UNITED STATES TIME TO BE HONEST IN SOUTH ASIA

South Asia Analysis Group

Paper no. 680

05. 05. 2003

UNITED STATES TIME TO BE HONEST IN SOUTH ASIA

by Dr Subhash Kapila

In South Asia, peace and stability have been elusive for the last fifty-six years because the United States has been less than honest in its policy attitudes and policy formulations towards the region. United States policies or lack of policies and permissiveness of tolerating Pakistan’s strategic delinquencies have led to the emergence of a “spoiler state” notable for its Islamic Jehadi instincts and Weapons of Mass Destruction (WMD). In the process an artificial ‘balance of power’ has been sought to be created in South Asia, matching and creating a state fraction of the size of the India to challenge the natural pre-eminence of a rising power.

In the aftermath of 9/11, while the United States may have learnt a lot of lessons in terms of dealing with the scourge of terrorism and WMDs in hands of politically unstable Islamic regimes, it has not honestly applied the same yardsticks to its strategic protégé in South Asia, namely Pakistan.

The Far Eastern Economic Review has very creditably captured this American characteristic in its editorial in the May 1,2003 issue. It has stated:

“ The longer the United States now abstains from imposing pressure on Islamabad, the greater it subjects to question its own campaign against terrorism.”

More tellingly, it further states:

“It may be time Washington became honest and held Pakistan to the promise it made last year. Then may be we can expect the first real step towards peace in the sub-continent.”

Giving full credit to the Far Eastern Economic Review, this paper would attempt to expand and analyse the imperatives of: “United States Time to be Honest in South Asia”

The United States and the Bush Administration in particular through the pronouncements of its leading officials in the State Department and the Pentagon have vociferously tried to build up a case that peace and stability in South Asia is threatened as a result of WMDs in South Asia with the two protagonists and their propensity for conflict arising from the Kashmir issue and the proxy war there in progress.

The United States and its leading officials are being less than honest when through their insensitive pronouncements they try to equate India and Pakistan or absolve Pakistan on the three issues of: (1) WMDs (2) Terrorism and (3) Kashmir issue.

United States attitudes as outlined above have generated very strong reactions in India. Indians are incensed that the United States adopts partisan attitudes on South Asia permitting Pakistan to get away with mayhem, while preaching restraint to India. The Nadimarg massacre is the most recent example. The Indian Government is hard pressed to explain to the Indian public as to why it exercises restraint when the United States itself took preemptive actions in Iraq. All this can be gleaned in the recent reporting and analyses in the Indian media.

It may therefore be timely and appropriate to examine how honest the United States has been on the three issues stated above on which it has now launched a propaganda and psychological war.

Weapons of Mass Destruction (WMDs) in South Asia and the United States Record: Like elsewhere in the world, the United States first generates conflict or is permissive to its evolution in a region and then makes a “big-do” to project its concerns at conflict prevention or conflict resolution. South Asia’s emergence as a WMD dominated region is a direct result of United States policies or lack of policies.

WMDs now form a major arsenal of an unstable, failed state and Islamic fundamentalist state like Pakistan due to the following American policies:

* Militarisation and over-militarisation of Pakistan was stimulated with billion dollar arms aid packages at frequent intervals. This as a ‘quid-pro-quo’ for Pakistan’s servicing of US strategic needs.

* Nuclear weaponisation of Pakistan by China was given a wink by the United States for two reasons (1) quid-pro-quo to Pakistan for launching Islamic Jehad against Russians in Afghanistan and (2) China was not restrained from nuclear proliferation in South Asia due to US strategic and economic stakes in China.

* Nuclear weaponisation of Pakistan was tolerated and an apathetic attitude adopted by USA for nearly a decade. The Pressler Amendment came much later.

* Missile arsenal of Pakistan was allowed to be built up by China and North Korea by United States permissiveness. CIA’s credible reports and Congressional testimonies were dismissed by US Administrations on grounds of “inadequate substantiations”!

