the return of
purist democracy in Pakistan and then only
engage Pakistan in Peace Dialogues.
“India is not a Strategic Co-Equal” of
Pakistan and that is what India’s
successive Prime Ministers and the Indian
policy establishment never ever have
emphasized to the Pakistani interlocutors
whether in formal Peace Dialogues or the
innumerable futile Multi-Track parleys
pursued behind closed doors or openly in
foreign capitals.
Indian policy reluctance on this account has
prompted Pakistan to box much above its
weight against India. Part of this Pakistani
boxing much above its weight was due to
United States propping the Pakistan Army.
With that ballast gone or going, it becomes
incumbent on India’s political leaders and
its policy establishment to moor its
Pakistan policy to more realistic strategic
parameters that are emerging.
The United States itself has now called upon
India to play a larger powerful role in
Asian stability and security which has drawn
howls of protests from the Pakistani
establishment. This United States political
signaling in direct contradiction to the
Pakistani establishment’s oversized
strategic ambitions in South Asia should
serve as a stimulant to India’s foreign
policy establishment and decision-makers to
carry out course corrections in India’s
Pakistan policy.
(The author is an International Relations
and Strategic Affairs analyst. He is
Consultant, Strategic Affairs with South
Asia Analysis Group. Email:
drsubhashkapila.007@gmail.com)