One is tempted to question the United State’s motives as to why it facilitated emergence of Pakistan’s WMD arsenal fully conscious of Pakistan’s political instabilities, a fact which no Indian leader or analyst has questioned so far.

The following factors need to be considered:

* Pakistan’s WMD arsenal does not serve the United States national interests or strategic interests in South Asia’s contiguous regions of strategic interest to the United States.

* Pakistani WMD arsenal is not sustainable without sizeable financial infusions by USA in economic aid to fill the void created by diversion of Pak funds to WMD buildup.

The answer is obvious: Pakistan’s WMD arsenal is useful to USA for the following reasons:

* Playing ‘balance of power’ politics in South Asia against India.

* Confers on USA a strategic pressure point against India.

* Use the Pak WMD as a pretext to blow up the “nuclear flashpoint” myth in South Asia and thereby indirectly attempt to arrest India’s growth of its strategic assets particularly ICBMs and SLBMs.

The operation of all these factors in United States policies are discernible today. The United States is not being honest in this context when it seeks to equate Pakistan’s WMD capabilities with those of India for the following reasons:

* India has been a politically stable entity and the only functioning democracy in South Asia for the last 56 years. Proper system of checks and balances exists including civilian control of WMD arsenal.

* Pakistan exists as an over-militarised state with the WMD arsenal in the grip of the Pakistan Army. Political instability is endemic and now has added dosage of Islamic fundamentalism trends.

* Propensity for conflicts, cross-border terrorism and proxy wars against India are the dominant characteristics of the Pakistani state.

* Nuclear blackmail in South Asia, both explicit and implicit, has been aired by Pakistan.

* Pakistan has publicly adhered that it will not subscribe to any ‘No First Use’ nuclear doctrine. It follows the “first-strike” option, thereby contributing to the “nuclear flashpoint” syndrome in South Asia.

The United States is not being honest when it hysterically blows up the ‘nuclear flashpoint’ angle in South Asia as evident in the last few days by a host of top US Administration officials.

Honestly, speaking, the United States in terms of a ‘nuclear flashpoint’ and WMD arsenals in South Asia must address its concerns towards Pakistan and not India nor try to equate India with Pakistan on this score.

Global War on Terrorism-United States Double Standards: The Far Eastern Economic Review editorial referred earlier needs to be quoted in more detail to substantiate the double standards being followed by the United States:

“ The longer the US now abstains from imposing pressure on Islamabad the greater it subjects to question its own campaign against terror. Why, many ask, must India quietly suffer danger to its own people in Kashmir when the United States insists on its right to take pre-emptive measures against attacks on its own people.”

The United States is being less than honest with India when it tries to convince India that it should exercise restraint on the plea that it is doing all it can to pressurise the Pakistani General to end his proxy war and terrorism against India.

The United States, if it is to be honestly serious on the issues of eradicating terrorism from South Asia, would require very little effort. It only requires the political will to spell out forcefully to Pakistan, that:

* United States equates 9/11 and Al Qaeda terrorism with the Pakistan-sponsored or Pakistan-facilitated terrorism against India in Kashmir; and therefore Pakistan if it does not desist would merit the same US military responses.

* United States does not recognize the Pakistan-sponsored terrorism in Kashmir as a part of some freedom struggle.

* United States gives a deadline to Pakistan, to hand over to India, all those terrorists in whose case lists stand provided by India.

The United States does not cut much ice with its frequent pronouncements that it is applying tremendous pressure on General Musharraf to eliminate Islamic Jehadi terrorism against India. The outgoing US Ambassador Robert Blackwill was the only US official honest in condemning Pakistan on this count and he has paid the price by opting out of the United States official machinery, which seems to follow different standards.

One is again tempted to put the following questions to the United States:

* How is that Pakistan at well-calculated frequent intervals hands over selectively one or two prominent Al Qaeda terrorists to USA?

* How is that Pakistan is unable to act with the same alacrity and ignores India’s requests to hand over terrorists and those involved in the Bombay blasts cases?

*USA would be well-informed about the presence, location and activities of the above in Pakistan by the large number of US FBI teams operating in Pakistan. How is it that USA is silent on this issue?

If the United States cannot deal with Pakistan firmly on the India related terrorism issues then not only does it display double standards but also forfeits the right to advise restraint to India. In Indian perceptions, such lack of US policies and actions, tantamount to allowing Pakistan a “safe sanctuary” in South Asia to pursue its Islamic Jehadi terrorism with impunity.

The Kashmir Issue and the Less Than Honest Record of the United States: The United States has been less than honest in its policy attitudes and policy pronouncements on Kashmir. The major reason being that the United States fluctuations get linked up to US strategic interests at a particular moment in time and Pakistan’s propensity to be a US hand-maiden to service those American interests.

Over the years, the United States has attempted to pressurise India on the Kashmir issue in the guise of disputing the Accession, followed by rights to self-determination, then as a human rights issue and now as a nuclear flashpoint.

The above aspects stand covered voluminously in books and analyses in the last56 years. What emerges forcefully today in a retrospective analysis is that the United States along with Britain has used the Kashmir issue as a strategic pressure point to brow-beat India and favour Pakistan.

This author would like to put a very simple question to the United States and that is how does Kashmir being a part of India (legal position) adversely affect the national interests and strategic interests of the United States in South Asia, the Indian Ocean Region or in West Asia? If it does not then why all the American fuss? If no cogent answers are forthcoming then it substantiates the assertion that Kashmir is a handy strategic pressure point available to USA for use against India.

To be honest in South Asia and to being peace in South Asia, the United States should officially assert or re-assert, that:

* Kashmir is a bi-lateral issue to be solved by India and Pakistan under the Simla Agreement 1972.

* United States intends to steer clear on Kashmir and will neither mediate nor facilitate its internationalization as sought by Pakistan.

* In US perceptions Kashmir as a pre-condition for any India-Pakistan dialogue is not sustainable and hence irrelevant.

United States Policy Problems in South Asia-Facing the Truth: United States problems in South Asia arise from its predilections in not facing the realities in the region in a bid to molly-coddle its strategic protégé i.e. Pakistan.

The United States needs to face squarely the following strategic home-truths in South Asia:

* Strategic asymmetry in South Asia between India and Pakistan is a hard reality. Both USA and Pakistan need to recognize it and adapt to it.

* South Asian peace and stability cannot be brought about by creating an “artificial balance of power” by building up Pakistan as a counter-weight.

* Nuclear war, if ever, in South Asia, can only be initiated by Pakistan. USA should therefore address its concerns on Pakistan.

* India cannot be “cut-down” to the size of Pakistan, strategically, under the guise of concerns based on WMDs, terrorism, or Kashmir issue.

* USA has to concede “strategic space” in South Asia to India as the naturally pre-eminent power in the region and an emerging global player to manage South Asian security.

Conclusions: The United States, so far, has been less than honest with India in South Asian affairs. It finds it easier and comfortable to get along with Pakistani military dictators than a vibrant Asian democracy like India.

The United States to be honest and to preserve its long term strategic interests in South Asia should move away from building up Pakistan as the ‘regional spoiler state’. Pakistan’s utility for USA as a pawn for a strategic pressure point against India, is fast eroding.

United States, to be honest, must appreciate and recognize that the ‘fulcrum’ or ‘centre of gravity’ in South Asia lies in India. If this reality is recognized then automatically United States policies in South Asia will stand naturally corrected and also force US Administration and their officials away from their ‘insensitivities’ and ‘insensitive pronouncements’ on India.

Honestly, there-in only lies and revolves the hopes and aspirations of both the United States and India to build up a long-term constructive partnership without the carping and cribbing on both sides.

(The author is an International Relations and Strategic Affairs analyst. He is the Consultant, Strategic Affairs with South Asia Analysis Group. Email <drsubhashkapila @yahoo.com>)

Back to the top

Copyright © South Asia Analysis Group
All rights reserved. Permission is given to refer this on-line document for use in research papers and articles, provided the source and the author's name are acknowledged. Copies may not be duplicated for commercial purposes.